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Introduction
Reading against Mastery
Everywhere I see the battle for mastery that rages between classes, peoples, etc., re-
producing itself on an individual scale. Is the system flawless? Impossible to bypass? 
On the basis of my desire, I imagine that other desires like mine exist. If my desire is 
possible, it means the system is already letting something else through.
—Hélène Cixous, Sorties (1986)
What different modalities of the human come to light if we do not take the liberal 
humanist figure of Man as the master- subject but focus on how humanity has been 
imagined and lived by those subjects excluded from this domain?
—Alexander Weheliye, Habeas Viscus (2014)
“Mastery,” Hélène Cixous laments, is “everywhere.” In our world, “the battle 
for mastery . . . rages between classes, peoples, etc., reproducing itself on an 
individual scale” (1986, 78). Ubiquitous, reproductive, and beyond enumer-
ation, mastery appears inescapable. And yet, Cixous declares, the very exis-
tence of her desire to live beyond mastery suggests that others too might 
share this desire. What she learns from her desire is that resistant collectiv-
ities are in reach, that in fact a seemingly impenetrable “system” of mastery 
has already been breached. Through my solidarity with Cixous’s desire and 
through my own desire for forms of what I call dehumanist solidarity, this 
book reaches toward other modes of relational being that may not yet be 
recognizable.
Precisely because mastery is “everywhere,” mine is an impossible project 
whose impossibility is what has made it inescapable for me. I attempt to 
unfold mastery rather than to foreclose it, and to dwell on its emergence 
where it is least expected. Rather than to define mastery (and in so doing to 
reproduce it), I aim across these pages to trace some of mastery’s qualities, 
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drives, corollaries, and repetitions across two crucially entangled moments 
of decolonization: the anticolonial and the postcolonial. Unthinking Mas-
tery is a summons to postcolonial studies and its interlocutors to attend 
to the persistence of mastery at the foundations of the field. I argue that 
mastery’s obdurate presence necessarily affects how scholars within and 
beyond the postcolonial project envision their intellectual pursuits today. 
More expansively, it is an appeal to begin not simply to repudiate practices 
of mastery but, to borrow from Donna Haraway (2016), to “stay with the 
trouble” that is produced through attention to where, how, between whom, 
and toward what futures mastery is engaged. In this sense, I am interested 
in mastery not as something to be overcome but rather as an inheritance 
that we might (yet) survive.
Across anticolonial discourse the mastery of the colonizer over the colo-
nies was a practice that was explicitly disavowed, and yet, in their efforts 
to decolonize, anticolonial thinkers in turn advocated practices of mas-
tery—corporeal, linguistic, and intellectual—toward their own liberation. 
Within anticolonial movements, practices of countermastery were aimed 
explicitly at defeating colonial mastery, in effect pitting mastery against 
mastery toward the production of thoroughly decolonized subjectivities. 
For thinkers as diverse as Mohandas K. Gandhi and Frantz Fanon—key 
players in the first two chapters of this book—decolonization was an act 
of undoing colonial mastery by producing new masterful subjects. I argue 
that this discourse of anticolonialism, which was geared toward the future, 
did not interrogate thoroughly enough its own masterful engagements. 
It did not dwell enough, in other words, on how its complex entangle-
ments with mastery would come to resonate in the postcolonial future it so 
passionately anticipated. Precisely because mastery served as a motive for 
revolutionary action and as an antidote for colonial domination, it is a vital 
site from which to analyze the work of mastery in “globalized” life today. 
Through discourses of decolonization that have sought to undo the dynam-
ics of colonial mastery, we can begin to understand how pervasive and in-
timately ingrained mastery is in the fabric of modern thought, subjectivity, 
and politics. The task of this book is to begin—simply to begin—to trace 
some of the desires and aims of mastery across decolonization movements 
of the twentieth century through the intimately sutured discourses of anti-
colonialism and postcolonialism. My desire is to engage with revolutionary 
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and literary texts in ways that can reorient our masterful pursuits, ones that 
characterize global relations and continue to threaten our survival. The 
outright repudiations and reinscriptions of mastery across anticolonial and 
postcolonial discourses are vital places from which we can begin to address 
how drives toward mastery inform and underlie the major crises of our 
times—acts of intrahuman violence across the globe, the radical disparities 
in resources and rights between the Global North and Global South, innu-
merable forms of human and nonhuman extinction, and escalating threats 
of ecological disaster.
For anticolonial thinkers, engaging the logic of mastery that had long 
since governed over the colonies was critical to restoring a full sense of 
humanity to the colonized subject, to building a thoroughly decolonized 
postcolonial nation- state, and to envisioning less coercive futures among 
human collectivities. In the anticolonial moment, mastery largely assumed 
a Hegelian form in which anticolonial actors were working through a desire 
or demand for recognition by another. The mastery at work in this project 
was one whose political resonance resided in national sovereignty and the 
legal principle of self- determination, one that approached the dismantling 
of mastery through an inverted binary that aimed to defeat colonial mas-
tery through other masterful forms. In postcolonial studies—which takes 
a decisively cultural turn in its attention to colonialism’s lasting legacies—
these Hegelian valences continue to dwell in articulations of mastery. The 
postcolonial literary texts to which I turn midway through this book repre-
sent mastery through an oscillation between the dialectical Hegelian mode 
and a deconstructive one. While these texts rehearse recognizably master-
ful forms of relation and practice, they also urge us—through their messy 
narrative play—toward mastery’s undoing. Through my close attention to 
the possibilities entangled in the complexities of decolonial discourses both 
political and literary, I identify, in the company of Cixous, “something else” 
being let through the abiding and proliferating force of mastery. Within 
these discourses, these modes of articulation that often (as we shall see) 
betray themselves, we can begin to imagine—even to feel, and in feeling 
be transformed by—what Alexander Weheliye calls other possible “modal-
ities of the human” (2014, 8). Weheliye turns us, through his black studies 
critique of the racial blinders of biopolitics, toward a critical engagement 
with the forms of humanity envisioned and practiced by those excluded 
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from the domain of Man as “the master- subject.”1 Alongside Sylvia Wynter, 
he signals “different genres of the human” that require us to attend to the 
always enfleshed alterities of being human (Weheliye 2014, 2– 3).
Dehumanism
I am eager to dwell alongside these other humanities, to explore as well 
how such dwellings might enable us to become exiled from subjectivities 
founded on and through mastery. This is a practice I call dehumanism: a 
practice of recuperation, of stripping away the violent foundations (always 
structural and ideological) of colonial and neocolonial mastery that con-
tinue to render some beings more human than others. Dehumanism re-
quires not an easy repudiation and renunciation of dehumanization but a 
form of radical dwelling in and with dehumanization through the narrative 
excesses and insufficiencies of the “good” human—a cohabitation that acts 
on and through us in order to imagine other forms of political allegiance. 
To read the human otherwise, I draw from the interdisciplinary discourses 
of posthumanism and queer inhumanisms even while my dehumanist aims 
depart in more and less crucial ways from these projects.
Within the broad reach of posthumanism, two intellectual branches are 
essential to Unthinking Mastery. The first takes up questions of the animal, 
including the animality of the human, which will come into sharp focus in 
chapter 4.2 The second falls under the heading of new materialisms, which, 
as I elaborate in chapter 5, emphasizes how matter actively contributes to 
and shapes environments, communities, and politics.3 These trajectories of 
posthumanism insist that “the dominant constructivist orientation to social 
analysis is inadequate for thinking about matter, materiality, and politics in 
ways that do justice to the contemporary context of biopolitics and global 
political economy” (Coole and Frost 2010, 6). They also call attention to 
how humanism is structured by a separation between the ideological fan-
tasies of the human’s unique agency and the disavowed materialities that 
underlie it. While I am drawn to these particular trajectories of posthu-
manism, little attention is paid in its discourses to the specificity of neoco-
lonial relations of power and materiality. Dehumanism, then, aims to bring 
the posthuman into critical conversation with the decolonial.
Posthumanism begins with a querying of the human through its most 
privileged points of departure, generally focusing on the philosophers and 
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techno- scientific innovations that allow us to trouble the category of the 
human as such. Following Wynter’s insistence on the difference between 
the human and Man, we can say that Man has been the subject/object of 
posthumanist inquiry. Departing from posthumanism, queer inhumanisms 
aim to query the human from the position of some of its least privileged 
forms and designations of life.4 Tavia Nyong’o, for instance, calls attention 
to the “continued liberal enchantment” in intellectual discourse with a sub-
ject that remains “transparent,” unmarked by various categories of differ-
ence. He argues that in collusion with this liberalism, “posthumanist theory 
has tended to present the decentering of the human as both salutary and 
largely innocent of history” (2015, 266). Drawing on black studies, Nyong’o 
queries how such subjects can then work to decenter the human while re-
maining committed to the political projects articulated from these posi-
tions of (in)human exclusion. How, in other words, might the project of 
remaking the human happen from its outside?
In the hopeful spirit of queer inhumanisms, dehumanism begins with 
the dehumanized—“humans” and their others—as its critical point of de-
parture. José Esteban Muñoz has summoned us toward the necessary labor 
of “attempting to touch inhumanity” (2015, 209), and Nyong’o insists that 
we pressure history in the making and unmaking of the subject. Indebted 
to queer inhumanism’s ethical reach, I modify the concept of inhumanism, 
which (despite the desires of those committed to its potentialities) loses 
track in its own grammatical formulation of the histories, practices, and 
narratives that make some human and cast others outside its orbit. The 
prefix “in” of inhumanism points to a privation that does not intuitively 
signal the history of the making of nonhuman subjects and forms of being. 
Shifting inhumanism to dehumanism, I move away from a seemingly onto-
logical formulation of Man and its others toward a more pointed formula-
tion that implicates in its very utterance the processes of dehumanization 
through a term that signals clearly the imperial work of making humans 
and worlds. Dehumanism, then, is united with queer inhumanisms as it 
presses us toward an overtly global, imperial critique of the making and 
mapping of Man and its proliferating remnants.
The “de” of dehumanism also and vitally articulates the “de” of de-
construction, crucially foregrounding the particular force of narrative in 
the making and unmaking of subjects, and the “de” of decolonial ethico- 
politics. Dehumanism is driven by the promises of vulnerability with the 
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aim of forming other less masterful subjectivities. As I argue across Un-
thinking Mastery, the act of reading is vital to this process of imagining 
otherwise and dwelling elsewhere, to the relentless exercise of unearthing 
and envisioning new human forms and conceptualizations of agency. Read-
ing becomes not a humanizing process that rehearses the largely anthro-
pocentric discourses of decolonization but a much more radical process 
of opening us to the possibility of becoming ourselves promisingly dehu-
manized. What possibilities live in these other “modalities” of the human? 
What vital hope is (still) lingering in exile when we are ready to open our 
borders? Even to become, ourselves, hopefully dispossessed of mastery?
Locating Mastery
Existing critiques of postcolonial studies have thus far not taken seriously 
enough the position of mastery at its foundations. Since its inception in 
the 1980s, subaltern studies (which holds a foundational role in the more 
diffuse intellectual body known as postcolonial studies) has been taken to 
task from within and by scholars outside its project. A central critique of 
postcolonial studies charges it with being an elitist intellectual fantasy re-
moved from the Realpolitik of capital.5 This critique accuses postcolonial 
theory of a blindness toward or a misrecognition of Marxism and calls for a 
turn from bourgeois nationalism toward a true proletarian nationalism (or 
internationalism). This turn necessarily requires a pruning back of the “ex-
cesses” of poststructuralist approaches to postcolonial history and political 
theory. My concern with this line of critique is that, while it attempts to 
become grounded in the facts of class struggle, it advocates a return to He-
gelian Marxism and implicitly concedes to an ongoing dialectic of “master-
ing mastery.” In effect, it returns us to a formulation of the master and slave 
in which the only way to undo their relation is through an overcoming, a 
mastering of that which masters. This logic of mastery superseding mas-
tery remains continuous across Georg W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx, and, as 
I argue in chapters 1 and 2, resonates in anticolonial thinking through revo-
lutionary figures such as Fanon and Gandhi. Mastery has likewise made 
its way, often unthinkingly, into the discourse of postcolonial studies and 
its critiques. It is the task of this book to signal this inheritance of mastery 
and to illustrate that, by continuing to abide by the formulation of “mas-
tering mastery,” we remain bound to relations founded on and through 
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domination. In so doing, we concede to the inescapability of mastery as a 
way of life.
In contrast to other predominant critiques of the field that take aim at 
the postcolonial project for its treatment of Marxist theory or assail it as a 
bourgeois project riddled by too much intellectual jargon,6 I approach post-
colonial studies with an intimacy and enduring attachment to some of its 
most rudimentary aims: to explore how the cultural politics of colonialism 
remain intact and to trace the entanglements of ideological practice and 
material fact as they signal the legacies of colonialism. My own critique 
of the field returns to the inaugural problematic of mastery in anticolo-
nial discourse in order to attend to its status therein and its legacies there-
after. This is not a gesture of repudiation but an invitation to approach the 
project of postcolonial studies with a new vitality. In complex and often 
unthinking ways, colonial mastery became politically disassociated from 
other masterful acts in anticolonial thought. The continuities among pur-
suits of mastery have, I argue, carried forward unreflexively into postcolo-
nial studies and have crucial consequences for the intellectual project. In 
order simultaneously to tarry with mastery and to unhinge ourselves from 
its hold, I turn toward some of the major voices of anticolonial politics 
before giving sustained attention to readings of postcolonial literary texts. 
These literary texts take up masterful trajectories in thought, language, and 
practice that remain if not extolled then largely ignored and unchallenged 
within the dominant modes of knowledge production today. They com-
plicate claims to goodness, civility, stewardship, and humanitarianism by 
emphasizing subjectivities that are, to quote Talal Asad, “beset with con-
tradictions” (2007, 2). Asad’s aim is to show these contradictions at work 
in relation to suicide bombings, in which the desire to distinguish between 
“morally good” and “evil” forms of killing reveals contradiction as “a fragile 
part of our modern subjectivity” (2). This fragile subjectivity emerges not 
only through extreme claims of good and evil killing but also and critically 
through practices of the quotidian “good” through which debilitating force 
is often concealed. In the second half of this book, when I turn explicitly 
to an exemplary archive of postcolonial literary texts, I aim to show how 
engaging with these texts can open us to finding mastery where it is least 
expected. In order to loosen the hold of mastery, we must learn to read 
for it. If we can do so, these texts, while in no sense offering guidelines for 
proscriptive future politics, ask us to open ourselves to reimagining ways 
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of relating to each other—to others human, nonhuman, and inhuman to 
which (even when disavowed) we are mutually bound.
As with so many of life’s most abiding preoccupations, my interest in 
the status of mastery across anticolonial and postcolonial discourses began 
indirectly, with a discomfort I did not yet understand. While pursuing my 
doctoral degree in comparative literature in the United States, I was seeped 
in anticolonial and postcolonial critique and began to notice the uncrit-
ical reproduction of mastery within texts otherwise overtly critical of its 
colonial forms. In Edward Said’s Orientalism (1979), a foundational work 
in postcolonial studies, he critiqued early Orientalist intellectuals “whose 
unremitting ambition was to master all of a world, not some easily delim-
ited part of it such as an author or a collection of texts” (109). Said insisted 
not on the need to redress mastery altogether but on the need to limit its 
reach, to pursue mastery within reasonable, delineated parts. In turn, from 
those geopolitical regions of the world that have been marginalized by the 
Eurocentricism of intellectual practice, mastery continues to echo as a 
mode of inclusion. Ferial Ghazoul’s vision of a future comparative literary 
practice for the Arab world, for instance, is one in which scholars will be 
“equally at home” in their native and foreign languages. She wishes that 
“a generation of comparatists be inspired who can master several literary 
traditions and speak about each of them with authority. It is only then that 
comparative literature will come into its own as an academic discipline 
that is credible and viable” (2006, 123). I sympathize with Ghazoul’s refusal 
of disciplinary marginalization, with the desire to find oneself “at home” 
within disciplinary knowledge production and within languages intimate 
and once foreign to us. And yet one of the claims of Unthinking Mastery 
is that we must begin to exile ourselves from feeling comfortable at home 
(which so often involves opaque forms of mastery), turning instead toward 
forms of queer dispossession that reach for different ways of inhabiting our 
scholarly domains—and more primordially, of inhabiting ourselves. The 
intellectual authority of literary and area studies, its “credibility” and “via-
bility,” continuously relies on mastery as its target, as that which will pro-
duce authoritative, legitimate knowledge and in so doing resist the power 
of Eurocentrism.
Some may balk at my emphasis on the language of mastery that recurs in 
crucial postcolonial texts, insisting that this particular evocation of mastery 
should be cordoned off from the more overtly violent aspects of colonial 
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mastery. But let us not forget that these are each scholars for whom lan-
guage and its resonances are absolutely critical to their intellectual pur-
suits, and for whom language speaks and acts through its connectivities 
and refractions. Although its history can be traced back to classical Latin 
forms, a perusal of the Oxford English Dictionary suggests that the word 
“mastery” and its morphemes (“master” as noun, verb, and adjective) took 
hold during the period of early modernity. In its oldest meanings, a master 
is someone who had bested an opponent or competitor, or someone who 
had achieved a level of competence at a particular skill to become a teacher 
of it. It is, of course, this last valence that is being signaled and advocated 
by these leading intellectuals. Yet what postcolonial thinking has taught us 
(perhaps even most cogently through Said himself and through the extra-
ordinary wealth of critical projects that have been informed by his work) 
is precisely that the mastery of colonization reveals the tightly bound con-
nections between these two seemingly distinct registers: to “best” some-
one, to beat them and in so doing become master over them on the one 
hand, and to reach a level of competence in which one becomes rightfully 
pedagogical on the other hand. To put it crudely, a colonial master under-
stands his superiority over others by virtue of his ability to have conquered 
them materially and by his insistence on the supremacy of his practices and 
worldviews over theirs, which renders “legitimate” the forceful imposition 
of his worldviews. The material and ideological, as postcolonial studies has 
time and again shown us so convincingly, cannot be easily parsed. The con-
scious and unconscious choices we make in relation to language (perhaps 
especially as scholars of languages and literatures) begin to reveal to and 
for us the ways that—often despite ourselves and our desired politics—we 
remain bound to structures of violence we wish to disavow. Conceiving of 
ourselves as intellectual masters over those bodies of knowledge (broad or 
discrete) that we have tasked ourselves to engage connects us to historical 
practices of mastery that our work seeks to explore and redress. We must 
with increasing urgency revise the very idea of (and the languages we use 
to describe) our work as intellectuals—with what resonances, and toward 
what possibilities.
The most contentious claim of this book, then, and the one that cuts 
to its core, is that there is an intimate link between the mastery enacted 
through colonization and other forms of mastery that we often believe 
today to be harmless, worthwhile, even virtuous. To be characterized as 
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the master of a language, or a literary tradition, or an instrument, for in-
stance, is widely understood to be laudable. Yet as a pursuit, mastery in-
variably and relentlessly reaches toward the indiscriminate control over 
something—whether human or inhuman, animate or inanimate. It aims 
for the full submission of an object—or something objectified—whether it 
be external or internal to oneself. In so doing, mastery requires a rupturing 
of the object being mastered, because to be mastered means to be weak-
ened to a point of fracture. Mastery is in this sense a splitting of the object 
that is mastered from itself, a way of estranging the mastered object from 
its previous state of being. Michel Serres insists upon this work of mastery 
when he writes that “he who likes to command can do so, but on one con-
dition: the eyes of the producers, of the energetic and the strong, have to 
be poked out” (2007, 36). For Serres, the “condition” of mastery is precisely 
that the master must maim the formerly “energetic” and “strong”—he must 
debilitate in order to be master. Whether we desire mastery over a slave, an 
environment, or a body of texts, we are always returning to this primordial 
fracture—to the partial destruction of the object that the would-be master 
yearns to govern over completely. Mastery, as we will see across anticolo-
nial discourse and postcolonial literary texts, also turns inward to become 
a form of self- maiming, one that involves the denial of the master’s own 
dependency on other bodies.
The Particularities of Mastery
I conceptualize mastery as a violent problematic that includes but remains 
critically distinct from the more particular versions of sovereignty and do-
minion. As such, I will dwell here briefly on the entanglements and dis-
tinctions between these categories. Sovereignty, a concept that functions in 
the discourse of political theory, is primarily concerned with the state. As 
such, and unlike mastery, it depends on the state for its action and prolif-
eration. “Sovereign is he,” writes Carl Schmitt, “who decides on the excep-
tion” (2005, 5). While there is a great deal of literature written on Schmitt’s 
notion of the exception,7 what is important to my argument here is that 
Schmitt links sovereignty to the production and security of state borders. 
Although power has long- since mutated from the sovereign, Michel Fou-
cault reminds us that within political thought and analysis we “still have 
not cut off the head of the king” (1990, 89). In Foucault’s inaugural for-
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mulation of biopolitics, he argues that it “focused on the species body, the 
body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the 
biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, 
life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these 
to vary” (139). Returning to the earliest meanings of mastery, we could say 
that the politics of mastery shift from a focus on overcoming an opponent 
or adversary toward skillful management of the self and its others. At the 
surface a less violent and coercive set of practices, skillful management 
becomes mastery’s dominant mode in the biopolitical moment. Through 
the emergence of biopolitics, mastery ceases to be localized in a sovereign 
power, instead becoming a network that is diffused and dispersed across a 
range of sites, institutions, and actors.
For Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, “the concept of sovereignty dom-
inates the tradition of political philosophy and serves as the foundation of 
all that is political precisely because it requires that one must always rule 
and decide. Only the one can be sovereign, the tradition tells us, and there 
can be no politics without sovereignty. . . . The choice is absolute: either 
sovereignty or anarchy!” (2004, 329). This unremitting reliance on “the one” 
who must rule and decide (whether this singular entity is king or a ruling 
collective) is for Hardt and Negri a fallacy that limits a thinking and prac-
tice of contemporary politics. To supplant this notion of the one, they in-
troduce the “multitude,” which is not a social body precisely because “the 
multitude cannot be reduced to a unity and does not submit to the rule of 
one. The multitude cannot be sovereign” (330). While this formulation of 
the multitude intervenes in the dominant discourse of political philosophy 
and holds promise for less coercive forms of relational politics, it does not 
necessarily dismantle or escape practices of mastery that can and do con-
tinue to circulate and proliferate within the political formation of the mul-
titude and “beyond” it. Mastery is always political but cannot be situated 
only within the realm of political governance. Even within collectives that 
refuse sovereign power, mastery can come into play through dispersed, im-
personal forms of power that operate masterfully on and within particular 
bodies within the multitude. As Judith Butler (2015) reminds us, even when 
“the people” gather in protest, there can be forms of violence operational 
within and in relation to the collective. If the multitude promises alter-
native forms of political action, it is not immune to masterful dynamics 
within and beyond the multitude itself.
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Similarly, the concept of dominion, which situates “man” in relation to 
the natural world, has entailed an interpretive practice of mastery over the 
earth. In Genesis, dominion becomes a particular human mode of relating 
to the world—indeed of caring for it—through practices of management 
and expertise that hinge on the human goal of mastering nature in order to 
let it flourish, to cultivate it, to submit it with the aim of maximum prosper-
ity. When God gives Adam and Eve dominion “over the fish of the sea, over 
the birds of the air, and over every living thing that moves on the earth” 
(Genesis 1:28), their first task is to name all that they will have dominion 
over. The question of language and naming recurs across Unthinking Mas-
tery, specifically in chapter 2, where I dwell on the anticolonial language 
debates, and again in chapter 5, where the Antiguan writer Jamaica Kincaid 
wades through the colonial stakes of naming and possession. The concept 
of dominion clarifies how mastery is tied to language, and how in its power 
to name the human also gains authorization to particular forms of master-
ful consumption: because I have named you, I can consume you. I take up 
this relation between logic, mastery, and consumption in chapter 4 through 
my analysis of the South African writer J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals 
(1999). Dominion is, as Mick Smith (2011) reminds us, certainly a relation 
where mastery plays out explicitly through the care of resources, land man-
agement, and animal husbandry. Both sovereignty as a state problematic 
and dominion as an ecological one are iterations of mastery—ones that 
reveal crucial aspects of mastery but without exhausting its machinations.
I have suggested that to define mastery would be a gesture toward mas-
tering it. It would also risk foreclosing mastery in such a way that disables 
attention to the gaps and fissures of such a definition, where mastery may 
leak out and take forms that are not contained within its definitive script. 
I am concerned with instances in which mastery is reinscribed as another 
kind of act, appearing untethered from its origin. I approach mastery, then, 
not by defining the act but through tracing some of its enduring character-
istics. At least three features of mastery circulate throughout my readings, 
offering us not a definition but qualities by which we can begin to think 
with mastery and against it—in the sense not merely of opposition but of 
dwelling alongside. First, mastery involves splitting in either the sense of 
carving a boundary or an infliction of mutilation—or, often, both at the 
same time. Consider the 1947 Partition of India, when the splitting of India 
to create an independent Islamic nation- state in the form of Pakistan was 
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entangled with the mass migrations and mutilations of various religiously 
coded bodies. Mastery in this political context illustrates other distinct his-
tories of colonization, histories that likewise can be traced via the enforced 
creation of political spaces and the mutilation of bodies.
A second quality of mastery that follows from the first is that it involves 
the subordination of what is on one side of a border to the power of what 
is on the other. In the Hegelian formulation of the master/slave dialectic, 
to which I will turn in detail below, this means that by splitting the slave, 
and by splitting off from the slave, the master comes to hold (at least a 
fantasmatic notion of) an enduring mastery. The splitting that is inherent 
to mastery, the fracturing that confirms and inaugurates it, and the on-
going practices of subordination that drive it forward are inescapable in the 
foundational thinking of the subject of modern political thought. Therein, 
the very notion of the human relies on and is totally unthinkable without 
mastery. In the Second Treatise on Civil Government (1689), John Locke 
grounds the modern subject, the subject of the emergent nation- state and 
capitalist economy, on a mastery that confirms the subject as such. In a 
famous passage linking “Man” to private property, Locke writes: “From all 
which it is evident, that though the things of Nature are given in common, 
yet Man (by being Master of himself, and Proprietor of his Person, and the 
Actions or Labour of it), had still in himself the great foundation of Prop-
erty; and that which made up the great part of what he allayed to the Sup-
port or Comfort of his being, when Invention and Arts had improved the 
conveniences of Life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common 
to others” (qtd. in Esposito 2008, 66). Man here is defined as the being who 
is, or who can be, “Master of himself.” He is not thinkable without this prac-
tice of mastery that inaugurates him as “proprietor” of himself, who as Man 
becomes master of himself as property. This would mean that before “Man” 
can mark himself out and become master/proprietor of himself, there has 
to be something (“himself ”) more primary, more diffuse, that enables the 
mastering but cannot be reduced to it. For Locke, then, Man as the master-
ful modern subject is a privatization and appropriation of something else, 
something that precedes and perhaps always escapes or exceeds mastery—
something within and around Man that, in fact, Man has to “master” in 
order to become himself, which is to say, in order to become free. While 
mastery here becomes totalizing and inescapable (one is either mastered 
by another or is master of oneself), its very emergence presupposes that 
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there is something outside of mastery, something that mastery feeds on but 
disavows. To unthink mastery therefore requires either a radically different 
understanding of what it could mean to be human or perhaps a thinking of 
the human that would not be human at all. Foucault reminds us, “Man is 
an invention of recent date” (1994, 387), and as such I am keen to imagine 
a subject or person who would not be human in this way, in this style of 
masterful Man articulated through political philosophy.
Finally, mastery requires that this split and hierarchized relation be ex-
tended in time. Hegel’s conception of the master/slave dialectic so domi-
nant in modern political thought is one that unfolds across time. That is, 
Hegel’s account of mastery is fundamentally narrative.8 A life and death 
battle for recognition (always, for Hegel, one that unfolds between mascu-
line gendered subjects) produces a master who is willing to die for an ideal 
and a slave who wants to preserve his life and thus submits to another. In 
the beginning, there are “two self- conscious individuals” who face a “life- 
and- death struggle” (Hegel 1977, 113). At the end of the struggle, “one is the 
independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the 
other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to 
live or to be for another. The former is lord, the other is bondsman” (115). 
Hegel will come to show us that the lord- as-master is in fact dependent on 
the slave’s recognition of him, “a recognition that is one- sided and unequal” 
(116) because one is “recognized” and one “recognizing” (113).9 What is cru-
cial to my argument here is the narrative form of this dialectic: what Hegel 
calls the “essential nature” of the master and slave are in fact the outcomes 
of a struggle that must unfold in time and come to be recognized as perma-
nent.10 In Alexandre Kojève’s highly influential reading of the master/slave 
dialectic, man is never merely man but “always, necessarily, and essentially, 
either Master or Slave” (1980, 8). Kojève’s reading presents a contingent 
outcome as a question of necessity and essence, in effect transforming his-
tory into myth.
And yet, as Marx would come to insist, like Fanon and Paulo Freire after 
him, the material labor of the slave—his work that transforms reality (Hegel 
1977, 117– 19)—holds the active potentiality of other relations of power not 
beholden to mastery. Joining Marx and Fanon toward a postcolonial peda-
gogy, Freire insists that the task of the oppressed is “to liberate themselves 
and their oppressors as well. The oppressors, who oppress, exploit, and rape 
by virtue of their power, cannot find in this power the strength to liberate 
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either the oppressed or themselves” (2000, 44). While Freire envisions this 
critical pedagogy as an urgent “humanistic” task, I would recast this liber-
atory politics as precisely a dehumanist necessity. If the masterful work of 
global imperialism functions through the dehumanization of those it aims 
to conquer, and if we can now argue that the human to which we have been 
aspiring is intimately bound to a logic of mastery, then looking toward 
those “other genres of being human” that have been lived and will be lived 
by those subjected by imperial force might offer us other performances of 
the human that allow us to begin to practice nonmasterful forms of poli-
tics. This dehumanist practice of “beginning” to unfold the human from its 
outsides necessarily takes place in a queer temporality, one that José Este-
ban Muñoz (2009) and Elizabeth Freeman (2010) insist has already been 
happening, and has yet to come.
Postcolonial Hegel
If the Hegelian dialectic of lordship and bondage has been cast and ac-
cepted across much of modern thought as mythical, as that which can 
account for relations across time and space, it has been the task of de-
colonial thinkers to contextualize it historically. Examining Hegel’s use of 
source materials in the making of his notorious claims about Africa as a 
place “outside” history,11 Robert Bernasconi (1998) argues that Hegel was in 
no sense formulating a reading of Africans (as proper subjects of slavery) 
that was free from the colonial mode of thinking of his day. Rather, Hegel 
embellished and culled selectively from his source materials, producing 
claims he desired to make about Africans. Such desire, Bernasconi shows 
us, is tied to the philosophical production of a certain conception of the 
subject (and of subjectivity) in which the European must be thought by 
and through the European philosopher in dialectical relation to its others. 
Africa therefore had to be cast by Hegel in terms that would enforce its 
unintelligibility in relation to Europe.12
Caroline Rooney follows this critique of Hegel to argue that “Western 
philosophical and critical thought serves, in the first place, to prevent a 
reception of the thought in question. Most seriously, there are ways—be 
they crudely obvious, subtly muted or genuinely perplexed—in which a 
thinking of Africa becomes that which is given as unthinkable” (2000, 15). 
Unlike Said’s notion of Orientalism, Africa emerges not as Europe’s antith-
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esis but as something so unthinkable as to be beyond the frame. Hegel’s 
own contradictory claims about Africans, and his assertions about Africans 
as contradiction, begin for Rooney to blur the lines between the self and 
the other, between the subject who produces knowledge and the objects of 
that knowledge production. Colonial thought, within which both Berna-
sconi and Rooney firmly situate Hegel, has relied on certain fabulous and 
fabricated (and sometimes geographically distinct) conceptions of others, 
conceptions that come to reveal less about the “objects” of its control and 
much more about colonial subjectivity and the production of its alterities.
In “Hegel and Haiti” (2000), Susan Buck- Morss offers a historically 
grounded answer to a question that has long occupied scholars of Hegel: 
From where did the philosopher’s conception of lordship and bondage 
originate? Buck- Morss locates Hegel’s “struggle to death” between mas-
ter and slave squarely within the facts of the Haitian revolution led by 
François- Dominique Toussaint Louverture that was taking place during 
the period of Hegel’s formulating this seemingly ahistorical relation.13 Hegel 
specifically discussed reading the newspaper during that historical period, 
even describing how the press “orients one’s attitude against the world and 
towards God [in one case], or toward that which the world is [in the other]. 
The former gives the same security as the latter, in that one knows where 
one stands” (Buck- Morss 2000, 844). Hegel all but confesses to being “ori-
ented” by the world events of his day, allowing Buck- Morss to declare that 
“Hegel knew—knew about real slaves revolting successfully against real 
masters, and he elaborated his dialectic of lordship and bondage delib-
erately within this contemporary context” (852). Why, then, had scholars 
not picked up on the influence that Buck- Morss proposes is inescapable 
in Hegel’s orientation, in the very formulation of the relation between the 
master and the slave?
I am especially compelled by the frame within which Buck- Morss situ-
ates her examination of Hegel and Haiti, bringing at the beginning and 
ends of her text the problem of disciplinary thinking through which we 
have inherited the past, and through which we safeguard ourselves against 
the threat of other modes of thinking, other possible forms of inheritance 
(2000, 822). Recalling how years after his shaping of the master/slave dia-
lectic, Hegel would come to study Africa with more concrete, scholarly 
intention, Buck- Morss argues: “What is clear is that in an effort to become 
more erudite in African studies during the 1820s, Hegel was in fact becom-
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ing dumber” (863). Beyond soliciting a chuckle from her readers (at least 
this reader), Buck- Morss shows us a Hegel who never understood Africa, 
who projected his desires onto it, and who would come paradoxically to 
know it less as he studied it more: “It is sadly ironic that the more faithfully 
his lectures reflected Europe’s conventional scholarly wisdom on African 
society, the less enlightened and more bigoted they became” (846). And 
here, Hegel comes to reflect us back to ourselves in our own pursuits to 
master the worlds we study. Disciplinary thinking is practical: it enables us 
to frame ourselves as masters of particular discourses, histories, and bod-
ies of knowledge. It safeguards us against the incursions of oppositional 
frames, or methods of understanding that might unhinge us from our own 
masterful frames. Concluding her study of Hegel and Haiti, Buck- Morss 
asks us: “What if every time that the consciousness of individuals surpassed 
the confines of present constellations of power in perceiving the concrete 
meaning of freedom, this were valued as a moment, however transitory, 
of the realization of absolute spirit? What other silences would need to be 
broken? What un- disciplined stories would be told?” (865). From a queer 
methodological standpoint, Jack Halberstam likewise echoes this deep 
concern with disciplinary knowledge production and its erasures when he 
argues that “disciplines actually get in the way of answers and theorems 
precisely because they offer maps of thought where intuition and blind 
fumbling might yield better results” (2011, 6).
Narrative and Matter
Mastery is a concept that is situated at the threshold of matter and narra-
tive. As a fundamentally narrative problematic, mastery assigns particular 
roles (the master, the slave) and holds those roles in place (it “character-
izes” them) in a temporal, narrative structure. To win a fight is not to be-
come the master, unless both the master and the slave recognize that in 
the future, the outcome will be the same. The master is envisioned as the 
winner, then, whose winning comes to be taken for granted in a proleptic 
narrative account of the world that authorizes future action. Once instan-
tiated, the narrative has to elicit the participation of both characters, mas-
ter and slave, in ways that allow and disallow particular material actions 
(labor first and foremost in the Marxist- Hegelian version). This calls for 
a renewed attention to the material effects of narrative at stake in what 
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has been called recognition (in Hegelian terms), interpellation (in Marxist 
terms), and identification (in psychoanalytic terms). Through these mate-
rial changes in a subject who “finds” him or herself in a narrative (either as 
master or slave), the subject’s actions and affects are informed by narrative, 
even as these subjects must continually reproduce it. In other words, narra-
tive and materiality are entangled in ways that cannot possibly be reduced 
to a unidirectional causality.
Once mastery is understood as an entanglement between narrative and 
matter, or “matter and meaning” (Barad 2007), it becomes crucial to recog-
nize how the narratives of mastery are always fragile, threatened, and im-
possible. Indeed, the most basic lesson of new materialist thinking is that 
matter itself is aleatory, surprising, and “vibrant” (Bennett 2010). Matter is 
not stable and cannot be mastered, despite the narrative fictions that enable 
us to imagine and engage it as such. It is not inert in time; it evolves, shifts, 
mutates, surprises. What is true of matter is true of those forms of matter 
called humans, who come to resist the narratives of mastery that shaped 
their subjectivities in surprising and excessive ways.
What gets bestowed with agency and rights is a question central to both 
new materialisms and postcolonial studies, although the two fields have 
yet to join forces explicitly. Because postcolonial studies has been primar-
ily centered on the urgency of policies and practices of dehumanization 
among peoples, it has been slower to see how the practices of dehumani-
zation at the heart of its politics cannot be extricated from a deep concern 
with a broader ecological thinking. It is not merely that the subjugation of 
environments is intimately linked to the subjugation of peoples; rather, it 
is that the logic that drives the modern world cannot formulate the non-
human world as one invested with meaningful, dynamic life. Equating 
colonization with the “thingification” of colonized peoples, Aimé Césaire 
(2001) argues that the processes of colonization require the commodifica-
tion and objectification of other cultures and the people who comprised 
them.14 To extend Césaire, I also argue that “thingification” vitally names a 
limit to our dialectical thinking of life itself: to be rendered a thing is to be 
placed into a whole world of other things that are not designated as valued 
life forms. Postcolonial studies needs to think with infinitely more care 
through its anticolonial foundations so as to approach the commonality 
of being among all these “things,” however proximate or distant they may 
appear to the “properly” human subject.
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Dipesh Chakrabarty’s recent attention to climate change and the emer-
gence of the human’s “geological force” is among the most ecologically in-
clusive turns for the field of postcolonial studies to date. Chakrabarty ex-
plains, building on scientific research, that in the aftermath of the Industrial 
Revolution, humans have emerged as “geological actors” to the extent that 
we are now “a force on the same scale as that released at other times when 
there has been a mass extinction of species” (2009, 207). While as a species 
and as individuals humans have always been “biological actors”—creatures 
whose presence affected their environments—we have now emerged as a 
geological force that is changing the basic functions of the planet. The sub-
ject that has formed modern Western thought, the one inherited by post-
colonial thinking, is one whose unequivocal goal of mastery has fractured 
the earth to the point of threatening destruction of its environment and 
itself. There can be no more urgent reason to rethink the subject and its 
desires than this. It is our charge, then, to explore the foundations of de-
colonial resistance to this subject, to see where such resistance remains 
entangled in its own inherited legacies, and to turn toward evocations of 
subjectivities no longer wed to an uncritical politics of worldly mastery. In-
deed, such politics hinge on a fantasy and relentless enforcement of human 
distinctiveness, and a new subjectivity that is not beholden to mastery ne-
cessitates calling into question the very notion of the human that has been 
produced and enforced across modernity.
This is a moment in which human- induced ecological catastrophe is 
both in effect and imminent, in which human population displacement and 
species extinctions have become normative expectations. It is a moment, in 
other words, when human practices of mastery fold over onto themselves 
and collapse.15 Mastery as the logic of a certain form of human being needs 
urgently therefore to be unthought and replaced by new performances of 
humanity. Dominic Pettman, urging us to recognize the “human error” 
implicit in our own self- conception as species, argues: “Considering our-
selves as the source of that- which- we- call- human, and viewing animals 
or technics as mere conduits—as a means to that end—is a fallacy. It is to 
see mastery where a vital, complex, ahuman dynamic reigns” (2011, 127). 
Working through Agamben’s (2003) notion of the “anthropological ma-
chine”—that logic that produces the human for itself—Pettman argues that 
the human is revealed to be nothing more than a provincial right to “con-
spicuous consumption.” By now, every devoted environmentalist, every 
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activist for humans and animals, and everyone who attempts to tread the 
earth with more care has confronted the systemic monstrosity of human 
mastery over the earth. Staring at ourselves as a conquering force, our mass 
destructive tendencies appear unstoppable. The act of unthinking mastery 
is in response a vehicle through which we can begin to change fundamen-
tally our thinking and practices of this style of being human.
I am curious about how anticolonial thought and postcolonial litera-
ture can lead toward a radical engagement with forms of worldly living 
that do not entail mastery at the center of human subjectivity. My critique 
of mastery dovetails with ecologically motivated discourses such as post-
humanism and new materialism, discourses that seek urgently to displace 
the anthropocentricism of the human. In these discourses, “things” come 
to matter—objects we ordinarily consider lifeless are positioned as vitally 
linked to our selves, our species, our individual and collective well- being, 
and our ability to sustain ourselves on the planet. Jane Bennett’s call to 
“enliven” matter, to see life where we have failed to recognize it, is a means 
of chastening her own “fantasies of human mastery” by emphasizing the 
materiality of being itself. By seeing matter as lively rather than inanimate, 
and as therefore intimately connected to us, we can “expose a wider distri-
bution of agency, and reshape the self and its interests” (Bennett 2010, 122). 
Likewise, Mel Y. Chen’s (2012) aim toward “animating” the world we ordi-
narily conceive as inanimate is similarly preoccupied with a distribution 
of agency that exceeds the human in order to queer our own subject posi-
tions. We can see clearly how the discourse of new materialism has, among 
other things, poignantly ecological stakes that aim to extend drastically the 
rights and agencies that have long since been guarded as essentially and 
exclusively human (even as new materialism and biopolitics would push 
us to seek forms of politics not dependent on humanist rights). Like other 
discourses positioned on the intellectual left, new materialisms name mas-
tery as a deleterious aim but have yet to engage a theoretical formulation 
and analysis of mastery as such.
New materialisms have also tended to eschew literature as its object of 
study. If new materialism has been in part a response to and against the lin-
guistic turn (Coole and Frost 2010), this perhaps accounts for why scholars 
in the field have in their attentions to corporeality overwhelmingly avoided 
an emphasis on language, literature, and their complex and contradictory 
relations to materiality. A critical exception is Christopher Breu’s Insistence 
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of the Material (2014), which reads the late capitalist literature of materi-
ality, attending to precisely the ways that materiality and language cannot 
be parsed. Engaging directly with new materialist discourse as a literary 
scholar, Breu argues that “in order for us to fully attend to the materialities 
of our bodies, we need to insist on the ways in which the materiality of 
language (as well as the forms of subjectivity shaped by language) and the 
materiality of the body not only interpenetrate and merge but also remain 
importantly distinct and sometimes form in contradiction to each other” 
(9). Breu’s insistence is precisely that both language and bodies are mate-
rial and have material effects that are interpenetrating and divergent. While 
the linguistic turn emphasized how language and discourse crucially shape 
our conceptualization of materiality, new materialisms have sought instead 
to attune to how materiality affects discourse, and how there are material 
relations that exceed what we can capture through language. These ideas 
are crucial to Unthinking Mastery, which braids together theories from the 
linguistic turn with the materialist turn in order to trace relations between 
forms of narrative and material politics across discourses of decolonization.
Vulnerable Reading
Unthinking Mastery engages the politics of decolonization through decon-
structive, feminist, and queer readings. If, as I have suggested, mine is an 
impossible project, it is also a profoundly hopeful one that gazes toward a 
future it still cannot see. Failure is absolutely crucial to my attempts, and 
to the ways that the texts I engage across this book invite practices of read-
ing that confront and question our subjectivities. Following Halberstam’s 
suggestion that we read failure as a queer refusal of mastery (2011, 11), I at-
tend to mastery’s recurring failures in postcolonial literature as promising, 
hopeful, even utopian. In failing to master, in confronting our own desires 
for mastery where we least expect or recognize these desires, we become 
vulnerable to other possibilities for living, for being together in common, 
for feeling injustice and refusing it without the need to engage it through 
forms of conquest. I am compelled by R. Radhakrishnan’s argument that far 
from being a sign of the instability or weakness of the postcolonial project, 
ambivalence is its vitality. Radhakrishnan argues that “postcoloniality is 
always already marked by ambivalence and that the task is to politicize 
this given ambivalence and produce it agentially” (2000, 37).16 To repudi-
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ate the ambivalence of postcolonial studies is to disavow its full potential 
as a mobilizing system of resistant thinking. If our very subjectivities have 
emerged through modern legacies of mastery, how could we not in fine 
Freudian style play out the fort- da of refusing mastery and calling it back? 
From within the logic of mastery, I dwell on ambivalence across the pages 
of this book, and I attend to the productive ways in which failure across 
anticolonial discourse and postcolonial literature is absolutely vital to the 
project of shaping a dehumanist politics to come.
What I call vulnerable reading is a dehumanist methodology that inherits 
two crucial deconstructive formulations of reading as a politics: Derrida’s 
(1988) insistence that one cannot simply reverse binaries but must displace 
them is vital to the task of disentangling mastery. Gayatri Chakravorty 
 Spivak’s attention to the essential unmasterability of literature allows for 
a reframing of reading and teaching that foregrounds “othering . . . as an 
end in itself ” (2003, 13). Reading encounters can for Spivak “rearrange” our 
desires in ways that are not anticipatable, and thus are vitally antimasterful 
and lead us toward our vulnerabilities. Working within this deconstructive 
tradition, Sarah Wood, in her attempt to read “without mastery,” summons 
a future reader who would not be beholden to mastery, one who can “be 
ready for all the things that happen to someone who doesn’t read as if they 
belonged with, or to, the right side, the side of the master” (2014, 20).
Building on these deconstructive reading practices, and following Ju-
dith Butler’s (2004) work on “collective vulnerability” as a mode of redress-
ing sudden violence, I advance vulnerable reading as an open, continuous 
practice that resists foreclosures by remaining unremittingly susceptible 
to new world configurations that reading texts—literary, artistic, philo-
sophical, and political—can begin to produce. Vulnerable readings resist 
disciplinary enclosure, refusing to restrict in advance how and where one 
might wander through textual engagement. Across Unthinking Mastery, 
I engage closely with thinkers and texts that I love. We might call this a 
queer love, following Elizabeth Freeman, who writes beautifully in Time 
Binds of her “queerest commitment” to close reading, to “the decision to 
unfold, slowly, a small number of imaginative texts rather than amass a 
weighty archive of or around texts” (2010, xvii). Like Freeman, my own 
book stays close to those thinkers and texts I cannot do without, and finds 
in them the messy utopian promises of dehumanism.
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Vulnerability brings to the fore subjectivities that are shaped by the inti-
mate awareness of relations of dependency. Dwelling on how the attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, exposed 
America’s own vulnerability in relation to the “outside” world, Butler theo-
rizes vulnerability as a mode of resisting ongoing cycles of violence and ret-
ribution. The sociopolitical response of America at this moment revealed a 
particular and particularly American subject, one that sought to “maintain 
its mastery through the systematic destruction of its multilateral relations, 
its ties to the international community” (Butler 2004, 41). Instantiated at 
the national level, this subject “seeks to reconstitute its imagined wholeness, 
but only at the price of denying its own vulnerability, its dependency, its 
exposure, where it exploits those very features in others, thereby making 
those features ‘other to’ itself ” (41). Urging us to move away from this dia-
lectical formulation of identity, Butler pressures a thinking of dependency 
that can produce alternative forms of subjective being and collectivity that 
do not remain hinged to a politics of vengeance against and disempower-
ment of others.
Although in this text Butler is committed to a thinking of human re-
lations in particular, her work exceeds the human realm since it reveals a 
mode of praxis in which the subject recognizes that every aspect of itself 
is dependent on everybody and everything around it. Even while the dis-
course of modernity has disavowed this vital dependency through its desire 
to render the human master of everything, the fragility of the human in 
the wake and anticipation of so many intercultural and ecological catastro-
phes can no longer afford to pretend that it is not dependent materially, 
bodily, and psychically on others, both human and nonhuman. Reading 
as a practice of unmasterful vulnerability can challenge the very founda-
tions of being human that make possible everyday life in the “globalized” 
world, opening up other modes of performing humanity that can become 
habitual. The practice of vulnerable reading can move us “beyond” mastery, 
not in the sense of exceeding it but in the sense of surviving it in order to 
envision being otherwise in and for the world. By reading literature vulner-
ably—with a willingness toward undoing the very logic that constitutes our 
own subjectivities—postcolonial literary texts can open us to other earthly 
relations and assemblages.
While I devote considerable energy to a critical reading of how mas-
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tery is unthinkingly reproduced within those very discourses that aim 
to reject its more overtly colonial forms, I do so precisely because of a 
haunting awareness that my own thinking, prose, and practices are rid-
dled with forms of mastery I still cannot identify. Through vulnerable 
reading, I turn back to myself to let narratives (and my readings of them) 
unearth me as a desiring, historical subject. Vulnerable reading rewrites 
me. A critical engagement with texts that shape my own ethical, political, 
and artistic imagination is a way of also becoming other to myself, of 
becoming myself differently. Aligned with Cixous, who posits the fact of 
her desire for unmasterful life as pointing to a system that is despite itself 
“letting something else through,” my critique of the limits of the thinkers 
and texts with whom I write is driven by an aim to unearth the (other) 
ethico- political possibilities that remain active within their thought—and 
within my own.
The Form of Unthinking Mastery
The first two chapters of Unthinking Mastery dwell within anticolonial dis-
course to flesh out the complex ways by which it aimed to undo colonial 
mastery through other masterful forms. In these chapters, I elucidate how 
colonial mastery becomes bound to other masterful practices of decolo-
nization through the submission of both physical bodies and less tangible 
bodies of knowledge. In chapter 1, I examine the work of Frantz Fanon 
and Mohandas K. Gandhi to situate mastery in the theory and practice 
of decolonization according to two of its most discerning thinkers. While 
Fanon formulated corporeal violence against the master as a necessary act 
that would restore the humanity of the slave, Gandhi insisted on nonvio-
lence as essential to the emergence of a truly liberated subject. Although 
Gandhi and Fanon appear to be diametrically opposed in their theories of 
decolo nization, their strategies for liberation similarly employed mastery 
as a concept and practice that was vital to the emergence of a fully decol-
onized subject. Through a feminist- materialist reading practice, I argue 
that this reliance on mastery remains bound to dialectical thinking and 
produces within Gandhian and Fanonian thought a series of sacrificial 
figures—women, animals, the disabled, and outcasts, for instance—that 
haunt anticolonial discourse as its “remainders” and have a critical reso-
nance for the politics and practices of decolonization in the present.
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Forms of corporeal mastery that were so crucial to colonization and its 
undoing were likewise echoed through anticolonial formulations of less 
tangible linguistic bodies. In chapter 2, I dwell on the valences of mastery 
in the anticolonial language debates. Decolonization necessitated critical 
considerations of colonial and native languages in envisioning liberation 
struggles and postcolonial education and governance. Like the physical 
bodies mastered through colonization, so too were languages—both colo-
nial and native—envisioned as bodies that needed either to be mastered 
or repudiated in the passage toward national independence. Tracing the 
discourse of language mastery in anticolonial thought through Gandhi, 
Fanon, Aimé Césaire, and Albert Memmi, I then turn to how postcolonial 
studies and world literature have in turn claimed language mastery as an 
intellectual necessity. Language mastery, I argue, travels across intellectual 
currents and unites them through an indiscrete drive toward conquest. 
Across various discursive fields, these rehearsals of linguistic mastery are 
intimately tied to practices of mastery over other more tangible bodies.
In the final three chapters, mastery is supplanted by my emphasis on 
the potentialities of dehumanism through engagements with postcolonial 
literary texts. I turn to texts that traverse multiple genres—the novel, the 
short story, the lecture- narrative, and the garden and travel memoir. The 
progression of these chapters is marked by a widening frame through 
which to read the human and its hopeful reconfigurations. Moving from 
intrahuman relations to human/animal relations and finally to the relation 
between humans and their ecological habitats, Unthinking Mastery glides 
toward increasingly expansive frames for (re)situating the human. Across 
genres and geographies, subjects repeatedly emerge as those in contest and 
compliance with forms, desires, and practices of mastery in and beyond 
the postcolony. These characters struggle with the tensions between how 
they live and who they imagine themselves to be, with their material and 
psychic lives that come into unwanted conflict with the disavowed lives of 
others. I read these characters critically and sympathetically—not with a 
will to point out their weaknesses and contradictions but to see how narra-
tive prose elucidates the complexities of postcolonial subjectivity and the 
possibilities for other psychic and affective forms of being that are mobi-
lized when we abide by literary language and representation.
In chapter 3, I analyze representations of humanitarian workers in con-
flict with their putative objects through readings of J. M. Coetzee’s novel 
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Life & Times of Michael K (1983) and Mahasweta Devi’s short story “Little 
Ones” (1998). These texts play with what I call humanitarian fetishism—
the process of obscuring the complicity of humanitarian agents with those 
systems of inequality they seek to redress. In these texts, the desire and 
practice of humanitarian workers to offer aid is revealed to be inextricable 
with a simultaneous desire to hold mastery over their objects of aid. They 
also emphasize the forceful work of narrative in the confirmation of the 
humanitarian subject as “innocent” or removed from politics. Pressing on 
how particular forms of aid remain inscribed by and complicit with colo-
nialism, these texts usher readers toward a critique of liberal subjectivity 
itself. In so doing, they edge us toward a dehumanist ethics through which 
we, along with the protagonists, tarry with the fictions that have produced 
and enforced our own subjectivities.
Chapter 4 takes up readings of Indra Sinha’s novel Animal’s People 
(2007) and Coetzee’s “lecture- narrative” The Lives of Animals (1999), texts 
that in very different but intimately sutured ways refuse an easy division 
between the human and the animal. By emphasizing the double valence of 
“dispossession,” I look to these texts as ways of both moving toward those 
beings dispossessed by the current global order and toward a disposses-
sion of our own masterful subjectivities. I begin with a reading of Sinha’s 
novel, based loosely on the 1984 Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India. 
The novel’s dehumanized protagonist Animal, whose body is crippled by 
toxic exposure, claims his animality and comes to mobilize a dehumanist, 
humani mal ethics by the end of the novel. In Coetzee’s lecture- narrative, 
his protagonist, Elizabeth Costello, an aging white female fiction writer, 
wishes to claim her animality and to convince, against Western reason, 
her academic audience to radically rethink their disciplinary refusals of 
animal subjectivity. Costello’s failure in the face of reason becomes a call 
to imaginative horizons and to ethical possibilities of humanimal collec-
tive living. She presents us with a contingent ethics based on feeling, on 
ambivalence, and on the critical, even hopeful, necessity of human failure.
I return to failure and complicity in chapter 5, where I explore the gar-
den as an ecological site rooted in (and uprooted by) histories of violence 
and promise. Through evocations of my own ecological pasts, and readings 
of Jamaica Kincaid’s garden prose, I summon the productive potential of 
discomfort and entanglement in rethinking how we might re- earth our-
selves as planetary beings. I examine what I call Kincaid’s vital ambivalence 
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in the production of her American garden, in which we discover a sub-
ject that is at times blatantly contradictory, at times violent in her desires 
to master her garden, at others projecting on postcolonial subjects of the 
Himalayan region the same kinds of Orientalist configurations that she 
disavows explicitly in her critique of colonial mastery. These contradictory, 
disturbing, and provocative ways of writing the postcolonial subject are, 
I argue, a most promising gesture toward an earthing of human subjectivity 
in the wake of ecological disaster. Precisely by exposing the radical incon-
gruities and “seedy” underbelly of the subject, Kincaid compels us to tend 
to our less masterful potentialities.
While mastery emerges somewhat differently across each chapter of 
this book, it does so in ways that are essential to think together. My read-
ings of revolutionary discourse and literary prose repeatedly confront the 
ways that “coherent” narratives of self and mastery are always based on far 
more fragile materialities and psychic displacements than their narratives 
enable. In so doing, they urge us toward dehumanism as a political prac-
tice that can produce profound psychic and material effects. These texts, 
as though anticipating Halberstam, recuperate failure as a necessary con-
dition of resistance, collectivity, and utopian promise in unmasterful rela-
tions among life forms. In the coda, I begin to think expressly about what 
it might mean to survive mastery, to live with mastery in such a way that 
lets other worldly forms of engagement resound. Through a brief reading 
of the final scene in Aimé Césaire’s A Tempest (2002), the anticolonial 
rewriting of Shakespeare’s The Tempest, I dwell on listening as a critical 
mode of becoming vulnerable to the voices—human and nonhuman, au-
dible and muted—that are always sounding even when we have not been 
trained or allowed ourselves to listen: Listening, as opposed to voicing that 
which we “know.” Listening, as an act that might let each other in—psy-
chically, physically—to another’s ways of inhabiting the world; to being 
entities that are always touching and being touched by others, even when 
we are not aware of this touching, even when this touching is entirely un-
predictable.
I once shied away from the critical charge of being “utopian,” as though 
utopia had nothing to do with the politics of the present. In fact, utopic 
desire materializes in tactile and corporeal ways, and it does so in par-
ticular places—even while it reaches toward an elsewhere that is not yet 
at hand. The desire for utopia is always and already a failed desire, but the 
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real and contextual effects of its failure are precisely where we can find 
mastery’s interstices. Now, in the face so many ongoing, firmly entrenched, 
and unthinking forms of mastery—over each other and over other worldly 




Love can fight; often, it is obliged to.
—Mohandas K. Gandhi (1976)
I am a master and I am advised to adopt the humility of the cripple.
—Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (1967)
At a quick historical glance, it would be easy to cast two of the twentieth 
century’s most radical anticolonial thinkers—Mohandas K. Gandhi and 
Frantz Fanon—as politically antithetical. While indeed there is much to 
distinguish their thinking, postcolonial theorists have pointed to the foun-
dational role that both thinkers have played in the emergence of postcolo-
nial theory as a mode of critical inquiry. Leela Gandhi, for instance, has 
argued that Gandhi and Fanon are “united in their proposal of a radical 
style of total resistance to the totalising political and cultural offensive of 
the colonial civilizing mission” (1998, 19). She follows Gyan Prakash, who 
positions Gandhian and Fanonian thought as “theoretical events” that 
situate their work squarely within the emergence of postcolonial theory 
(1995, 5). Against the common historicization of postcolonial theory’s 
emergence in the 1980s when it swept the academic scene, these scholars 
enable us to see postcolonial theory’s longer critical history. Returning to 
Gandhi and Fanon as early iterations of postcolonial theory, then, is vital 
to the task of revisiting the postcolonial project today in the efforts to rein-
vigorate and to mobilize it toward new world dynamics.
In this chapter, I dwell on the works of these two central figures of 
twentieth- century decolonization in order to query their mappings of 
thoroughly decolonized subjectivities. For both Gandhi and Fanon, decolo-
nization hinged on the necessity of a fundamental reconstitution of the 
self in the shaping of a postcolonial world. And yet, to achieve this end, 
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the subjection of other bodies appeared almost necessary to anticolonial 
self- recovery. I trace the intertwined and overlapping circuits of love and 
violence across Gandhi and Fanon and attend to forms of anticolonial em-
bodiment that each thinker advanced. In particular, I am interested in how 
two such distinct thinkers reveal within their accounts of decolonization 
seemingly inescapable sacrificial frames, ones in which particular bodies 
come repeatedly under masterful subjection in the narrative accounts of 
psychic, bodily, and socio- structural liberation. While they aimed in utopic 
gestures toward masterful practices that could lead to a liberation of the 
“whole,” I argue, Gandhi and Fanon could not adequately account for the 
remainders of mastery—for those figures of abjection that were reproduced 
through the liberatory horizons of anticolonial discourse.
My critique of Gandhi and Fanon is born from the haunting knowl-
edge that my own thinking is, like theirs, always producing remainders 
I cannot yet identify. To look back at Gandhi and Fanon critically is in 
effect to reflect on how those of us positioned on the intellectual left are 
also (and often despite ourselves) creating outsides to our own desiring 
inclusivities. Far from disciplining anticolonial politics and current critical 
thinking, I want to mobilize their messiness. Perhaps embedded within the 
knotty contradictions of decolonizing discourse lies the very possibility of 
unmasterful styles of being. Attending to the remainders that could not be 
enfolded into the unifying efforts of Gandhian and Fanonian politics is thus 
a way of bringing history forward to meet our own political projects. Sift-
ing through the mess of utopian anticolonial politics is an act of becoming 
more sensitive to those remainders we continue to produce in the present 
moment. José Esteban Muñoz describes this as a melancholic politics that 
can become “a mechanism that helps us (re)construct identity and take our 
dead with us to the various battles we must wage in their names—and in 
our names” (1999, 74). My critique of these monumental figures of decolo-
nization is thus based not on an ungenerous desire to expose the contradic-
tions of those to whom I am so undeniably indebted but to bring Gandhi 
and Fanon with me into the present. Doing so, I aim to listen to the haunt-
ing legacies and inspirational force that continue to resonate through them 
in the service of those who have been forced out of ethico- political move-
ments, and those we might yet come to embrace.
Returning to Gandhi and Fanon toward a revitalized thinking of post-
colonial theory, we can begin to see how anticolonial solidarities are forged 
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by way of mastery even while particular forms of colonial mastery are re-
buked. Critically, we can also identify how the pursuit of mastery produces 
remnants of the social body that come to be employed by and excised from 
the rhetoric of a decolonizing body politic. Within Gandhian and Fano-
nian narrative accounts of decolonization, there is a continuous way in 
which particular figures—colonized women, indigenous peoples, the “un-
civilized” groups of the emergent nation- state, the animal, the cripple, and 
nature itself—must be subjected by the emergent master who is himself the 
embodiment of the new nation- state and who maneuvers away from colo-
nial domination toward freedom. As a literary scholar, I emphasize here 
narrative—how Gandhi and Fanon craft their emergent politics through 
political discourses that tell stories of becoming psychically and corporeally 
decolonized. What careful attention to these narratives reveals are figures 
of difference that are exiled from and subjected by masterful anticolonial 
movements, ones that linger at the margins of its discourses as exclusions 
that betray the purportedly inclusive aims of anticolonial futures. Within 
this anticolonial discourse, I read for and toward the most vulnerable sub-
jects of decolonization. Attending to the slips and sacrifices of “other” bod-
ies within this discourse becomes critical to the making, shaping, and read-
ing of our own psychic, bodily, and relational selves.
For Gandhi, “love can fight,” and it can do so both through the self- 
mastering body that resists external forms of violence and through the 
body that enacts physical violence against others in the service of less vio-
lent futures. What we see through careful attention to Gandhian ethico- 
politics is that these forms of “fighting” are never as separable as they ap-
pear. Acts of self- mastery can and do also entail forms of violence against 
other bodies. As I look to Gandhi’s work on self- mastery as the antidote to 
holding mastery over others, and to becoming self- governing and free from 
the hold of the colonial master, I attend to how his narratives of swaraj 
(self- rule), satyagraha (truth- force), brahmacharya (celibacy/abstinence), 
and ahimsa (nonviolence) often involve the subjugation of other bodies. 
Women, indigenous peoples, animals (both human and nonhuman), and 
“uncivilized” groups who do not properly conform to the struggle for 
Indian national unity are all figures that reveal the contingencies, remain-
ders, and dominance of Gandhi’s masterful politics. Such bodies, I argue, 
become subjects of and subjected to a Gandhian ethico- politics of self- 
mastery. Decolonization was likewise an embodied process of self- making 
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for Fanon, whose psychoanalytic practice led him to advocate for collective 
violence against the colonial forces that restricted the (masculine) colo-
nized body. Fanon framed himself explicitly as a “master,” one that had 
been “crippled” through the colonial relation. For him, decolonization was 
an act of reclaiming this lost, masterful humanity that had been stripped 
from him through the racist dehumanization of colonialism. He articulated 
this through the language of humanism and universal love, even while he 
cast his anticolonial humanist politics in tension with women, the disabled, 
and, more subtly, the natural world.
These admittedly crude summations of Gandhi and Fanon’s masterful 
anticolonialisms illustrate how tightly linked they are, despite one being 
lauded as a nonviolent activist and the other criticized as a thinker who 
promoted violent action. Both popular formulations selectively pluck from 
the oeuvre of their political writings, abandoning, for instance, the often 
perplexing necessities of violence in Gandhian thought, or the explicit calls 
to love and orientation toward the Other across Fanon’s writing. Following 
their narrative paths, I aim to consider their resonances through their 
mutual calls for new forms of embodiment in the process of decolonization 
and to attend to what such forms of masterful self- practice and embodi-
ment shape and efface in collective struggle for liberation. In the narrative 
accounts of each thinker, the decolonizing body aims toward more loving 
relations and more peaceful forms of sociality. Both Gandhi and Fanon 
make clear that the domain of love is not dissociable from violence, and 
that violence is at stake in every act of remaking the self and is always em-
bedded in the engagements of love toward oneself and others. Attending to 
the messy entanglements of love and violence in these thinkers allows us to 
move past the overly simplified versions of Gandhian and Fanonian poli-
tics in order both to offer more nuanced and generative accounts of their 
foundational contributions to anticolonial thought and postcolonial theory 
and to loosen some of the knots of their political thought so as to develop 
through and alongside them different political possibilities for the present.
Fanon’s Sacrificial Women
Feminist readings have already stressed women as glaring figures of dif-
ference and subjection across anticolonial writing. Kalpana Sheshadri- 
Crooks, for example, refers to “the now over- familiar feminist contention 
decolonIzIng mAstery 33
that most national liberation movements and thought tend to be mascu-
linist in their orientation and rhetoric” (2002, 93). I will trace some of these 
critiques here both because they bear repeating and because they are re-
lated to the other figures of alterity that remain outside Fanon’s political 
purview and to which I turn later in this chapter. Feminist scholarship has 
aptly pointed to the crucial fact that liberation was mobilized in these dis-
courses through practices of control over female bodies in the remaking 
and restaging of specifically masculine ones. Women often emerge in the 
discourses of liberation as self- masters par excellence, subjects that without 
pause remain steadfast in the face of danger. Yet they are also the weak 
links in the trajectories of national freedom—freedom that remains bound 
to new visions, performances, and embodiments of masculinity. If women 
are both instrumental and sacrificial in the creation of anticolonial mas-
culinities, this does not mark a paradox but signals instead a logic of an-
ticolonialism. Within this logic, bodies marked as feminine are abjured 
in the recuperation and transformation of masculine bodies in the act of 
liberation.
Fanon, whose anticolonial politics were shaped by and through psycho-
analysis, insisted on the primacy of race in the processes of identification. 
In Identification Papers, Diana Fuss locates identification within a particu-
larly colonial history (1995, 141). She explains that identification “is itself 
an imperial process, a form of violent appropriation in which the Other 
is deposed and assimilated into the lordly domain of Self. Through a psy-
chical process of colonization, the imperial subject builds an Empire of 
the Same and installs at its center a tyrannical dictator, ‘His Majesty the 
Ego’ ” (145). As Fuss and feminist scholars after her have argued, however, 
the woman of color in particular disappears in Fanon’s framing of identi-
fication.1 For Fuss, identification has a genealogy that is rooted in colonial 
history. Yet she argues that while Fanon situates race as central to identifica-
tion, he “does not think beyond the presuppositions of colonial discourse to 
examine how colonial domination itself works partially through the social 
institutionalization of misogyny and homophobia” (160). In effect, Fanon 
races identification while he erases the woman of color from its purview. 
Fanon could write of the psychosexual lives of white women (1967e) and 
dwell at length on Algerian women’s heroic psychic and bodily sacrifices 
toward the revolution (1965), but on the psychosexuality of the woman of 
color, he declared outright (in an echo of Freud): “I know nothing about 
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her” (1967g, 180). Hegel and Fanon make funny bedfellows here: While 
Africa was, as I discussed in the introduction, absolutely unknowable for 
Hegel, he nevertheless fabricated and produced decisive readings of it that 
contributed to the imperial project on the continent.2 Fanon produced psy-
choanalytic readings of Algerian women in the struggle for decolonization 
even while he professed that he “knows nothing” of black women, whose 
sexual desires and psychic constitutions appear too inconsequential and 
confounding to be folded into his larger narrative of decolonization.3
In “Algeria Unveiled” (1965), Fanon illustrates how the “liberation” of 
women’s bodies in the colonies became central to the colonial enterprise 
through a process of domination that Spivak would famously come to for-
mulate as “white men . . . seeking to save brown women from brown men” 
(1988, 305). Fanon argues that the figure of the veiled woman became for 
the colonizer both the symbol of cultural savagery in the colonies and the 
most effective tool for controlling the colonized body politic. If the veil 
was the most glaring sign of the Algerian woman’s oppression, it became 
the unrelenting task of the colonial administration “to defend this woman, 
pictured as humiliated, sequestered, cloistered” and in urgent need of lib-
eration from the barbaric Algerian man (1965, 38). She became a means by 
which the colonizer could gain full control over Algerian culture: “In the 
colonialist program, it was the woman who was given the historic mission 
of shaking up the Algerian man. Converting the woman, winning her over 
to the foreign values, wrenching her free from her status, was at the same 
time achieving a real power over the man and attaining a practical, effec-
tive means of destructuring Algerian culture” (39). Here we see the “civi-
lizing mission” of colonial practice framed precisely and most effectively 
through the mastering of the female body. This body reflected for the colo-
nizer a barbarous patriarchy that itself needed to be brought to full sub-
mission. Unveiling the Algerian woman would thus not only “liberate” her 
but would perversely bring her into a pseudomasterful role (always under 
the authority of the white man) by empowering her to hold a “real power” 
over Algerian men. By being laid bare, brought into the fold of Western 
femininity, she would become able to emasculate the Algerian man who 
had enslaved her. This emasculation would in turn make the Algerian man 
more easily dominated by colonial power, “destructured” by his woman 
into a form ripe for full submission to the “real” (white) Man. In his reading 
of colonial logic’s confounding contradictions, Fanon emphasizes how the 
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Algerian woman emerged all at once as absolute victim, weapon of imperial 
conquest, and gateway to conquering the Algerian man and “delivering” 
him into colonial submission.
While Fanon “unveils” colonial logic, he also cannot help but to affirm 
the Algerian woman as a threat to Algerian masculinity even as he is deter-
mined to defend her honor. His aim is to illustrate how the colonial imagi-
nation of the Algerian woman has been a radical mischaracterization. In 
fact, for Fanon she is selfless in relation to the revolution and, even more 
strikingly, she is one who best performs self- mastery: “This revolutionary 
activity has been carried on by the Algerian woman with exemplary con-
stancy, self- mastery, and success. Despite the inherent, subjective difficul-
ties and notwithstanding the sometimes violent incomprehension of a part 
of the family, the Algerian woman assumes all the tasks entrusted to her” 
(1965, 53– 54). Although she is “sometimes” subjected to the “violent incom-
prehension” of parts of the patriarchal family unit, the Algerian woman 
remains undeterred by this violence and is steadfastly committed to “the 
tasks entrusted to her” (54). Her agency in Fanon’s narrative is here limited 
to a masculine revolution that decides to “entrust” her, that makes use of 
her body and her determination in carrying out revolutionary acts. She is 
an agent but not agential: she follows the orders of the revolution because 
she remains so devoutly committed to the embodied masculinity of the 
anticolonial men whose bodies and psyches will, unlike her own, be posi-
tively reshaped and humanized by the revolution.
In contrast to Diana Fuss, who argues that in Fanon’s thought “the colo-
nial other remains an undifferentiated, homogenized male, and subjectivity 
is ultimately claimed for men alone” (1995, 160), Kalpana Seshadri- Crooks 
insists that “a sympathetic understanding of Fanon’s masculinist politics 
forces us to confront the contradictions in a simple feminist position that 
privileges women’s issues and well- being first (even if it is because women 
otherwise always come last) and in isolation from other overlapping and 
extenuating concerns. In the ‘suicide’ and rebirth of the ‘new man’ envi-
sioned by Fanon perhaps lies ‘our’ salvation as (women and as) human 
beings” (2002, 94). For Seshadri- Crooks, Fanon’s “political masculinism” 
folds into a broader struggle of decolonization that gives way to inclusion, 
to a politics of decolonization that is dehumanizing to all humans. She thus 
historicizes Fanon by arguing that “what Fanon makes clear is that at the 
moment of his writing, political struggle and national sovereignty were 
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unimaginable without a rehabilitation of masculinity” (96). I remain com-
pelled by Seshadri- Crooks’s commitment to the promise of more inclusive 
futures that can be shaped through politics that themselves hinged on par-
ticular forms of exclusion. Other accounts of Fanon’s masculine politics, 
however, explicitly pressure the idea that such political discourses might 
give way to an increasingly expansive and inclusive politics to come.4 Gwen 
Bergner signals how Fanon’s “universal” subject is specifically male, indi-
cating that “racial identities intersect with sexual difference” (2005, 3). She 
aims to examine the role of gender in Black Skin, White Masks in order to 
“broaden Fanon’s outline of black women’s subjectivity and to work toward 
delineating the interdependence of race and gender” (3). Feminine sub-
jectivity is both crucial to and absent from Black Skin, White Masks, and 
this slippage becomes vital to understanding Fanon’s own account of ra-
cialized masculine subject formation (9). For Bergner, then, the parsing of 
race and gender in Fanon’s psychoanalytic formulation of the “universal” 
is imperative to mobilizing his anticolonialism, to recognizing what Fanon 
overlooked—namely, how colonial society “perpetuates racial inequality 
through structures of sexual difference” (13).
In “The Woman of Color and the White Man” (1967h), Fanon famously 
engages an extended, wholly unsympathetic reading of Mayotte Capécia’s 
autobiography, Je suis Martiniquaise (1948). Introducing this text as “cut- 
rate merchandise, a sermon in praise of corruption,” Fanon embarks on 
a psychoanalytic reading of black Antillean female subjectivity through a 
narrative account of a woman’s desire to be married to a white man (1967h, 
42). In an interesting move, Fanon narrativizes Capécia’s own narrative 
account by beginning his discussion of her text as follows: “One day a 
woman named Mayotte Capécia, obeying a motivation whose elements 
are difficult to detect, sat down to write 202 pages—her life—in which 
the most ridiculous ideas proliferated at random. The enthusiastic recep-
tion that greeted this book in certain circles forces us to analyze it” (42). 
Fanon’s introduction to this text, which he proceeds to rail against, is cast 
as a story—“one day a woman . . .”—that represents a black woman’s desire 
to self- represent as not only absurd but incomprehensible. Like so many 
other gendered and sexed slippages and continuities across Fanon, here 
his telling of Capécia’s own story becomes a story in itself, one in which 
Fanon as narrator tells us that the motivations of his black, female antihero 
are “difficult to detect.” It is she, after all, who extends out to all women 
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of color, of whom Fanon “knows nothing.” (I will turn in the following 
chapters to the crucial importance of writing ourselves as impossibly split 
subjects, and to the gendered, raced, and hybrid possibilities of such writ-
ing.) Given Fanon’s own psychoanalytic frame, one in which the black male 
body is “universal,” Capécia’s writing is always already indecipherable to 
him. Within Fanon’s own narrative of decolonization, the woman of color’s 
narration must be proleptically dismissed.
Gandhian (Ef)feminism
Instrumental and disposable. Allies and excesses. What becomes clear is 
that in the formation of Fanon’s own masterfully embodied emergent sub-
jectivity—a subjectivity that for him is necessary to decolonization—other 
specifically gendered and sexualized figures must be eschewed in its mak-
ing. Likewise, in Gandhi’s own narrative accounts and pursuits of swaraj 
(self- rule)—a state of being produced by and through practices of mas-
tery—women play a tricky role. As Madhu Kishwar (1985) has illustrated, 
Gandhi was inclusive of women in the movement toward national libera-
tion and saw them as critical constituents to producing social change. For 
Gandhi, accounting for women was in fact instrumental to the transfor-
mation of the body politic at large, and he was quick to see the relations 
between the personal (the home) and the political, especially in terms of 
the embodied politics of ahimsa (nonviolence) as a devotional practice. He 
persistently situated women in the home as wives and mothers even while 
he created social change that sought to alleviate gender oppression. As pro-
gressive as Gandhi’s inclusivity of women appeared, as Kishwar argues, he 
failed to understand that gender oppression was a historically grounded 
and social experience that could not simply be overcome through the moral 
dedication of women.
If the proper place of women for Gandhi was as devoted homemakers, 
he also selectively employed the figure of the improper woman to frame 
British life and its illnesses. In Hind Swaraj, a narrative framed as a discus-
sion between an inquisitive, well- educated “Reader” and an “Editor” (the 
loosely veiled figure of Gandhi himself), the Editor argues that the British 
Parliament, hailed “the Mother of Parliaments,” is like a “sterile woman and 
a prostitute” (1997, 32). While Gandhi- as-Editor acknowledges that these 
are “harsh terms,” he also abides by them, affirming that the British Parlia-
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ment is a “sterile woman” insofar as it “has not yet of its own accord done 
a single good thing” and is like a prostitute because “it is under the control 
of ministers who change from time to time” (32). Gandhi later declared that 
he stood by every word of Hind Swaraj with the exception of his use of the 
term “prostitute”—a word that offended the “fine taste” of a female English 
friend and that he therefore regretted using (Skaria 2007, 219).
The link here between sterility and prostitution is fascinating in its own 
right, not merely because it reveals a striking (but not altogether unex-
pected) patriarchy at work in Gandhian metaphorics but because it links 
the biological capacity for reproduction with the social production and 
function of sex labor. If the corporeal is tied to the social in Gandhi’s mas-
culinist politics, the female slides between the biological and the social, but 
she does so as an errant subject.
Gandhi proceeds from this unabashed evocation of the British Parlia-
ment as a failed or fallen woman to a declaration that the fundamental 
problem of the Parliament is that it is one “without a real master” (1997, 32). 
Perceived as the height of civilization, the Editor explains that Britain is in 
fact diseased and suffering from its commitment to the pursuit of modern 
civilization, a commitment that lends itself directly to colonization. Follow-
ing Gandhi’s logic, the colonial master is one born from an improper, mas-
terless nation- state, and his actions are the actions of a master who himself 
has not been subjected to a “proper” form of state mastery.5 The develop-
ment of a properly masterful governing body in Gandhian terms would 
thus necessitate a rescue from its thoroughly gendered insufficiencies.
Over the course of his autobiography, Gandhi’s anticolonial politics are 
crystalized through the transformation of his own anticolonial masculinity. 
Parama Roy (2010) offers a rich and persuasive account of Gandhi’s com-
plex staging of anticolonial masculinity, particularly through the lens of 
the mahatma’s alimentary politics.6 As a youth, Gandhi believed that India’s 
freedom from British colonial rule would happen through the embodied 
transformation of Indian subjects. According to his early logic, because 
large constituents of Indian subjects were vegetarian, they had bodies that 
were too weak to fight their carnivorous masters. The young Gandhi held 
firmly to the belief that meat eating was the gateway to national liberation, 
to literally overthrowing the British through what Roy calls “culinary mas-
culinity” (2010, 81), and to claiming India as a self- ruled nation- state.7 He 
would famously come to reverse this logic, believing instead that nonvio-
decolonIzIng mAstery 39
lent practice was vital to true liberation. This meant, as Roy aptly illustrates, 
that Gandhi’s own body and its self- staging would become vital to his pro-
jection of an explicitly anticolonial masculinity. While Fanon’s masculine 
colonized body was one always tensed by and against the force of coloni-
zation, and in need of release from that tension, Gandhi’s own slim, scantily 
clad figure—one that leans toward effeminacy—would come to signal a no 
less embodied but very different representation of masculinity positioned 
against colonial force.
If Gandhi’s body has become emblematic of “passive resistance” to colo-
nial rule (a term that Gandhi himself renounced because in fact the practice 
of satyagraha was better translated as “love- force” or “truth- force,” which 
was in no sense “passive”), it remains a body that recasts the “look” and 
register of masculinity itself.8 Indeed, as Roy argues, Gandhi’s own adop-
tion of a nearly naked aesthetic aligned him with debates about respectable 
women’s attire in public places (2010, 85– 86). As both Kishwar and Roy 
illustrate, Gandhi was in so many respects aligned with women’s issues and 
saw women as vital allies in his movement toward a mass mobilization of 
anticolonial social transformation. But within the practices of self- mastery 
that Gandhi saw as so vital to the production of truly liberated subjectivi-
ties, women play an odd role. Gandhi’s commitment to brahmacharya—a 
term that translates as “celibacy” but exceeds the sexual connotations of 
this term—necessitated for him practices of testing his self- control. Some-
what scandalously, such tests included lying in bed beside female followers 
and ashram inmates to ensure that he would not become aroused by them. 
Joseph Alter begins an essay on celibacy and sexuality in North Indian 
nationalism by declaring, “It is well known that Mahatma Gandhi felt that 
sexuality and desire were intimately connected to social life and politics, 
and that self- control translated directly into power of various kinds, both 
public and private” (1994, 45). But if Gandhi could claim to have mastered 
his sexual desire, he certainly struggled across his life with its alimentary 
corollary, struggles that Roy reveals cannot be extricated from the female 
figures that in his autobiography appeared never to waver in their practices 
of abstinence.
Drawing on Derrida’s reading of the biblical story of Abraham and 
Isaac,9 Roy turns to the figure of Sarah as mother who is explicitly absented 
from the story. Thinking through the gendered valences of sacrifice in The 
Gift of Death, Derrida asks: “Does the system of this sacrificial responsibil-
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ity . . . imply at its very basis an exclusion or sacrifice of woman?” (1995, 76). 
Roy illustrates how women were complexly situated within the sacrificial 
frame of Gandhian ethico- politics. In her reading, Gandhi’s vegetarianism 
is bound to self- subjection and sacrifice in the service of refusing harm 
to others. I will return expressly to the figure of the animal in Gandhian 
thought below, but first I want to dwell on Roy’s argument for how Gand-
hian ethics hinges on a sacrificial exclusion of women: “If the vegetarian is 
one who is willing to sacrifice himself rather than sacrificing the other that 
is the nonhuman animal, what is indeed properly his own to sacrifice? Who 
is it who can undertake the responsibility of sacrifice? If sacrifice is a bur-
den it is surely also an entitlement and an assertion of one’s rights over one’s 
body and one’s actions and those of others. Can a woman be a sacrificer?” 
(2010, 109). Here Roy asks us to consider the fascinating figure of Gandhi’s 
wife, Kasturba, who across the autobiography repeatedly emerges as more 
devout and less conflicted in her unfailing religious commitment. Unlike 
Gandhi, who struggles relentlessly with his alimentary desires (much more 
so than with his sexual desires), Kasturba appears—just as Gandhi’s mother 
did early in the autobiography—steadfast and unwavering in her religious 
devotion. Mothers and wives are thus the unflagging keepers of proper 
practice in Gandhian ethics, ones that he looks to as models for his own de-
sired purity and as figures that often exceed his own devotional capacities.
Yet Kasturba in particular reveals what Roy calls the “gendered con-
tours” of Gandhi’s parables of alimentary crisis, parables that illustrate “the 
complex character of women’s (non-)sacrifice” (2010, 109) as Gandhi holds 
the position of “vegetarian patriarch” (106). In one parable, Gandhi falls 
gravely ill at a moment when he has vowed to abstain from cow’s milk. 
Kasturba, herself an abstainer, persuades her husband to drink goat’s milk 
to restore him to health. Roy writes: “Gandhi’s response to this instance of 
apad dharma, a paradoxical act that preserves life and undermines ethics 
at the same time, is an acknowledgement of his human frailty” (112). While 
Gandhi confronts his frailty, he also breaks (or compromises) the vow in 
order to carry on the fight for national independence. On the one hand, 
the political becomes a realm that makes this particular sacrifice necessary, 
for Gandhi must live in order to stay the course of the fight for satyagraha. 
On the other hand, Gandhi describes himself as having “succumbed” to 
his wife’s insistence, here making clear the relation between sexual and ali-
mentary seduction. Roy writes: “This tale stages the question . . . of what or 
decolonIzIng mAstery 41
who is sacrificed in sacrificing oneself to an ideal of vegetarian purity. How 
is one to assess, for instance, the vegetarian sacrifice of the public man or 
mahatma in relation to the vegetarian sacrifice of the child or the woman/
wife/mother?” (113). Gandhi characterizes woman as “the embodiment of 
sacrifice and ahimsa” (114). But in this narrative (as in others), Kasturba 
comes clearly to lack the “heroic status and purity of sacrifice” (114). Here 
she serves as a proper figure of the Hindu wife’s dharma in sustaining the 
life of her husband, all the while confirming “her status as one who is not 
entitled to offer sacrifice in her own right. Sacrifice is . . . an entitlement, 
even a property right, so that the sacrificer proper is ready not just to sacri-
fice himself but, perhaps just as importantly, to sacrifice others” (114). Roy’s 
reading of Gandhi’s gendered embodiment and sacrifice emphasizes how 
within his thought women play an absolutely vital role in his self- staging 
and vision for political mobilization, while revealing that sacrifice is a prop-
erly masculine realm, one through which female agency is concurrently 
sacrificed.
The Potential of Self- Mastery
Fanonian and Gandhian thought—as divergent as they appear—rely, then, 
on particularly gendered alliances, exclusions, and erasures in order to 
stage their political projects. Women emerge in the narrative accounts of 
these anticolonial leaders as indispensable supporters and as subjects that 
need to be cast off from the properly male realm of decolonization. The 
scholarship that has taken up the status of women in anticolonial thought 
paves the way toward a thinking of other less explored figures of anticolo-
nial discourse that are similarly caught up in and refused by the masterful 
aims and practices of decolonization. I will turn to some such figures—
the indigene, “uncivilized” groups, the animal, the cripple, and nature—to 
dwell on the relations between anticolonial masteries and colonial violence 
in the making of particularly masculine decolonized subjectivities.
As Ashis Nandy argues, in Gandhian thought “freedom is indivisible, 
not only in the popular sense that the oppressed of the world are one but 
also in the unpopular sense that the oppressor too is caught in the culture 
of oppression” (1983, 63). Gandhi wrote at length about how modern civili-
zation created sick societies from which colonization was born. Through-
out Hind Swaraj, he dwells extensively on how his path toward freedom 
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would liberate Indian subjects not only from colonial rule but from its re-
liance on the more primordial disease of modern civilization. Swaraj was 
thus critically also an invitation to freedom for India’s English masters. 
The pursuit of self- rule was therefore not merely targeted toward the lib-
eration of Indians and other global subjects living under colonial rule but 
was an act of utopic mobilization in which both colonizers and colonized 
would become liberated. The gateway to true liberation was, for Gandhi, 
absolute discipline over oneself, and he sought “complete independence” 
not merely from British rule but from any external power whose influence 
could lead him away from the proper path of “truth.” Elaborating this no-
tion of “truth” at the center of Gandhian thought, Partha Chatterjee writes: 
“To Gandhi . . . truth did not lie in history, nor did science have any privi-
leged access to it. Truth was moral: unified, unchanging and transcenden-
tal. It was not an object of critical inquiry or philosophical speculation. It 
could only be found in the experience of one’s life, by the unflinching prac-
tice of moral living” (1986, 97). If truth was that which one discovered for 
oneself through a relentless pursuit of moral living, this meant also that it 
could not be squared with “the dominant thematic of post- Enlightenment 
thought” (97). Gandhi’s truth, then, resided in a politics of experimentation 
that could never be foreclosed, and that was thus fundamentally incom-
patible with dialectical reason. This formulation of truth, founded on an 
uncertain practice of experimentation, might offer us the most powerful 
method by which to exceed mastery’s hold in the everyday production of 
the human through neocolonial politics today.10
While Gandhi’s formulation of his practice remains structured by log-
ics of (self-) mastery, his experimental practice in fact functions against 
mastery’s definitive foreclosures. This is most apparent—perhaps paradox-
ically—in his attempts to explain brahmacharya, a practice of self- mastery 
in which one “controls his organs of sense in thought, word, and deed” 
(1998, 24). Gandhi took the vow of brahmacharya in his pursuit of truth, 
and confesses that its definition is one that he himself does not under-
stand completely: “The meaning of this definition became somewhat clear 
after I had kept the observance for some time, but it is not quite clear even 
now, for I do not claim to be a perfect brahmachari, evil thoughts having 
been held in restraint but not eradicated. When they are eradicated, I will 
discover further implications of the definition” (1998, 24). Since Gandhi 
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himself could not claim to be a perfect brahmachari (one who practices 
brahmacharya), he refused a full definition of the term. Brahmacharya 
was something aspirational and radically uncertain; it could produce in-
finite possibilities, yet he could not foreclose its definition. As I argued in 
the introduction of this book, where I sketched some qualities of mastery, 
definitional foreclosure can itself become a practice of masterful exclusion. 
Gandhi’s refusal to offer a definition of something he is still (and will always 
be) learning points toward an embodied, material practice that exceeds 
what conceptual thought can contain. When turned inward, mastery for 
Gandhi refuses to be transparent and definable, even while for him it holds 
out limitless possibilities. Unlike foreign mastery, which functions through 
a logic of domination that is concrete in its aims (even while its effects may 
be intangible or diffuse), brahmacharya as self- mastery aims toward the 
uncertainty of its own practice and the experimental quality of its aims, 
with a will to the experimental subjection of the self as opposed to the 
domination of others in the pursuit of truth.
The Violence of Swaraj
Meditating on the wars of Europe, Gandhi questioned why one nation’s 
cause should be considered right and another wrong, why brute force re-
peatedly governed instead of the pursuit of truth. The commitment to sa-
tyagraha as a governing practice refused outright this dynamic and insisted 
that the force involved in the pursuit of truth was a force imposed by but 
also toward the truth- seeker. The political pressure of the satyagrahi (one 
who practices satyagraha) in action, which was always driven by a prin-
ciple of love, revealed to others their wrongdoings and urged them to cor-
rect their own actions. It also rendered powerless those in power, because 
for the satyagrahi no one external to him could make him act in ways that 
did not accord to his own will (1976, 16:64). The satyagrahi was one ready 
to submit himself to the punitive power of the state, willfully disobeying 
it when he found it to be unjust. He did penance for social injustices, and 
through this form of civil disobedience he could be violently penalized but 
never fundamentally governed by the state. The “complete independence” 
of the satyagrahi was born therefore through this unrelenting willingness 
to suffer for and in turn transform the disorders of society. Crucially, if the 
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satyagrahi found that he had been misled in his pursuit of truth, only he 
(and his fellow satyagrahis) would have suffered through the enactment of 
satyagraha (1976, 16:63).
Gandhi’s popular legacy as a renowned advocate of peace becomes 
quickly complicated, however, through a careful reading of his work. 
Claude Markovitz suggests that the critical contrast between Gandhi as 
icon and Gandhi as “blood- and- flesh individual” is the result of “selective 
memory” (2004, 163– 64). Such memory is crafted both by Gandhi’s own 
practices of historical self- representation and through political discourses 
in South Africa, India, and beyond that have employed his legacy selectively 
toward mobilizations for peace.11 What this selective memory relies on is 
a popular conception of an unfailingly nonviolent humanity, in effect for-
getting the ways that Gandhi himself was at times a proponent of violence, 
and that his trajectory toward swaraj was replete with violent practices. He 
understood that violence was not only inescapable in human life but also 
that at times taking violent action would be the best course toward avoiding 
greater violence. Violence was not only necessary but highly contextual and 
at times ethically imperative. Roy points us to “the complexity of Gandhian 
nonviolence, and his awareness not only of the proximity of violence and 
nonviolence but also of the coimplication of the nominally nonviolent in 
structures of violence” (2010, 105). Violence and nonviolence for Gandhi 
were intimate, collaborative, and far from antithetical. Because in Gand-
hian philosophy love was often “obliged” to fight (1976, 16:63), Gandhi did 
not eschew it completely, framing life as itself dependent on requisite forms 
of violence. He cited, for example, the necessary act of drawing breath that 
required the ingestion of microorganisms, and the need for the human use 
of disinfectants that would kill harmful germs (1976, 31:488).
Beyond these requisite forms, he also framed violence as something that 
was at times ethically imperative. To kill someone who sought to do ex-
tensive harm to others, for instance, could be deemed a necessary act of 
violence. In this respect, violence emerged as something contingent and 
contextual, something that could work in the service of nonviolence. While 
Gandhi insisted that “non- violence is the supreme dharma” (1976, 14:299), 
violence was so often at stake in his own pursuit of ahimsa (nonviolence). 
Indeed, the practice of satyagraha was for him “India’s distinctive weapon” 
(1976, 16:64), a vehicle that was driven by a politics of love and nonviolence 
but was also bound to violence through the language of weaponry. Reading 
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Gandhi from the vantage point of a literary scholar, one cannot ignore the 
implications of this metaphor, how the metaphor itself reveals something 
vital about Gandhian politics. Satyagraha is a weapon used against the 
(colonial) master, a weapon necessary to undoing the hold of the master 
over Indian subjects. Gandhi did not see a tension between the language of 
weaponry and his politics of nonviolence because for him love could not be 
altogether extricated from violence. In Faisal Devji’s provocative reading of 
Gandhi and violence, he argues that Gandhi’s movement in fact “had noth-
ing to do with avoiding violence” (2012, 7). Far from shunning violence, 
Devji argues, Gandhi appropriated and sublimated violence “by inviting 
and directing it through a series of political experiments, both theoretical 
and practical” (8). If Gandhi in effect courted violence in order to convert 
it within the colonial context, he did so in ways that were often contradic-
tory. One struggles to account for a particular logic or pattern in Gandhi’s 
engagements with violence, which are united, Devji argues, by a set of prin-
ciples but are often difficult to reconcile.
In their recent work on Gandhi in South Africa, Ashwin Desai and 
Goolam Vahed argue against the dominant narrative of Gandhi as “a great 
inventor of the new tactic and philosophy of nonviolent popular politics 
and as a pioneer of anti- colonial nationalism” (2016, 25). Rather, Desai 
and Vahed argue that Gandhi’s political imagination remained bound by 
a desire for equality within empire. They read Gandhian tactics as shaped 
by “a conservative defence of class, race and caste privilege” (25). Given 
 Gandhi’s popular legacy, it is almost unfathomable to think that in 1906, 
during the Zulu rebellion against debilitating taxes in Natal, he went to war 
as a stretcher- bearer on behalf of empire. This war produced very few Brit-
ish casualties, while “three thousand five hundred Zulu were killed, seven 
thousand huts were burnt, and thirty thousand people were left homeless” 
(20).12 Desai and Vahed ask us to remember Gandhi before India, a Gandhi 
that does not square easily with his legacy. What was at stake for Gandhi 
in participating actively in the violence of war? Desai and Vahed argue 
that Gandhian politics in South Africa remained locked within a desire 
for Indian recognition from Britain at the expense of other disempowered 
groups: “Gandhi sought to ingratiate himself with Empire and its mission 
during his years in South Africa. In doing so, he not only rendered African 
exploitation and oppression invisible, but was, on occasion, a willing part 
of their subjugation and racist stereotyping” (22). This picture of Gandhi 
46 chApter one
in South Africa, participating in the subjugation of non- Indian marginal 
communities, is one that confronts with great unease the legacies of Gandhi 
that dominate in popular and political discourse. If it has become almost 
an intellectual fashion of late to rehistoricize Gandhi and to draw out some 
of the most deeply unsettling aspects of his history, politics, and practice, 
this fashion signals a felt urgency to think critically about our legacies 
of nonviolence—ones that relied on the violent extermination of certain 
populations toward the recuperation of others. Such “inconvenient truths” 
(24) about Gandhi include his engagements in the war against the Zulus in 
South Africa when he was a mere three years away from the writing of Hind 
Swaraj, the doctrine of Indian self- rule that he would famously craft over a 
period of days on a return journey from England to South Africa on board 
the Kildonan Castle in 1909.13 He was very close, in other words, to launch-
ing an explicit treatise on Indian independence, on the necessity of swaraj 
and nonviolent resistance to the British control of India as he participated 
in the violence against indigenous peoples in South Africa.14
Across Gandhi’s political career, there would continue to be commu-
nities, groups, and bodies whose conquest became crucial to the achieve-
ment of the mahatma’s “greater” political aims. In the section of Hind 
Swaraj titled “The Condition of India,” the Editor overturns Gandhi’s early 
political thinking about the strength of Indian bodies as the gateways to 
Indian independence. The Editor asserts of the pursuit of swaraj: “Strength 
lies in the absence of fear, not in the quantity of flesh and muscle we may 
have on our bodies. Moreover, I must remind you who desire Home Rule 
that, after all, the Bhils, the Pindaris, the Assamese and the Thugs are our 
own countrymen. To conquer them is your and my work. So long as we fear 
our own brethren, we are unfit to reach the goal” (1997, 45). Referencing 
here a host of groups perceived as “uncivilized” and thus expressly perilous 
to the mobilization of the nation- state, Gandhi insists that it is the job of 
those seeking swaraj through practices of self- restraint and self- sufficiency 
“to conquer them.” In the English translation of the text, the phrase is sup-
plemented with a clarifying footnote: “ ‘To conquer them’: in the Gujarati 
text this reads ‘To win them over’ ” (1997, 45n71). This translation is re-
markable in its discursive shift from the Gujarati sense of persuasion to 
the overt subjugation at work in the English translation. The fact that such 
a slip happens within English—the language of the colonizer—is a prob-
lematic I will return to in the next chapter. Critical here is how the valence 
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between “winning over”—a kind of seduction of self- rule that would entice 
these “uncivilized” groups—becomes expressly a conquest in which they 
are dominated by the “civilized” body politic who conquer in order to be-
come independently ruled at the level of the nation- state.
Because Gandhi himself was actively involved in the translation of Hind 
Swaraj, this distinction deserves significant attention. Persuaded by En-
glish friends that he must translate the text, Gandhi states that it is not 
a “literal translation” but that it “is a faithful rendering of the original” 
even while it was written in some degree of haste (1997, 5). In his preface 
to the English translation, he writes, “It is not without hesitation that the 
translation of ‘Hind Swaraj’ is submitted to the public” (5). Of the Gujarati 
text, Gandhi declares that there are “many imperfections” in the original: 
“The English rendering, besides sharing these, must naturally exaggerate 
them, owing to my inability to convey the exact meaning of the original” 
(6). That his inability to convey exactly the meaning of his Gujarati text 
lends itself to natural exaggeration in translation is fascinating in itself, but 
here my interest lies in how this particular “exaggeration” betrays the slip-
pery relation between persuasion and mastery across moments of Gand-
hian thought. To “win over” in the original Gujarati text designates some 
degree of agency to these marginal groups, indicating that the persuasion 
enacted by Gandhi’s followers is a form of pressure that is placed on the 
wayward subjects of the state in order to usher them into the “proper” 
fold. This is a pressure that works on but not against such subjects, wel-
coming them into the fold of the proper through an engagement that they 
may or may not choose to pursue. The English translation betrays this aim 
by issuing “conquest” as the targeted act of seekers of swaraj. Within the 
translation, seekers of swaraj take up both of the early modern definitions 
of “mastery”—seeking to “best” these marginal groups as opponents and to 
educate them through the more knowledgeable frame of the swaraj- seeker. 
To bring these marginal groups into the proper fold of an independent, 
self- ruled nation- state requires in the English translation their masterful 
domination. If we follow Gandhi’s insistence in the preface to the English 
translation, we might read this movement from winning over to conquest 
as merely one of the “natural” exaggerations that occur in the act of transla-
tion. I want to suggest that while this may well be so, the slip toward con-
quest reveals the ways in which the mastery turned inward in Gandhian 
thought cannot help but to seep outward—onto and against other bodies.
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Yet another footnote contextualizing this passage informs readers that 
“in 1921 Gandhi apologised to the Assamese for listing them among the 
‘uncivilised’ tribes of India” (44n71). In his apology, Gandhi calls his error 
“a grave injustice done to the great Assamese people, who are every whit 
as civilised as any other part of India” (44n71). He proceeds to explain that 
his “stupidity” in characterizing the Assamese as uncivilized was informed 
by his reading of an English account of the Manipur expedition by Sir John 
Gorst. Because Gandhi admits that he was “an indifferent reader of his-
tory,” he suggests that he retained this historical account of the Assamese 
as jungli (wild/uncivilized) as historical fact, and subsequently “committed 
it to writing.” This is a fascinating moment in which conquest is explicitly 
informed and delegated by a specifically Western history, a moment that 
reveals how Gandhian philosophy could not be dissociated from the colo-
nial frame against which it positioned itself. It also illustrates how, through 
reading and writing practices, particular subjects become enfolded in or 
excluded from the realm of civility and thus subjected to masterful forms 
of action against them.
Gandhi’s Animals
Mastery in Gandhian discourse slips between the internal and the exter-
nal, between the colonizer and the colonized, between the individual body 
and the body politic, and, critically for Gandhian ethics, also between the 
human and the animal. Gandhi explained that the life of the satyagrahi 
is one governed by the discipline of the body and the soul (1976, 16:63). 
This form of discipline required both a pacification of the human’s “animal 
passions” and an overcoming of the “enemy within” (Gandhi [1932] 2004, 
5). It was by turning away from “the imagined enemy without” and turn-
ing toward the “enemy within” that Gandhi understood the social enact-
ment of love. Such love required an overcoming of aspects and qualities of 
the human that signaled for him its unenlightened status. Sexual drives, 
among other yearnings, would need to be unremittingly tamed for the en-
lightened subject to emerge. Specific aspects of oneself as an uncontrolled 
animal being, therefore, would have to be mastered in order to pave the 
way toward a decolonized society. The effect of the satyagrahi was a politics 
of the unmasterful persuasion of the other, a practice that embodied forms 
of masterful violence against the self in order to do penance for individual 
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and state injustices. The force of satyagraha was therefore to be found ex-
plicitly in its determined refusal to enact violence against others by aiming 
toward complete mastery over oneself. For Gandhi, satyagraha was fun-
damentally an act of love aimed toward the “so- called enemy,” to illustrate 
the error of the adversary’s ways. This was the critical method Gandhi em-
ployed to show the British colonizers the error of their ways, but Gandhi 
also did penance for the acts of Indian political leaders and fellow ashram 
inmates who had, to his mind, strayed from the proper path. To love one’s 
perceived adversaries it was essential to show them kinship and to persuade 
them that their ways were misleading or unjust. Violence directed at an-
other betrayed this aim, and so the satyagrahi embodied the violence he 
refused in the political realm.
If other human groups become complex sites for understanding Gand-
hian philosophy, so too does the nonhuman world leave open questions 
about Gandhian ethico- politics. Gandhi’s key concepts—swaraj, ahimsa, 
brahmacharya—fundamentally implicated the animal.15 Gandhi signals 
this repeatedly across his writings, for instance when he queried the seem-
ingly arbitrary limits we attach to our spiritual and political imperatives. 
He called on Indians to query when they would know they had reached the 
limit of swaraj, urging them to consider whether treating the untouchable 
castes of India as “blood brothers” was enough. He asked them to consider 
extending this limit to include their animal brethren, positing that humans 
and animals share the same soul (1976, 19:518). Humans and animals were 
bestowed with the same life force, and true swaraj could not therefore be 
confined by a commitment to humanity. Swaraj properly achieved would 
produce a limitless openness toward all other beings—beings that were 
vitally linked to humans. Yet even while he insisted on the animal’s place 
within ethics, he repeatedly returned to the exceptional status of the human 
by situating it at the top of a species hierarchy. Gandhi insisted on our need 
to avoid a life that was “animal- like,” insipid, and improper (1993, 317). In 
this sense, while he advocated for a radical openness toward animals, he 
did so through a deeply anthropocentric and paternalistic frame that could 
not reconceive of human/animal relations beyond a hierarchical formula-
tion. Humans should “serve” animals that were intimately tied to them, a 
service that was required because of the animal’s “lower” status.
While humans held an ethical commitment to animals, the animal as-
pects of human life needed paradoxically to be tamed in order to effec-
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tively perform this ethical commitment. Parama Roy points to this shift-
ing status of the animal in Gandhian thought when she argues, “In his 
more mundane communications with correspondents from all over India 
and the globe, he was possessed by the question of the relative importance 
of human and animal life, arguing sometimes against an anthropocentric 
bias and sometimes in favor of the greater moral worth of human beings” 
(2010, 105). Animals were among Gandhi’s most unreconciled, inconsis-
tent, and indeed for him haunting aspects of his ethico- politics. The spe-
cific instance of a “mercy- killing” of an injured calf at Gandhi’s Sabarmati 
Ashram and Gandhi’s provocative gesture of serving meat at the otherwise 
all- vegetarian Ashram to his carnivorous allies, Louis Fischer, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, and Maulana Azad, are instances of public controversies around 
Gandhi’s animal politics (Roy 2010, 106).16 His ethico- political stance on 
stray dogs likewise shocked many of his readers and followers, which ap-
peared to them to fall problematically short of ahimsa.17 Often undernour-
ished and carriers of disease, stray dogs in India were at times dangerous 
to human communities and had become a serious concern for the nation. 
To Gandhi’s mind, stray dogs were a direct reflection of the “ignorance and 
lethargy” of human society. If the state was to blame for failing to control 
the epidemic of stray dogs, so too were seemingly benevolent citizens in 
the wrong for perpetuating the problem by feeding them. Gandhi insisted 
that to feed stray dogs was a “misplaced kindness” that left intact the struc-
tural problem that produced them (1976, 28:5). True kindness, he declared, 
would necessitate housing and caring for the dogs in all respects. He also 
argued that in certain circumstances, euthanizing stray dogs was necessary 
to the eradication of suffering and the welfare of human communities. This 
position outraged many, who saw Gandhi as abandoning ahimsa outright. 
His was not an easy position to reconcile, but it reflected the path of ahimsa 
as necessitating contextual decisions that would produce ahimsa even while 
pursuing nonviolence.
One of Gandhi’s most revealing discourses on the limits of his spir-
itual capacity emerges through his failure to protect sheep, a failure on 
which he dwells during a recollection of a visit to the Kali temple in Cal-
cutta. With great anticipation, Gandhi set off to see the famous temple but 
along the way witnessed a “stream of sheep” being led to sacrifice in the 
name of Kali (Gandhi 1993, 234). Gandhi stopped to converse with a sadhu 
(wandering ascetic), and both men agreed that animal sacrifice was by no 
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means or in any circumstance properly religious. When Gandhi questioned 
why the sadhu did not preach against the killing of animals, the sadhu 
replied: “That’s not my business. Our business is to worship God” (235). 
Dismayed by the distinction the sadhu makes between the worship of God 
and responsible religious practice, he proceeded toward the temple and was 
horrified to witness copious amounts of animal blood: “I could not bear 
to stand there. I was exasperated and restless. I have never forgotten that 
sight” (235). Later that evening, still haunted by the sight of the sheep blood, 
Gandhi found himself in conversation with a Bengali friend with whom 
he spoke about the cruelty inherent in this form of uncritical worship. The 
friend attempted to convince Gandhi that the sheep felt no sensations of 
pain during their death, since their senses became dull by the ceremonial 
drumming. Gandhi refused this logic outright, insisting that if the animals 
could speak they would undoubtedly attest to their suffering. Although he 
felt adamantly that the custom should be abandoned, Gandhi stopped short 
of acting on this feeling because he believed that the task of preventing the 
practice was “beyond” him. Despite his failure to act, he felt nevertheless 
compelled to elaborate the responsibility that the human has toward the 
animal. He declared: “He who has not qualified himself for such service 
is unable to afford it any protection” (235). He believed that he would “die 
pining for this self- purification and sacrifice,” and this declared inability 
to fight against the sanctioned violence inflicted on sheep in the name of 
organized religion led him to long for another more exalted being to serve 
the animal as he wished but failed to do.
There is perhaps no clearer sign of the contingent, contextual, and at 
times irreconcilable aspects of Gandhian ethics than in his desire to pro-
tect and his will to eliminate animal forms of suffering. His reputation for 
a politics that hinged exclusively on peace becomes complicated through 
attention to his writing on women, his actions in relation to indigenous 
peoples of South Africa (which cannot be extricated from his willingness 
toward war in the service of Empire), his writings and translations of the 
“uncivilised” groups of India, and the various moments in which violence 
toward animals is enfolded into his pursuit of ahimsa as a path toward 
truth. What Gandhi shows us is the experimental necessity of contextual 
action, and while we may well disagree with some of the historical deci-
sions he made, he leaves us with the promise and necessity of confronting 
inescapable violence. His is a politics in which violence not only exists but 
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cannot be avoided. Gandhi’s own confessed failings to act in purely non-
violent ways, and the irreconcilability of his ethico- politics, is precisely the 
messiness we have to risk if we are to act differently in and toward the 
world. In this regard, what Gandhi saw as the limits of his spiritual capac-
ity, and what I have identified as some of the tensions and contradictions 
within his thinking about how to live ethically, are essential resources that 
his thought continues to offer us today.
The Entanglements of Love and Violence
Fanon’s oeuvre likewise reveals that his popular legacy is founded on strik-
ing elisions of the critical nuances of his anticolonial writings. Fanon’s repu-
tation is largely built on readings that emphasize his advocacy of violence 
while disregarding the many moments in which his thinking is inflected 
by love, and in which he articulates his vision for an almost romantic, thor-
oughly deracialized and declassed future of man. Situating Fanon within 
a squarely humanist frame, Nigel C. Gibson reminds us that far from a 
simplistic desire for violence, Fanon’s project was “to understand as well as 
to abolish the divisive and hierarchical zones that divide, fragment, and de-
stroy human beings” (2003, 6). Gibson writes that although Fanon is pop-
ularly remembered “for his powerful descriptions of, and prescriptions for, 
a violent engagement with colonialism and its logic, his project and goal is 
to get beyond Manicheanism both in its colonial form and as an anticolo-
nial reaction” (6). Fanon was in fact explicitly geared toward new world 
dynamics that fundamentally relied on mutual love in the formation of 
emergent subjectivities. In an idealist gesture toward the end of Black Skin, 
White Masks, for example, Fanon asks: “Why not the quite simple attempt 
to touch the other, to feel the other, to explain the other to myself?” (1967b, 
231). It is in such moments that we see crystalized a postcolonial vision in 
Fanonian thought that is no longer bound by the racial politics of coloni-
zation. Like Gibson, Homi Bhabha sees in Fanon the powerful potential to 
begin to live with/in difference. Bhabha declares: “The time has come to 
return to Fanon; as always, I believe, with a question: how can the human 
world live its difference; how can a human being live Other- wise?” (1994, 
64). While Fanon points us toward a politics of love- in-difference, differ-
ence in his thinking is chartered through the terrain of racialized mascu-
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linity. He envisions a deracinated future of “man” that emerges through the 
rejection of alliances with other nonconforming bodies.
In Sara Ahmed’s phenomenological work, she emphasizes how bodies 
are oriented toward different objects in space. Such orientations teach us—
often unconsciously—about who we are, leading us toward certain socially 
sanctioned objects and away from others in the formation of “proper” sub-
jectivities. Engaging with Fanon, Ahmed argues that “colonialism makes 
the world ‘white,’ which is of course a world ‘ready’ for certain kinds of 
bodies, as a world that puts certain objects within their reach. Bodies re-
member such histories, even when we forget them” (2006, 111). The colo-
nized body embodies the histories of its oppression by recognizing in mate-
rial ways that it is not free in relation to the world that surrounds it. The 
dehumanization of the colonized subject inhabits space in particular ways 
that signal its own subject/object status: “The black man in becoming an 
object no longer acts or extends himself; instead, he is amputated and loses 
his body” (139). Ahmed reminds us that the orientation of the black body 
in Fanon is one that is “lost” in a world that disavows it through forms of 
material restriction, restrictions that shape and echo his psychic existence.
Taking account of Fanon’s reach toward others, and the limits of that 
reach under colonialism, we must also attend to how “otherness” and al-
liance with alterity come to matter selectively in Fanonian discourse. Re-
nowned for its advocacy of violence, The Wretched of the Earth begins with 
the declaration that “decolonization is always a violent phenomenon” (1963, 
35). In Black Skin, White Masks, however, Fanon specifically turns toward 
love as he relays the profoundly destructive bodily and psychic conditions 
that comprise the colonial relation. Aggression and love for Fanon were 
constitutive components of every consciousness, and the task was thus to 
navigate one’s own capacity for each: “Man is motion toward the world 
and toward his like. A movement of aggression, which leads to enslave-
ment or to conquest; a movement of love, a gift of self, the ultimate stage 
of what by common accord is called ethical orientation. Every conscious-
ness seems to have the capacity to demonstrate these two components, 
simultaneously or alternatively” (1967h, 41). The entanglements of love and 
violence required a careful and relentless negotiation of constitutive parts 
whose relation overlaps and interchanges. Real love—which intends to op-
pose the will toward mastery—entails the “mobilization of psychic drives” 
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by enabling one to become free of one’s own “unconscious conflicts” (41). 
A love of this kind—love in its most “authentic” form—reaches between 
oneself and others. But to reach this authentic state of love, one has first to 
violently wrench away the material and psychological shackles of coloni-
zation; only having done so for oneself could this new man emerge, a man 
finally capable of authentic love. The violence necessary to decolonization 
was therefore intimately connected to, even inextricable from, the trajec-
tories and aims of love.
While for Gandhi violence was deeply contextual, for Fanon decoloniza-
tion was a specifically temporal practice. It was violence that had confirmed 
these “two forces” as master and slave, and it was also violence that would 
finally undo this dynamic. Seizing mastery over his master, the slave would 
insist on his recognition as man by refusing his own mastery. Violence 
against the master was therefore a productive act that would fundamen-
tally transform the slave by ushering him into being as a “new type of man” 
(Fanon 1967f, 36). In so doing, through the act of violence he reinstated 
his own humanity in an act that would fundamentally alter the world (37). 
Fanon did not envision this temporal enactment of violence as remain-
ing bound within a Hegelian structure of revenge and ongoing usurpation. 
Rather, the moment of anticolonial violence would fundamentally trans-
form colonial subjectivity and reconstitute world relations beyond a politics 
of racial subjugation.
Sociogeny and Narrative
In “The Fact of Blackness,” Fanon’s famous narrative account of colonial 
embodiment, other subjugated bodies surface as prospective allies but are 
refused alliance with the black male body readying itself for decoloniza-
tion. Fanon engages literary texts throughout the chapter as he tells the 
story of his own corporeal experience in relation to whiteness. He includes 
poetic and narrative accounts of other black thinkers such as Leopold 
Senghor, Jacques Roumain, David Diop, and Richard Wright, emphasizing 
the vitality of the literary in the thinking and articulation of anticolonial 
revolutionary politics. As I have already illustrated in his caustic approach 
to Mayotte Capécia’s autobiography, here too Fanon posits a theoretical 
account of race in deliberately narrative terms. He calls this “sociogeny,” 
which stands “beside phylogeny and ontogeny” (1967d, 11). Sociogeny is 
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Fanon’s term for how social fictions like race come to shape bodies and 
subjectivities at particular historical moments. Sylvia Wynter uses the title 
of Black Skin, White Masks to explain the function of sociogeny, referring 
to “Fanon’s redefinition of being human as that of skins (phylogeny/ontog-
eny) and masks (sociogeny)” (Wynter and McKittrick 2015, 23). Wynter 
explains that “we can experience ourselves as human only through the me-
diation of the processes of socialization effected by the invented tekhne or 
cultural technology to which we give the name culture” (2001, 53). Develop-
ing Fanon’s concept of sociogeny, Wynter argues that in any given historical 
moment the dominant conception of “Man” shapes the “subjective experi-
ence” of being human, including how we feel about our own humanity and 
the humanity of others (46). What is vital here is that “feeling” human—as 
an embodied, affective state—becomes central to realms such as ethics and 
politics, which are most often understood to be removed from affective 
life. Both Fanon and Wynter emphasize how the dominant conceptions of 
Man at any political moment are shaped and carried over through cultural 
narratives. Fanon’s narrative emphasis shows how the political and corpo-
real are always in fact tied to narrative—to elaborate not only politics as 
narrative with concrete material effects but also the transformative power 
of narrative in resistance to dominant politics. If the white man had woven 
the black man “out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories” (Fanon 1967c, 
111), Fanon responds with a black, intertextual, anticolonial narrative that 
details the tangible, embodied effects of colonial politics.
Early in “The Fact of Blackness,” Fanon declares that “the black man 
among his own in the twentieth century does not know at what moment 
his inferiority comes into being through the other” (1967c, 110). He pro-
ceeds to describe how he discussed at length “the black problem” with black 
male friends and asserted through protest “the equality of all men in the 
world.” Being satisfied with his “intellectual understanding of these differ-
ences,” Fanon suggests that his experience of race was “not really dramatic.” 
He ends the paragraph with a sentence fragment followed by ellipses: “And 
then . . .” (110). At the start of the following paragraph, Fanon picks up 
and completes this fragment: “And then the occasion arose when I had 
to meet the white man’s eyes.” Initially satisfied by his intellectual engage-
ment with racial inequality, he then confronts the gaze of the white man—
“and then”—comes to understand that his psychic and bodily experience 
of the world exists in a dehumanized relation to the white, fully human 
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subject. “In the white world,” Fanon writes, “the man of color encounters 
difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the 
body is a solely negating activity. It is a third- person consciousness. The 
body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty” (110– 11). It is 
through Fanon’s experience with the colonial gaze, then, that he becomes 
acutely aware that “below the corporeal schema” exists “a historico- racial 
schema” (111).
“The Fact of Blackness” centers on Fanon’s famous train scene, where he 
recounts his experience of disembodiment in relation to whiteness in the 
confined but peripatetic space of the locomotive. Having experienced the 
radical alienation of being “other” in relation to the fully human white man, 
Fanon writes: “On that day, completely dislocated, unable to be abroad with 
the other, the white man, who unmercifully imprisoned me, I took myself 
far off from my own presence, far indeed, and made myself an object. What 
else could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that 
spattered my whole body with black blood? But I did not want this revi-
sion, this thematization. All I wanted was to be a man among other men. I 
wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was ours and to help to 
build it together” (1967c, 112– 13). Fanon’s desire toward the end of this pas-
sage to be “a man among other men” in a collectively constructed world is 
perhaps the best illustration of both his commitment to humanism and his 
utopic desire for forms of human solidarity across difference. Rather than 
to have the opportunity to live this utopic desire, Fanon declares: “My body 
was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourn-
ing in that white winter day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, 
the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly” (113). Across the rest of the chapter, 
Fanon details the processes and effects of masterful erasure produced by 
and through the colonial relation. In doing so, he turns toward other fig-
ures whose own subjection to masterful distortion he evokes but refuses to 
mobilize alongside black male revolutionary politics.
Recalling his own Antillean education, Fanon describes a pedagogical 
moment in which he is taught to consider the oppression of the Jew in rela-
tion to that of the Negro: “At first thought it may seem strange that the anti- 
Semite’s outlook should be related to that of the Negrophobe. It was my 
philosophy professor, a native of the Antilles, who recalled the fact to me 
one day: ‘Whenever you hear anyone abuse the Jews, pay attention, because 
he is talking about you.’ And I found that he was universally right—by 
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which I meant that I was answerable in my body and in my heart for what 
was done to my brother. Later I realized that he meant, quite simply, an 
anti- Semite is inevitably anti- Negro” (1967c, 122). The logical progression 
in this passage is fascinating, as Fanon moves from the “strange” associa-
tion between anti- Semitism and Negrophobia, to his reading of his teach-
er’s declaration as a universal ethics in which Fanon becomes “answerable” 
in his body and heart to his Jewish “brother,” and finally to a concession 
that forms of oppression are always linked. Here Fanon summons a uni-
versal, ethical bond, both bodily and psychic (registered via the metaphor 
of the “heart”), that links him intimately to the Jew. Yet later in the chapter, 
when Fanon critiques Jean- Paul Sartre for having “destroyed black zeal” 
(135) and for forgetting “that the Negro suffers in his body quite differ-
ently from the white man” (138), he moves away from the alliance between 
the two marginalized figures. Fanon declares in a footnote that although 
Sartre may well be correct in his reading of “alienated consciousness,” the 
white man remains “the master, whether real or imaginary,” and therefore 
Sartre’s attempts to apply his formulation to “a black consciousness proves 
fallacious” (138n24). The Jew becomes proximate to the black man but fails 
to be mobilized as an effective ally in decolonization because he (dis)em-
bodies oppression differently.
Detailing the risk of “the closure of difference instead of the expansion 
of political possibilities” (1997, 93), Ann Pellegrini illustrates how while 
Fanon expresses a commitment to heterogeneity, he repeatedly “replicates 
a hom(m)ologics of the same.” If, as we have seen, black women mark what 
Pellegrini calls Fanon’s “extended blind spot,” the figure of the Jewish man 
in Fanon’s writing extends the horizons of this blindness. Pellegrini argues 
that “the ambivalence of Fanon’s own identifications with Jewishness and 
Jewish men holds out, as it turns its back on, the spare promise of speaking 
across difference” (93). Reading alongside his European interlocutor Sartre 
in Anti- Semite and Jew (1995), Fanon aims to cast the “sympathetic anal-
ogies” between anti- Semitism and Negrophobia without conflating them, 
signaling how in the European imperialist frame the Negro is characterized 
as body, as sexual predator, while the Jew is figured as cerebral, dangerously 
prosperous, but removed from the realm of body. In thinking the Negro in 
relation to the Jew—both historically racialized figures that pose “opposite” 
dangers to white Europeans—Fanon forges an alliance through difference. 
But Pellegrini illustrates that he does so by ultimately “assimilating Jewish 
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men to the feminine” (1997, 121). The Jew becomes an almost impotent cere-
bral figure in relation to the overly sexualized bodily Negro, and the Jewish 
male body become more closely identifiable as “feminine” than as an allied 
masculinity in the rhetoric of decolonization. As black women disappear as 
entities about which Fanon “knows nothing,” functioning as constituents of 
the colonized body politic who become disposable in the psychodynamic 
frame of Fanon’s anticolonial struggle, other (racialized) masculine bod-
ies in turn become feminized, emerging as allies only to be ushered back 
toward the negligible realm of the (racialized) feminine.18
The critical differences between the white man and the black man in 
Fanon are articulated through the language of mastery in ways that register 
the slave in a complex relation to masterful being. Fanon declares that “the 
white man wants the world; he wants it for himself alone. He finds himself 
predestined master of this world. He enslaves it. An acquisitive relation is 
established between the world and him” (1967c, 128). There is a form of 
passivity here in which the white man “finding” himself as “predestined 
master” is almost incidental—his mastery is a relational mode that has 
befallen him as inheritance. Fanon is, of course, expressly critical of this 
masterful mode in which the world—a term that implicates here other 
humans as much as it signals other “natural” beings and spaces—becomes 
the desired possession of the white man. Later, however, decrying his af-
fective dehumanization produced by this masterful subject, Fanon states: 
“I feel in myself a soul as immense as the world, truly a soul as deep as 
the deepest rivers, my chest has the power to expand without limit. I am a 
master and I am advised to adopt the humility of the cripple” (140). Fanon 
passionately characterizes himself, like the white man, as master—but one 
disabled from embodying and performing himself as such. This soul, “as 
immense as the world” and “as deep as the deepest rivers,” ties Fanon to 
nature even while his unrecognized status as master would, if recognized, 
situate him over and against it. Fanon’s humanism makes little room for 
an African animism that would see natural elements as imbued with life, 
with subjectivities that (like the figure of the Jew) he could conceivably call 
his “brother.” Instead, he “feels” himself as nature, as an expansive space 
that is being subjected by another master whose authorized mastery he 
paradoxically wishes to possess. To return to Bhabha (1994), we must ask: 
What forms of living “Other- wise” can emerge when mastery remains 
the horizon of Fanon’s desired decolonization? What futures can be born 
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from this attachment to mastery? To grapple with Fanon’s self- conception 
through explicitly natural imagery—his “soul” and body living as “cripple” 
when in fact a master is “felt” therein—is to confront a desire for decolo-
nization in which a “new type of man” will always emerge through the 
rightful subjugation of otherness. While Fanon employs nature metaphor-
ically in his formulation of colonial racism, his humanism trails away from 
an ecological worldview, one that holds out the possibility of angling away 
from the dialectic of mastery.
Fanon’s Cripple
Fanon’s masterful self, “crippled” by colonial racism, is oriented in very par-
ticular ways toward and against other bodies. Beyond the prohibitions of 
the black male body’s orientation in colonial space, the figure of the cripple 
also signals a disavowal that “cripples” the universal reach of Fanon’s own 
anticolonial desire. His reliance on the cripple in “The Fact of Blackness” is 
among the least explored and most perplexing of his narrative disablings. 
Earlier in the chapter, when Fanon writes of his experience of alienation on 
the train, he asks: “What else could it be for me but an amputation, an exci-
sion, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole body with black blood? But I 
did not want this revision, this thematization. All I wanted was to be a man 
among other men. I wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was 
ours and to help to build it together” (1967c, 112). Here we witness Fanon’s 
utopian spirit, his embodied desire to be “lithe and young” and to build 
collectively an inclusive world of men “among other men.” Fanon explains 
the break of his utopian spirit via a “historico- racial schema” that produces 
an affective feeling of corporeal amputation, of excision, of hemorrhage. He 
employs the figure of the cripple—of amputation—to symbolize a racially 
embodied subject whose existence is one of bodily erasure, lack, and de-
pletion. Set against the properly masterful white embodied subject, Fanon 
is crippled by the force and play of colonization. The cripple becomes, in 
effect, the mastered body, the one subjected to mastery, the one whose em-
bodiment always performs and reveals externally its subjugation, the one 
who is, in effect, not fully man, and thus the one with whom Fanon cannot 
ally himself.
At the end of “The Fact of Blackness,” Fanon turns again to the cripple, 
pronouncing: “I am a master and I am advised to adopt the humility of the 
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cripple.” Citing the final scene of the 1949 psychoanalytic film Home of the 
Brave, directed by Mark Robson, Fanon writes: “The crippled war veteran 
of the Pacific war says to my brother, ‘Resign yourself to your color the way 
I got used to my stump; we’re both victims’ ” (1967c, 140). Fanon responds 
to his own citation of the film by declaring that “with all my strength I 
refuse to accept that amputation.” (And interestingly here, the racially un-
marked body of the cripple produces an understanding for the reader that 
the body of the cripple is a white body.)
Fanon’s gloss on this film is not incidental, since Home of the Brave is 
among Hollywood’s inaugural engagements with race and war, and since 
the film revolves around the psychoanalytic treatment of a black patient, 
Private Peter Moss (played by James Edwards). Moss is a topography spe-
cialist in the army undergoing psychoanalysis (not coincidentally, by a Jew-
ish analyst played by Jeff Corey) for a psychosomatic condition that has 
paralyzed him from the waist down in the aftermath of a secret mission 
on a Japanese- invaded island on the Pacific Ocean (fig. 1.1). We come to 
learn through flashbacks that Moss has witnessed the death of Finch, his 
only white friend and ally. As viewers we believe that Moss’s paralysis is the 
result of guilt born from Moss’s repudiation of his interracial friendship 
when, just before his friend is shot, Finch (despite his antiracist desires) 
calls Moss a “yellow- bellied nigger.” The killing of his ally at the hands of 
the Japanese enemy (an enemy that remains a dangerous though altogether 
invisible presence in the film) becomes a convenient offing at the moment 
that the white friend betrays his own racism. Through the doctor’s narco-
synthetic treatment (injections that prompt the patient to relive his trau-
matic experiences), we come to believe that Moss is paralyzed by the guilt 
of disavowing his friend at the moment before death.
What the analyst finally reveals, however, is that Moss’s paralysis is not 
a result of guilt born from racism but about the guilt of feeling relief when 
it is his best friend and not he who is killed in war. The analyst therefore 
reorients the orientation specialist, curing Moss’s paralysis by pointing 
him toward a universal response to war that is detached from racial poli-
tics. At the end of the film, Moss is sent home with Sergeant Mingo (Frank 
Lovejoy). Mingo is a new amputee who has lost his right arm, having been 
shot on the island with Moss. Throughout the film, Mingo has been rather 
apathetic to the problem of racism on which the film hinges. In the final 
scene, however, as the two men wait to be escorted back to the United 
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States, Mingo becomes a “crippled” substitute for the dead Finch. While in 
this final scene Mingo initially scolds Moss and insists that he “get over” 
the paralyzing effects of racism, the amputee quickly turns toward an 
offering of radical friendship: Mingo confesses that despite a confident, 
quick- witted demeanor, he is undone by his newly configured body, and 
offers to fulfill Moss and Finch’s dream of opening up a restaurant and bar 
together. The one- armed Mingo—newly amputated and struggling with 
his disability—articulates promise in his alliance with Moss, as both men 
recognize that they will struggle against systems of oppression that refuse 
their full subjectivities. Mingo offers himself up as both business partner 
and “one- armed bartender,” forging an economic and sociopolitical alli-
ance with Moss that not only refuses either as “resigned” but collectively 
and collaboratively reenters the social world through an unlikely but newly 
empowered body- politic. In the final moments of the film, Moss helps to 
hoist Mingo’s duffle bag over his armless shoulder as they prepare to leave 
the war behind them. Awaiting their transportation “home,” they gaze out 
1.1 Private Peter Moss undergoes analysis for psychosomatic paralysis. James 
Edwards as Moss and Jeff Corey as army psychiatrist in Home of the Brave (1949), 
directed by Mark Robson.
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the window together—beyond the war and toward a futurity marked by 
new forms of collective embodiment (fig. 1.2).
Fanon thus misrepresents this final scene in Home of the Brave in order 
to conclude “The Fact of Blackness.” His peculiar glossing of the film avoids 
the profound political, economic, and social alliances boldly forged at the 
end of the film, where promise is based on the recognition that the notion 
of “lack” itself is socially produced. What Fanon reveals through his gloss—
through the assertion that the crippled war veteran wants a shared victim 
status with the black man and wants him to “resign” himself to his color 
the way that the cripple has become accustomed to his stump—illustrates a 
resistance in Fanonian thought to claim the power of prospective alliances 
between differently “othered” subjects. Fanon’s rendering of the cripple be-
trays in this sense his own conception of “man” as one that is conceived 
not merely through a specifically masterful masculine body but through a 
body that is “whole” by those very standards that maintain the hierarchies 
Fanon’s own politics aim to renounce.
1.2 Private Moss and Sergeant Mingo look together out the window and toward a 
collective future. James Edwards as Moss and Frank Lovejoy as Mingo in Home of 
the Brave (1949), directed by Mark Robson.
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Dehumanism against Mastery
If I am appearing at moments harsh in my readings of Fanon and Gandhi, 
mine is a critique born of real indebtedness and driven by the profound 
potentialities still embedded in their political writings. There is a beauti-
ful moment in “The Fact of Blackness” in which Fanon pauses to consider 
his own character. He writes: “If I were asked for a definition of myself, 
I would say that I am one who waits; I investigate my surroundings, I in-
terpret everything in terms of what I discover, I become sensitive” (1967c, 
120). I am entirely taken by Fanon’s “becoming sensitive” as a self- defining 
quality, and I am interested in how sensitivity itself—especially within the 
discourses of liberation that are grounded in love and the pursuit of less 
violent human futures—can continue to refuse alliances with other dis-
crepant bodies that are cast as excessive to particular political aims.
While so much of my own attention to both Gandhi and Fanon em-
phasizes moments in which they appear quite insensitive to their own re-
hearsals of mastery, my aim has been to consider carefully how even the 
most impassioned thinkers of liberation—thinkers driven by love and less 
violent human futures—continuously refused alliances with certain bodies 
that did not conform to the political aims of their movements. It is by re-
turning to these figures of decolonization, and by politicizing their knotty 
contradictions, that we can begin to register those that are currently excised 
from our own political moment—those others we continue to produce in 
our ongoing practices of mastery and, paradoxically, through our struggles 
for justice.
Fanon’s “becoming sensitive” as a quality of the self is instrumental to 
vulnerable reading, to becoming porous to texts in ways that might reshape 
our subjectivities and our political aspirations. Pairing Fanon’s sensitivity 
with Gandhi’s always shifting experimental practices in search of truth, we 
can begin to see the possibility for a dehumanist praxis in which the re-
mainders of anticolonial political thought—women, indigenous peoples, 
animals, the disabled, and nature writ large—become sites that can cul-
tivate our own sensitivities to those we are currently (and often despite 
ourselves) producing as remainders to our purportedly inclusive politics. 
The decolonizing politics of our present moment might reach for sensitivi-
ties we ourselves cannot yet anticipate through experimental practices that 
can lead us into radically other forms of feeling and acting. Such practices 
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include vulnerable reading, which I take up in the last three chapters of the 
book as I turn toward a dehumanist ethico- politics. The decolonizing po-
tential of dehumanism against mastery must reach beyond the historically 
contingent figure of the human toward other forms of living and being. De-
humanism’s promise is in becoming sensitive to those human and inhuman 
beings that we currently conceive as proximate to us, and most urgently to 
those which we still imagine as radically distinct.
CHAPTER 2
The Language of Mastery
Mastery of language affords remarkable power.
—Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (1967)
The choice of language and the use to which language is put is central to a people’s 
definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment, indeed 
in relation to the entire universe.
—Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, Decolonising the Mind (1986)
Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact lan-
guage remains the master of man.
—Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (1975)
Yes, I have only one language, yet it is not mine.
—Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, Or, The Prosthesis of Origin 
(1998)
In the spring of 2015, after weeks of campus protests, a statue of the British 
colonial magnate Cecil John Rhodes that symbolically lorded over the com-
munity was removed from the University of Cape Town’s campus. The pro-
tests were initiated by an activist who threw human feces on the statue, an 
act that repudiated the enduring legacies of racism at uct. The subsequent 
public debates around the removal of the Rhodes statue brought to public 
attention the extraordinary racial inequality of uct’s campus environment. 
Across South Africa and beyond, the removal of the Rhodes statue came to 
signal the necessity of refusing the legacies of colonization, emphasizing the 
critical relation between symbolic spaces and material realities. As Rhodes 
continued to reign symbolically on the campus decades after the formal 
end of apartheid, it made a certain disturbing sense that uct should have a 
scant five South African– born black professors on its faculty.
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A few months later, in the fall and winter of 2015, the legacies of colonial 
mastery on college campuses in the United States likewise came to public 
consciousness through mainstream media attention. At the University of 
Missouri, the football team protested the administration’s lack of attention 
to incidents of racism on campus, resulting in the resignation of its presi-
dent, Timothy Wolfe. At Yale University, the spouse of a “college master” 
(known elsewhere in the United States as a “resident dean”) publicly dis-
paraged a student- led request that the campus community be considerate 
in choosing their Halloween costumes. The college master, Nicholas Chris-
takis, and his spouse, Erika Christakis, both faculty at Yale, insisted that no 
one should be allowed to “control the forms of costumes” that students elect 
to wear, and in so doing advocated for freedom of self- representation—even 
if that representation may be racist. Around the same time at Princeton 
University, student protests over Woodrow Wilson’s legacy on their campus 
prompted their own college “masters” to be renamed “heads of college.”
Across these various and ongoing instances of student protest, the leg-
acies and language of mastery have been challenged and transformed by 
mobilizing student bodies. Through these various protests, the haunting 
questions of race, domination, silencing, and abjection have been brought 
to the fore of campus politics. At Yale and Princeton, the language of mas-
tery reflects a particular political practice: the “master” is not merely a title 
but a relation that signals a very specific history of colonization and slavery. 
This relation has continued to linger and to be confirmed through everyday 
speech acts across even the most elite college campuses. What the language 
of mastery does is to enforce legacies of violence, erasure, and dehumaniza-
tion on which the nation—and indeed our educational institutions—have 
been erected. The language and practices of mastery that underscore these 
debates are critically instructive. For so-called racial minority students, 
mastery names a global political relation on and well beyond the site of 
the college campus. Indeed, watching the viral videos of black and brown 
student protesters, it is virtually impossible not to see the palpable traces 
of slavery and colonialism playing out. By no means am I arguing that stu-
dents of color in privileged college institutions are in fact slaves—but the 
dynamics of power in which they are enfolded and the legacies (linguistic 
and material) that they are aiming to confront are at least inseparable from 
the exploitation, torture, and deaths of people who gave rise to the very 
institutions in which many thrive today.
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In U.S. mainstream media, these student organizers have been cast as 
overly sensitive “cry- bullies” demanding “safe spaces” in place of a real 
brass tacks education. This radically insufficient notion of education as a 
practice that holds no room for “sensitivity” is at its root a colonizing ges-
ture that casts education as a practice of subjecting others to the exclusive 
force of a firmly established hierarchy. Both the student protests and their 
critiques draw attention to the linguistic and symbolic force of colonial 
mastery that continues to resound in the ostensibly postcolonial present. 
Like anticolonial discourse, student protests and the media attention that 
has followed them have underscored mastery—most often implicitly—as 
an enduring ethico- political problem. In support of student organizers in-
ternationally, and against the deeply problematic registers of education in 
mainstream media, we might think toward a decolonized education that 
would engage education as praxis, as a process of critical becoming that en-
tails various (and at times totally unanticipatable) forms of care and prac-
tices of unlearning that which we already “know.” Education in this sense 
is a transformative act of becoming profoundly vulnerable to other lives, 
other life forms, and other “things” that we have not yet accounted for or 
that appear only marginally related to us. Nathan Snaza calls this a practice 
of “bewildering education” (2013, 48), one that insists on our vital entangle-
ments with other forms of life and matter. Following Snaza, I would call for 
a dehumanist education through which “subject matter” comes not merely 
to describe a topic of study but to signal the physical matter that makes 
study possible. Coming to “know” ourselves through education must also 
be a radical renarration and reorientation of what it is that we are aspir-
ing to know. A dehumanist higher education would insist that knowledge 
production itself become unpredictable, unanticipatable, unmasterful. Re-
calling my discussion of Frantz Fanon and Sylvia Wynter in the preceding 
chapter, coming to know ourselves in this way will require taking account 
of “sociogeny,” and engaging new narrative inventions that bring into being 
alternative modes of subjectivity. As Snaza proposes: “We must learn to 
think of ourselves as something other than ‘human,’ and we have to imag-
ine and experiment with pedagogies that do not presuppose this ‘human’ as 
their telos” (2013, 50). This education would have to take language seriously, 
to interrogate how we name and what histories of conquest, erasure, and 
profit are embedded in the words through which we come to “know”: Edu-
cation as ethics; education as a radically unmasterful act that requires that 
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our ethical grounds are always aspiring, shifting, experimenting, failing—
but striving nevertheless toward more ethical orientations.
Possessing Language
In Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida writes of his own intimate es-
trangement with the French language, declaring, “I have only one language, 
yet it is not mine” (1998, 2). Derrida reminds us, as an Algerian writing in 
France, of the historical force rooted in the very use of language. To elabo-
rate the fantasmatic notion of language as “possession,” he turns to the 
colonial politics of language: “Because the master does not possess exclu-
sively, and naturally, what he calls his language . . . because language is not 
his natural possession, he can, thanks to that very fact, pretend historically, 
through the rape of a cultural usurpation, which means always essentially 
colonial, to appropriate it in order to impose it as ‘his own’ ” (23). This 
“always essentially colonial” relation between the master and his language 
reveals the fraudulency of the master who by performing language posses-
sion conquers and usurps foreign cultures. Gauri Viswanathan’s account 
of British language and literature education in India emphasizes this foun-
dational element of colonial “masking” in her argument about how “En-
glish literary study had its beginnings as a strategy of containment” (1989, 
19). Aiming to “teach” colonial subjects how to mimic British civility, this 
strategy of containment was, Viswanathan argues, a mask for “the vulner-
ability of the British, the sense of beleaguerment and dread” felt by British 
colonial administrators who anticipated an almost certain rebellion by na-
tives against their authority (10). English language and literature education 
was a “humanistic” method of civilizing natives by teaching them how to 
approximate their colonial masters. Yet, as Viswanathan elucidates, “the 
view that a humanistic education holds the same meaning and purpose for 
both colonizer and colonized quickly crumbles under the weight of even 
the most casual scrutiny” (7). When we read Viswanathan and Derrida 
together, colonial language and its masterful framing emerge as a fantas-
tic defense against the vulnerability of the master who fears his own lack, 
and who responds to that fear through instituting and enforcing his “own” 
masterful language.
Derrida’s declaration of French as his sole language and as that which is 
not his own is not only a historico- political problem but also an ontological 
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one in which language both shapes and refuses to become the property of 
the subject. The language Derrida speaks is neither historically nor on-
tologically his own; it belongs to another as Other. The intimate political 
nexus of language, mastery, and colonization always summons the problem 
of what language is. I engage in this chapter evocations of language and 
mastery across anticolonial and postcolonial discourses, thinking alongside 
those whose language relation has been overtly caught up in the political 
and dehumanizing stakes of colonization. I illustrate how mastery surfaces 
repeatedly in colonial and postcolonial language debates around the force 
of the colonial language over colonized subjects, the desire to reclaim mas-
tery over native languages in decolonization efforts, and the advocacy of 
language mastery as the aim of literary studies in the purportedly post-
colonial world. Across the complex and widely divergent formulations of 
decolonization, language and mastery return us to the figures of women, 
animals, adversaries, and weaponry that were at play in the preceding chap-
ter. Querying the figurative evocations of language in relation to colonial 
mastery and decolonization, I turn at the end of the chapter to the con-
temporary discourse of “world” literature in an effort to reconsider the cur-
rent aims of literary practices. Current discourses that detail the aims of 
ambitions of literary study, I argue, speak to a much wider tendency in aca-
demic thinking and aspiration today. Calling into question intellectual pro-
duction from the vantage point most intimate to me as a literary scholar, 
I urge scholars away from intellectual mastery and toward the horizon of a 
dehumanist education.
Decolonizing Languages: Fanon and Memmi
Across twentieth- century anticolonial discourses, language repeatedly 
emerged as one of the most vital problems in the production and articula-
tion of decolonized subjectivities. If in Western thought language has been 
understood as key in the shaping of human subjects, anticolonial think-
ers pressured and elaborated the crucial place of language for those de-
humanized by political formations of the proper human subject. Think-
ers like Frantz Fanon, Mohandas Gandhi, and the Tunisian writer Albert 
Memmi charted the political function of humanization and dehumaniza-
tion through language use and acquisition. Because these thinkers insisted 
on thinking the politics of language from the position of those excluded 
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from the status of the fully imbued human, they were already pointing us 
toward a dehumanist politics even if they also remained caught up with a 
masterful thinking of the human.
The gender politics of decolonization and mastery that I charted in 
chapter 1 echo across debates of colonialism and language, in which a male 
speaking subject is often cast in relation to a feminized language that he 
is either in pursuit of or at war against. Rife with metaphors of antago-
nism, emasculation, and patriarchal force, the predominant discourses of 
decolonization in the last century characterized language relation through 
gendered violence. Whether through struggles with colonial language and 
its enforcement in the colonies, through the colonial subject’s torturous 
embodiments of colonial language, or through the reclamation of “native” 
languages, gendered force repeats across discussions of language and colo-
nial power. Language and the speaking subject are repeatedly caught up 
in colonial and anticolonial force exerted (literally and metaphorically) 
against “other” bodies.
Both Fanon and Memmi dwell on the corporeal force of colonial lan-
guage for the educated colonized subject. In “The Negro and Language,” 
Fanon writes that “to speak means to be in a position to use a certain syn-
tax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all 
to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization” (1967f, 17– 18). 
Locution for Fanon is directly tied to location, to the arduous labor of the 
speaker who endures a civilization’s “weight.” The act of speaking is loca-
tional, “to be in a position” to “grasp” the forms of language, and to carry 
the historical pressure encompassed by language. The speaker, cast as a ca-
pable and laboring subject in a particular time and place, is also locked into 
a relation of power with language. Within the relay of power between the 
speaker and the world, Fanon declares that “it is implicit that to speak is to 
exist absolutely for the other” (18). The existential quality of this statement 
seems to imply an ethical relation to another; yet in the colonial context 
where language is imposed on the colony, this absolute existence that lan-
guage entails becomes a confirmation of the mastery at stake in the colonial 
enterprise. The colonized subject who speaks a language he has inherited 
by force comes to “exist absolutely” for his master.
As I illustrated in the previous chapter, Fanon was not one to decry 
mastery outright but rather insisted on the emergent master- status of the 
masculine, colonial subject. He situates himself as a “master” who has been 
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“crippled” by the force of the colonial relation (1967c, 140). In so doing, 
Fanon claims mastery as the proper status of all men, regardless of race. 
Beyond the exclusions that this masculinist frame of mastery produces, 
what Fanon does not attend to is how his declaration “I am a master” relies 
on a relation to language that is fundamentally dependent. Fanon must 
articulate himself as master through language, revealing a dependency 
on language that threatens his own self- conception as master. In order to 
identify himself in the first place, through the written utterance “I am,” 
Fanon troubles his own master- status by showing mastery as a fantasy. If 
one needs language to identify oneself as master, one cannot hold “true” 
mastery over language and the world it signals. Fanon attempts, then, to 
renounce colonial mastery while recuperating the masterful subject toward 
a deracinated global politics.
Fanon’s relation to language mastery is as complex as it is at times con-
founding. He declares that the “mastery of language affords remarkable 
power” and that the speaking subject who masters a language “possesses 
the world expressed and implied by that language” (1967f, 18). By “mas-
tering” language, the speaker comes not only to “possess” language but 
also to hold power over the “world” that language signals. Like Heidegger 
(1995), who frames language as “world forming,” Fanon as psychoanalyst 
ascribes a fundamental significance to the phenomenon of language in 
the human’s relation to the world. At the end of Identification Papers, 
Diana Fuss turns to Fanon’s own “complete reliance upon translators to 
converse with his Muslim patients” (1995, 162) to remind us of the inti-
mate bind between politics and language. As both Fuss and Fanon’s bi-
ographer Irene Gendzier (1985) note, as a French- speaking analyst treat-
ing Arabic- and Kabyle-speaking patients in Algeria, Fanon’s analytic 
practice hinged on local Algerian hospital staff who translated for him 
throughout his analytic sessions. These vital intermediary figures—Alge-
rian men working as nurses who were not permitted to become doctors 
under the colonial administration—appear only incidentally in Fanon’s 
analytic notes. Fuss dwells on how the use of translators not only reveals 
Fanon’s own inability to “master” Arabic and Kabyle but how the ques-
tion of language so crucial to psychoanalytic practice—the word choices 
and slips—are “lost in translation” through Fanon’s own linguistic lack 
and his reliance on others to make his analysis possible (1995, 162). What 
Fanon is interpreting, Fuss argues, is the language of the translator as 
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opposed to the patient. What I find so fascinating about Fanon’s Alge-
rian translators is how they come to illuminate his own complex relation 
to language mastery. Fanon- as-analyst does not give sustained attention 
to his fundamental reliance on the language of his Algerian translators 
as third parties in the room. By not critically engaging with these third 
parties and their language as translators, he produces a theory of the colo-
nial psychopathology through the erasure of these vital “third” linguistic 
figures. In reading his patients, he is invariably also always reading the 
translator, whose translations necessarily alter, build on, adjust, and elide 
the language of the patient. Foreign language in this analytic context ne-
cessitates a palimpsestic reading of language as an impossible plurality, as 
that which is always mediated and dispersed, as always in translation—in 
other words, as thoroughly unmasterable. His own practice reveals al-
ready the impossibility of language mastery, just as the presence of a lit-
eral third body in the room signals the always present social body therein, 
even in the more traditional frame of two—patient and analyst—engag-
ing through a “common” language.
While Fanon props up the idea of language mastery as that which af-
fords remarkable power, in the colonial context he dwells on the impossi-
bility of language mastery for the educated colonial subject. He binds lin-
guistics to racism, emphasizing how the European holds a “fixed concept” 
of the Negro that irrevocably confirms his inferiority. The result is that the 
mastery of the French language for the colonized subject is strictly and 
finally impossible, regardless of the fluency of the colonized speaker. Yet 
the colonial subject is driven by this impossible pursuit of language mas-
tery, which produces in him “paranoia” and physically deforms his body. 
For this subject, colonial language is both a mobilizing and subjugating 
force. On the one hand, “the Antilles Negro who wants to be white will be 
the whiter as he gains greater mastery of the cultural tool that language 
is” (Fanon 1967f, 38). French is the “key that can open doors” historically 
barred from the colonial subject (38), but it is a power that is contingent 
and comes at a vital cost. In his characterization of this quest for mastery 
over the colonizer’s tongue, Fanon turns to its absolutely bodily aspects, to 
how the pursuit of language mastery produces both psychic and physical 
alterations to the colonized subject: “The Negro arriving in France will 
react against the R- eating man from Martinique. He will become aware 
of it, and he will really go to war against it. He will practice not only roll-
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ing his R but embroidering it. Furtively observing the slightest reactions 
of others, listening to his own speech, suspicious of his own tongue—a 
wretchedly lazy organ—he will lock himself into his room and read aloud 
for hours—desperately determined to learn diction” (21). Going to “war” 
against his historico- political location (Martinique) and his racialized body 
(that “eats” the consonant R), this split colonial subject violently cultivates 
himself as a new man. In Fanon’s “verbal performance” (Pellegrini 1997, 
97), speech becomes a site of self- embattlement because the colonial sub-
ject must prove his likeness to his colonizer through fluency. Going to war 
against his “lazy organ,” Fanon ties the tongue to the phallic virility of the 
colonized black body. While the black man is cast as a hypersexual and 
dangerous force whose active “organ” is threatening to the colonial regime,1 
here Fanon’s “lazy organ” reveals a bodily paradigm in which the black 
man cannot train his body into proper civility and is thus symbolically 
emasculated by its ineptitude. If he is seen as a body that poses a phallic 
threat to his colonizer, this other lazy organ betrays a cultural impotence 
because of which he can never come to pass himself off as properly civi-
lized. The colonized subject thus becomes attentive to his speech to the 
point of paranoia, hyperaware of how his own sounds register to/through 
his colonial masters. Seeking relentlessly to master French, his education 
in the colonial language becomes a process of locutionary exile in which 
his body—through its particular relation to colonial force—becomes im-
potent, paralyzing, imprisoning.
The speaking subject in Fanon is saddled with the burden of a civi-
lization that language beholds, and in the colonial context this requires 
taking on the weight of an alien civilization. For the colonized speaker, his 
power over the colonial language will remain insufficient: he will be per-
petually bound as slave to his colonizer’s language. While Fanon provides 
a fascinating psychoanalytic account of the kinds of psycho- dynamics and 
what Ann Pellegrini (1997) calls “performance anxieties” produced through 
the colonial language relation, his argument hinges on an actual potential 
of language mastery, one that refuses the colonized as a language master. 
Abiding by Derrida’s (1998) formulation that language is never a human 
possession, we see a tension arise in Fanon’s thinking: he claims language 
mastery as factual as opposed to fantasmatic before turning to the colonial 
context. In framing the problem of language in the colonial context, he 
upholds the possibility of language mastery beyond the colonial context in 
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order to emphasize how racism disables certain subjects from becoming 
themselves (language) masters.
In The Colonizer and the Colonized (1991), Memmi anticipates Derrida’s 
formulation by insisting that the colonizer must always understand himself 
as a “complete master” and must in turn enact mastery over others. Re-
sponding to his master, the colonial subject’s first ambition is “to become 
equal to that splendid model and to resemble him to the point of disappear-
ing in him” (1991, 120). For Memmi as for Fanon, colonization and the ac-
quisition of the colonial language in particular forms and deforms colonial 
bodies, resulting in the devaluation and “disappearance” of the self. Like 
Fanon too, Memmi argues that regardless of how well the native speaks the 
colonizer’s language, his linguistic skills are always marked as deficient be-
cause of his racial difference. Memmi places critical emphasis on race and 
education in the deformation of colonial subjectivities; in order to succeed, 
the educated colonized subject must participate actively in this devaluation 
by succumbing to the colonizer’s tongue: “If he wants to obtain a job, make 
a place for himself, exist in the community and the world, he must first bow 
to the language of his masters” (107). By “bowing,” he sets out to discard 
his own “infirm language,” concealing his native tongue while he diligently 
pursues that of the colonizer. Here again, as in the preceding chapter, we 
find the language of disability in discourses of decolonization, positing in 
this instance an abject native tongue against a robust colonial language. 
Rather than being a “polyglot’s richness” or a form of coexistence between 
native and foreign, colonial bilingualism for Memmi is a “linguistic drama” 
that creates in the colonial subject a “permanent duality” (108). Within the 
play of this drama, the colonized speaker engages in a “wholesale subju-
gation” of his native language and erodes its vitality. In essence, his attach-
ment to pursuing the master’s tongue leads (perversely) to the complete 
subjugation of his own.
Memmi argues that language must be the primary site of decolonization, 
and that native language reclamation and revitalization are key to cultural 
“self- rediscovery”: “To this self- rediscovery movement of an entire peoples 
must be returned the most appropriate tool; that which finds the shortest 
path to its soul, because it comes directly from it” (1991, 134). Embracing 
the limited vocabulary and “bastardized syntax” of the native tongue is 
an act of accepting the linguistic debasement that the bilingual colonial 
subject has himself helped to produce. While this language cannot yet re-
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flect “higher mathematics or philosophy,” it cuts directly to the “souls” of 
the people, and by articulating those subjectivities it can lead toward other 
forms of critical discourse. As we shall see imminently, Gandhi shares this 
conception of a debased language that can be mobilized and revitalized.
Memmi concludes his meditation on the role and necessity of language 
reclamation by turning to the construction of a “whole and free man” who 
at last speaks his own revitalized language: “Having reconquered all his 
dimensions, the former colonized will have become a man like any other. 
There will be the ups and downs of all men to be sure, but at least he will 
be a whole and free man” (1991, 153). If native language reclamation is an 
act that Memmi insists will redirect the colonized subject away from the 
“permanent duality” created by his bilingualism, he does not pose this act 
of reclamation outside colonial discourse. Rather than to embrace his lost 
dimensions and to enable the emergence of other forms of (human) being, 
the colonial subject must instead “reconquer” them. Here, the language 
Memmi uses to think about the primordial dimension of language recla-
mation and revitalization gives way to a colonial mindset in which par-
ticular (male) subjects continuously engage in a linguistic practice of con-
quest. This language reveals the abiding structure of mastery at work in 
the formal colonial relation and in the act of decolonization. Becoming “a 
whole and free man” remains in Memmi’s thought bound to conquest, and 
through acts of self- conquest (as we saw in the previous chapter through 
my discussion of Gandhi), mastery is reoriented against a colonized subject 
that has already experienced the force of mastery by another. His fantasy 
is that conquest—which I have argued necessitates splitting—can lead to 
wholeness. As such, he imagines that colonial language’s mastery over the 
colonized subject can give way to another form of conquest in which the 
colonized man becomes “whole and free” through the masterful reclama-
tion of those “dimensions” taken from him through colonial violence.
Gandhi’s (Inter)National Languages
The urgent need to restore native languages to colonized subjects is like-
wise prominent in Gandhian thought. While he would insist that the ques-
tion of language was not as critical as that of truth and nonviolence—in 
other words, that swaraj (self- rule) could be attained even if the English 
language prevailed (as it has) in India—it is clear that Gandhi could not 
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think liberation without repeatedly returning to the problems that language 
posed for Indian independence.2 Like Fanon and Memmi, Gandhi attends 
to language as a crucial aspect of India’s decolonization movement. He 
argued repeatedly that Indians had impoverished their “mother tongues” 
as a direct result of colonial India’s love of the English language (1965, 1997). 
What was needed in order to achieve an independence worth its name was 
twofold: the mobilization of a rashtrabhasha—a national language of the 
masses that would unite the Indian nation—and the restoration of mother 
tongues that had been sacrificed through the colonial encounter. Gandhi 
would ultimately envision “Hindustani” as India’s national language, one 
that would combine Hindi and Urdu to create a language aimed at uniting 
the otherwise divided Hindu and Muslim parties by reflecting the linguis-
tic intimacies of both in the quest for national liberation.3 Yet, as Sumathi 
Ramaswamy reminds us, it was finally Hindi that rose to national promi-
nence and displaced other regional languages: “Hindi, the putative ‘official’ 
language of India, is but the tongue of one region masquerading as the 
language of the nation” (1997, xx). If Hindi finally emerged as India’s “offi-
cial language,” it did so through the subjugation of other languages made 
marginal through its rise to national prominence.
Gandhi wrote often about language, repeatedly issuing the figure of the 
mother in relation to language politics. His formulations of language as 
feminine and maternal reflect a broader political discourse characterizing 
the relation between the speaking subject and language. In her study of 
Tamil language devotion, Ramaswamy “opens up for critical scrutiny the 
feminization of languages in modernity, a feminization that has been so 
naturalized as to have sealed off the ‘mother tongue’ from history” (1997, 
17). Ramaswamy asks us to consider the political implications of a “natu-
ralized” formulation of language- as-female through her attention to Tamil. 
Teasing out the ways that Tamil devotees evoke the language using “moth-
er’s milk,” “mother,” and “mother tongue” as synonyms (17), she illustrates 
how language devotion is “multiply manifested, as religious, filial, and 
erotic, and struggling for prominence and domination” (21). In the case of 
Tamil, while the language was posed as female, its speaker was invariably a 
masculine devotional subject. Gandhi participates in this discourse, insist-
ing that “language is like our mother. But we do not have that love for it, 
as we have for our mother” (1965, 12). Here language as mother is suffering 
and impoverished under colonial rule because the Indian body politic does 
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not love her as its subjects love their mothers. To bring language back to 
health, to resurrect the mother as the nurturing figure she is expected to be, 
Indians (cast as male children) must love her appropriately.
Following the simile between language and the mother, Gandhi claims 
the milk one receives from one’s native tongue as “pure” in opposition to 
the watered- down and poisoned milk ingested by Indians who spoke the 
colonial language. From this historical vantage point, we would do well to 
take pause at Gandhi’s claims of purity, given how often the politics of pu-
rity in the South Asian context has continued to lead to the violent control 
of bodies marked as “impure.” But here, rather than to take aim against an 
“impurity” marked by gender, caste, or sexuality, Gandhi critiques Indian 
elites for refusing their own “pure” languages. He argues that the educated 
classes had developed a profound “distaste” for the milk of their mother 
tongues, spellbound by the insidious lure of the English language. In his 
refusal of the power of English language over India, Gandhi declares, “This 
slavery to an alien language has kept our millions deprived of a great deal 
of necessary knowledge for many long years” (1965, 131). Undoing the mas-
tery that English holds over the colony and liberating its “slaves” therefore 
requires the restoration of the primary bond between the mother (as lan-
guage) and the child (as both educated elite and as local native subjects). 
Such a return to the linguistic bond characterized as properly maternal 
and wholly nourishing would lead directly to the achievement of swaraj 
(self- rule) and would give rise to relations not predicated on the politics 
of domination.4
For Gandhi, there was nothing intrinsic about a particular language that 
made it powerful. If English was a language of power, this was so only be-
cause the British had committed completely to their mother tongue: “No 
language is intrinsically all that the correspondent says. A language be-
comes what its speakers and writers make it. English had no merit apart 
from what Englishmen made it. In other words, a language is a human 
creation and takes the colour of its creators. Every language is capable of 
infinite expansion” (1965, 64). English had therefore failed as the lingua 
franca of India because, like French for Memmi, it did not reflect the cul-
tural spirit of the people. What’s more, the English spoken in the cities was 
a “broken English,” a substandard version of the language that was inca-
pable of producing a liberated subject (23). In the postcolonial moment, 
it is precisely these forms of “broken English” that come to be politicized 
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by writers like Evelyn Nien- Ming Ch’ien (2005), who engages “weird En-
glish,” and Ken Saro- Wiwa (1994), who mobilized “rotten English.” But for 
Gandhi at this historical moment, there was no recuperative potential in 
speaking “cast- off ” forms of the colonial language. The only path to free-
dom was to give English its proper place, to abandon its use as the language 
of Indian politics and social engagement, and to turn back toward the local 
Indian languages as mothers who had been abandoned by their children.
Reflecting on the eager adoption of English by India’s colonial elite in 
their desires to mimic their masters, Gandhi turns to English- language use 
as a practice of dehumanization: “In slavery, the slave has to ape the man-
ners and ways of the master, e.g., dress, language, etc. Gradually, he devel-
ops a liking for it to the exclusion of everything else” (1965, 101). Aspiring to 
become like the master, the slave works alongside his master in order to de-
humanize himself. Not merely does the slave desire to become like the mas-
ter; the slave apes his master and in so doing is rendered animal.5 Until the 
educated elite consciously returned to their native languages, freedom was 
not possible. Since for Gandhi all language is “capable of infinite expan-
sion,” he also insisted that languages—even those that have deteriorated 
because of the fetishism of the colonial language—could become evocative, 
powerful systems of expression if only we bound ourselves to them. In this 
respect, the resurrection of native language is a process both of becoming 
human, of restoring one’s humanity through the refusal to “ape” the master, 
and of returning to the primary site of the mother- as-language in order to 
grow toward individual and political freedom.
In Gandhi’s thinking on language, the nuanced dynamics of mastery 
appear in his own relation to language acquisition, in the relation of the 
Indian masses to language, and in the relation of the language teachers to 
the new rashtrabhasha (national language). As David Lelyveld (2001) has 
illustrated, Gandhi was not someone for whom languages came easily even 
though he was well versed in several. A native Gujarati speaker, his broader 
experience with Indian languages came during his tenure in South Africa, 
where much of his critical philosophy about the achievement of swaraj was 
likewise developed. There he studied Hindi, Urdu, and some Tamil while 
in and out of prison for his activism, insisting on the importance of unit-
ing Indians through the medium of language acquisition and developing 
a rashtrabhasha that would mobilize the nation (Lelyveld 2001, 69). What 
is key is that for Gandhi knowing languages gave one access to others and 
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opened the possibility of dialogue, but it was not his personal aim to be-
come a language master. While he apologized repeatedly for his flawed 
spelling and grammar, even in his native Gujarati, he himself did not aim 
for complete control over language.
Of his own verbal style, Gandhi declared, “My language is aphoristic, it 
lacks precision. It is therefore open to several interpretations” (qtd. in Chat-
terjee 1986, 85). Asserting the malleability of his language, the importance 
of being able to make it speak by others within and across multiple con-
texts, Gandhi’s rendering of his own use of language posits it as fundamen-
tally open- ended. That he aims to speak “openly” suggests his refusal of a 
master discourse, one that declares the right and the proper and in so doing 
subjugates other interpretations. Yet for him, language was not merely an 
open- ended form, and the language one used to articulate one’s thoughts 
had critical political consequences: “When I find myself able to express my 
thought with more facility in English than in Gujarati, I  tremble” (1965, 2). 
If for Gandhi English most readily expresses his thoughts, it is a sign that he 
has internalized his subjection by the colonial master. English in this sense 
speaks for him, rehearsing its mastery over him as it reveals his enslave-
ment. Yet his relation to English is certainly not one of mere animosity: “It 
is necessary to say that I do not hate the English language. I myself have 
benefited from many of the precious gems of the great treasury of English 
literature. We have also to acquire a knowledge of science and such like 
through the English language. Knowledge of English is, therefore, very nec-
essary for us. But it is one thing to give it its due place, and quite another 
to make a fetish of it” (16). Here Gandhi reveals that English was a benefit 
to him, something that contained the “precious gems” of the English liter-
ary tradition—or what Matthew Arnold (1993) called its “sweetness and 
light”—and that therefore enriched him with artistic beauty. English for 
Gandhi was not merely the language of conquest but also vitally of art and 
knowledge.
As such, Gandhi refused to “drive out the English language” from his 
other languages (1965, 130). While at times he admitted his great love of 
the English language, at others he revealed his intense struggles with it. Of 
his various languages, English was the most frustrating for him to learn. 
Gandhi claimed for this reason that it is “a huge waste” to spend years 
studying English, a notoriously difficult language, when native languages 
were more easily and swiftly learned. Excising English as a prospective 
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language of the Indian masses was not therefore merely a political and 
philosophical position but an entirely practical one toward mobilizing the 
country: “If we spend only half the effort we do in learning English in 
the learning of Indian languages, there will be born a new atmosphere in 
the country and a good measure of progress will be achieved” (1). Gandhi 
cites his own experience with English, having spent seven years “master-
ing” English in order to pass the matriculation examination. In his native 
language, he insists, he could have passed the exam in a year. This, to Gand-
hi’s mind, was a great “misfortune,” a squandering of precious time that 
could have been used toward other ethico- political efforts (94).
Just as English was the language of India’s enslavement for Gandhi, it 
was also because of British imperialism an essential world language, indeed 
the language of global commerce, and could not merely be discarded. It 
holds in this respect an ambivalent position in Gandhian thought. Within 
the pages of Hind Swaraj (1997), his manifesto on Indian self- rule, Gandhi 
advances his most vital declarations about the achievement of Indian in-
dependence. What he insists repeatedly therein is that Indians have been 
complicit in their own subjugation. The key to independence, then, is not 
to overthrow the colonizer but to change radically the colonized self and its 
relation to society at large. If, as he declared in an earlier work, “the char-
acter of a people is evident in its language” (1965, 2), their use of English 
at the expense of their native tongues signals their own self- devaluation 
and reveals how at the most intimate level of thought and speech they have 
enabled themselves to be subsumed by an outside force. To refuse English 
as the language of the educated classes and to mobilize the native tongue 
to speak of politics and liberation were necessary steps toward the psychic 
transformation of the colony into a liberated nation- state. English held a 
wealth of information that Indians needed, and scientific and commercial 
discourses needed to be “translated” or infused into the rashtrabhasha that 
did not yet contain it. Like Memmi, Gandhi figured the native language as 
that which had been debased by colonization yet also needed the colonial 
language to infuse it with those forms of knowledge it lacked.
For artistic and practical reasons, then, Gandhi desired to preserve his 
own knowledge of English and encouraged other Indians likewise not to 
“give up or abandon” their English. While he defended his right to com-
municate in the colonial language, he also insisted that English must not 
be allowed “to transgress its rightful place” (1965, 131). English should 
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never emerge as India’s national language nor should it become, as Thomas 
Babington Macaulay advocated, the language of Indian education.6 Ma-
caulay’s call to enforce English- language education in the colony aimed 
famously to produce hybrid subjects—Indian in appearance but English 
in every other way—whose familiarity with English language and culture 
would enable them in turn to “enrich” vernacular dialects with Western 
thought. This new class of Indian subjects would infuse local dialects with 
Western ideology, rendering them “by degrees fit vehicles for conveying 
knowledge to the great mass of the population” (1835, 8). For the native, 
learning English was the best way toward civilization: “Whoever knows 
that language has ready access to all the vast intellectual wealth, which all 
the wisest nations of the earth have created and hoarded in the course of 
ninety generations” (3).
Gandhi explicitly refuted Macaulay’s claims about English and argued 
that Indians had enabled the impoverishment of their own languages and 
in so doing enslaved themselves (1997, 103). While he agreed with Macau-
lay’s insistence on the central importance of bolstering India with “modern” 
knowledge, he understood that Macaulay’s vision would confirm the subju-
gation of Indians well beyond the achievement of national independence. 
Instead, Gandhi advanced and worked toward the idea of an India that em-
ployed the new Hindustani to serve intra- Indian political exchange while 
bolstering native dialects with the language of modernity. Both Hindustani 
and the native dialects would then shift and advance through proper use 
and increasing education.
Gandhi became the leader of the Hindustani Prachar Sabha, an organi-
zation aimed at mobilizing and spreading Hindustani across the country. 
In order to accomplish this task, he set out to create a fleet of rashtrabha-
sha workers across the nation whose advanced language training would 
then enable them to educate the masses in Hindustani. These rashtrabhasha 
workers, Gandhi insisted, should have “perfect mastery over both Hindi 
and Urdu.” Only once they had mastered these two languages could they 
hope to be “true Rashtrabhasha workers” (1997, 55). Yet for those students 
who would be taught Hindustani, mastery was not the aim. They simply 
needed an “All- India heart” or an “All- India will” and Hindustani would 
come to them, not as a language that they would aim to hold dominion 
over but as a language that would unite them with others through a mutual 
and noncoercive devotion to the nation. The teachers of Hindustani would 
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thus be Hindi and Urdu language masters, but their mastery would serve 
to establish an abiding unity among Indian communities through the abil-
ity to speak a common national language. The mastery practiced by some 
would lead, then, to the decolonization of others.
Across diverse geopolitical contexts, Fanon, Memmi, and Gandhi share 
a conception of colonial languages as holding mastery over the colonized. 
They also each, in very different though intimately connected ways, ad-
vance forms of linguistic “countermastery” as gateways to undoing the 
psychodynamics of colonization. Perhaps the fact that Gandhi, the world’s 
most renowned practitioner of self- mastery, never considered himself a 
master of languages can serve as a valuable touchstone. Recalling the dis-
cussion in chapter 1 of Gandhi’s inability to define the practice of brahm-
acharya, I suggest that here too Gandhi’s practice exceeds his political con-
ceptualizations. Mastery recurs in Gandhi’s writings on language, but his 
own language practices present an unmasterful approach that might well 
be more radical than his stated politics.
Language and Literature in the Postcolony
As we have seen so far, language was a central problematic in the political 
discourses of anticolonialism. It was likewise a contentious debate in colo-
nial and postcolonial literary production where writers theorized the vital 
work of literature in the realm of decolonization. The Francophone theorist 
and poet Aimé Césaire (who was, importantly here, Fanon’s teacher) de-
scribes his use of French as innovative: “Whether I want to or not, as a poet 
I express myself in French, and clearly French literature has influenced me. 
But I want to emphasize very strongly that—while using as a point of de-
parture the elements that French literature gave me—I have always striven 
to create a new language, one capable of communicating the African heri-
tage. In other words, for me French was a tool that I wanted to use in devel-
oping a new means of expression. I wanted to create an Antillean French, 
a black French that, while still being French, had a black character” (2001, 
83). Césaire begins with a sense of removal, a lack of agency—“whether 
I want to or not”—that is part of the subjectivization of any linguistic sub-
ject, and which marks his relationship to French as the language of his 
poetry. Like French literature, French language is also a “point of depar-
ture” for Césaire, who envisions his poetic use of language as a means of 
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developing new forms of expression through surrealism. The fact that they 
are rooted in the colonial language reflects the historicity of French coloni-
zation in the Antilles, but surrealism works to undo the character of the 
language in order to shape it anew. Poetry breaks the “stranglehold” that 
the standard French form held over him, and surrealism offers a mode of 
summoning unconscious forces within the postcolonial subject and find-
ing within the French language a fundamentally black character (82). Far 
from holding mastery over him, he envisions this new “black character” of 
French as a “weapon”—like Gandhi’s practice of satyagraha discussed in 
chapter 1—that can be wielded to express colonial and postcolonial black 
subjectivities. Here we see the force of language, articulated through the 
metaphor of weaponry, yielded against itself: the French once used to col-
onize will now return through the colonized pen with a vengeful, recuper-
ative force aimed toward decolonization.
The Martinican writer and poet Edouard Glissant draws on Césaire to 
contend that language itself cannot limit human expression even when 
it is an imposed or inherited tongue. To those who insist that the colo-
nizer’s language cannot reflect the colonial experience, Glissant retorts: 
“To say that is to dignify a language beyond its due. In our present world, 
the equivalence between self and language is an aberration that disguises 
the reality of dominance. Let us challenge the latter with the weapon of 
self- expression: our relationship with language, or languages, that we use” 
(1989, 171). What Glissant proposes is that power is more fundamental 
than both “self ” and “language.” These two latter categories “disguise” the 
reality of dominance that underlies them. The self and language come into 
existence because of already existing power relations, which following 
Glissant’s thought means that unmasterful politics will enable the forma-
tion of new kinds of selves and new forms of language. I will turn to these 
new forms of language and subjectivity in the second half of this book, but 
for now what I want to emphasize is the “equivalence” between the self 
and language as an equation that for Glissant mischaracterizes the relation 
between them. Language for him is a “weapon” that can be wielded by 
the self regardless of the historical stakes that have led to its utterance by 
the speaking subject. The writer, then, who uses language as a mobilizing 
force need not be unduly hindered by the historicity of language. Extend-
ing Audre Lorde’s (1984) famous assertion that you cannot dismantle the 
master’s house with the master’s tools, Glissant suggests that it is not the 
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tools that pose the problem but the relations that precede and give rise to 
the tools as such.
In the postcolonial moment, we have witnessed a continuation of colo-
nial language debates in literary production that hinge on metaphors of 
violence and weaponry. Chinua Achebe and Ngũgı̃ wa Thiong’o, both par-
ticipants at the 1962 Conference of African writers of English Expression 
at Makerere University College in Uganda, illustrate the oppositional posi-
tions of this debate. In tracing their positions, however, we can see a fas-
cinating affinity across both writers for seeking unmasterful relations to 
language at the same time as they continuously rely on violent metaphors 
to seek them out. With the publication of Things Fall Apart ([1958] 1994) 
and its rise to global popularity, Achebe’s aim was to speak of “African ex-
perience in a world- wide language” (1965, 29). For him, the fact that this 
worldwide language is English is almost incidental: realizing that a “world 
language” is critical for cross- cultural exchange, Achebe concedes to En-
glish as the language of his literary production even while he acknowledges 
that there is both “good” and “evil” that accompany this inheritance (28). 
Speaking of the flourishing body of literature being produced by African 
writers in the midsixties, Achebe identifies a “new voice” emerging from 
Africa that articulates a particularly African experience through English 
prose (29). For him, the English language must accept its “submission to 
many different kinds of use,” and in this sense English offers itself to a 
practice of antimastery in which new forms of English emerge from within 
it (29).
For the serious postcolonial writer, argues Achebe, the task is to use En-
glish pragmatically. As a world language, writers must carve it in ways that 
make it speak to their own postcolonial cultural experiences. Here I em-
ploy the metaphor of carving intentionally, since Achebe goes on to suggest 
that “a serious writer must look for an animal whose blood can match the 
power of his offering” (1965, 29). For Achebe, this “animal” is the English 
language, and a skilled writer can sacrifice it through the manipulation of 
its grammar, its syntax, and its style and in so doing render the postcolonial 
literary text as global offering. (I return explicitly to the complex relations 
between language use and animal sacrifice in chapter 4 through my reading 
of J. M. Coetzee’s lecture- narrative The Lives of Animals.) The metaphors 
of sacrifice and offering here return the violence of the English language 
back unto itself: If English was first a violent imposition on the colonized 
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tongue, its sacrifice by the (formerly) colonized writer is redemptive in the 
Fanonian sense, giving voice through violence to new forms of expression 
and being. Achebe declares that English is a “world language which history 
has forced down our throats,” but rather than banishing English he envi-
sions a counterassault on language that will reflect other forms of being 
(29). On African writing in English, Achebe declares: “My answer to the 
question, Can an African ever learn English well enough to be able to use it 
effectively in creative writing? is certainly yes. If on the other hand you ask: 
Can he ever learn to use it like a native speaker? I should say, I hope not. 
It is neither necessary nor desirable for him to be able to do so. The price 
a world language must be prepared to pay is submission to many different 
kinds of use” (29). Using English as a nonnative speaker, then, should not 
be an act aimed at language mastery. Rather, the use of the colonial lan-
guage in postcolonial literature should aim to produce new forms of En-
glish that reflect the colonial and postcolonial experience and the cultural 
traditions from which they emerge. What is critical for Achebe is that in 
creating these new forms of English, in subjecting them to “sacrifice” and 
“submission,” the writer always maintains the capacity of English as a “me-
dium of international exchange” (29). The sacrifice of the colonizer’s tongue 
is therefore only ever partial, because it insists on a sustained relation to 
Standard English that while potentially destabilizing to a global reader-
ship remains accessible to them. What emerges through Achebe’s prose 
is a narrative in which the colonized writer must sacrifice, carve up, and 
consume the colonial tongue in order to digest it, and in so doing produce 
(or excrete) a new living language that would nourish a postcolonial body 
politic.
Implicitly evoking Shakespeare’s wayward “savage” Caliban, Achebe de-
clares of English that “for me there is no other choice. I have been given this 
language and I intend to use it” (1965, 30). Like Caliban, to whom I turn 
again in the coda, Achebe can decry colonization and its ongoing effects 
precisely through the language that has been thrust on him. Through lan-
guage, he can curse his masters. Yet Achebe continues to express his great 
hope that there will be those who continue to carry on their ethnic tra-
ditions by writing in their native tongues, even while he himself reaches 
toward the global through his use of English prose. These ethnic literary 
traditions, he hopes, will “flourish” alongside the national ones that are 
being reflected through the colonizing language.
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For the Kenyan writer Ngũgı̃ wa Thiong’o, Achebe’s hope for a thriving 
ethnic literature appears willfully to forget that the language of the colo-
nizer is inextricable from the colonizer’s ongoing economic and political 
power. In his chapter “The Language of African Literature,” Ngũgı̃ recalls 
his experience at the Makerere meeting of African writers. There, he recalls, 
“the only question which preoccupied us was how best to make the bor-
rowed tongues carry the weight of our African experience by, for instance, 
making them ‘prey’ on African proverbs and other peculiarities of African 
speech and folklore” (1986, 7). Against this ideological tendency in African 
writing, Ngũgı̃  famously abandons his “Afro- English” writing in 1977 in 
order to write in his native Gikuyu. By this time, of course, Ngũgı̃  had 
established himself as a significant name in postcolonial African writing, 
and his notoriety as such ensured that his writing would be translated to 
circulate globally. For Ngũgı̃, writing in one’s native language enriches the 
language and reflects the experience of one’s own community, one’s own 
history, by refusing the physical and mental shackles of colonization. Im-
plicating Achebe, he provocatively asks: “What is the difference between a 
politician who says Africa cannot do without imperialism and the writer 
who says Africa cannot do without European languages?” (26). Since the 
fact of English as a “global language” cannot for Ngũgı̃ be extricated from 
the fact of its colonial mission, he refuses Achebe’s logic of writing in a 
language that is decipherable by a world audience, since that world is a 
direct reflection of colonial mastery. Ngũgı̃  concludes “The Language of 
African Literature,” however, with this declaration: “We African writers are 
bound by our calling to do for our languages what Spencer, Milton and 
Shakespeare did for English; what Pushkin and Tolstoy did for Russian; 
indeed what all writers in world history have done for their languages by 
meeting the challenge of creating literature in them, which process later 
opens the languages for philosophy, science, technology and all the other 
areas of human creative endeavors” (1986, 29). While Ngũgı̃ rehearses colo-
nial discussions about language recuperation and revitalization, he does so 
in an interesting twist that situates European literary “masters” as models 
for what African writers are “bound” to replicate. If the European literary 
giants of the last centuries are models for African writers through what 
they have done for English and Russian languages, Ngũgı̃ runs the risk of 
remaining bound to a logic of literary mastery that may well efface some 
of the critically unmasterful potentialities of African languages, literature, 
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and imaginative capacities. What would it mean to turn away from Euro-
pean writers designated as “literary masters” toward African artists and 
storytellers whose own worldviews and cultural deployments could alter-
nately become antimasterful models of imbuing native languages with new 
potentialities?
If brute European force confirmed the physical subjugation of the 
colony, language for Ngũgı̃ marked its “spiritual subjugation” (1986, 9). To 
redress this subjugation, to reclaim African identity and to refuse the sub-
suming nature of colonial languages, in 1968 Ngũgı̃  famously called for 
the abolition of the English department at his then home institution at the 
University of Nairobi. Responding to proposed developments of the En-
glish department and its ties to other departments, the justification for the 
necessity of English is articulated by way of a need to study “the historic 
continuity of a single culture” (1973, 145). If this is so, Ngũgı̃  asks, “Why 
can’t African literature be at the center so that we can view other cultures in 
relationship to it?” (146). To answer this question we must recall Macaulay’s 
stance on Sanskrit literature and the vernacular languages of India: they are 
simply too unrefined, too void of elegance and too inept at expressing the 
more profound and philosophical subtleties of human existence. Ngũgı̃ in-
sists that the continued centrality of English language and culture in Africa 
is neocolonial, a pedagogical device to ensure the ongoing supremacy of 
the Western world and its traditions. Instead, he summons a course of lit-
erary study that would move from the local toward the global regardless 
of whether the local includes works that have been subjectively bestowed 
with titles of literary excellence. For him, it is urgent to study oneself from 
the point of view of one’s culture first and to expand from this point toward 
other linguistic and literary traditions.
While Achebe and Ngũgı̃ appear as opposing figures in the postcolonial 
language debates, their own uses of language similarly rehearse the violence 
at stake in claiming or recrafting language in the postcolony. Employing 
animal metaphors of “sacrifice” and “prey” to think the relation between 
humans and their languages, both writers take for granted human mas-
tery over the nonhuman world. Language is repeatedly figured as some-
thing to hunt, to kill, to subject. Yet this metaphorical attachment to human 
practices of mastery is also challenged through their mutual insistence on 
thinking postcolonial language beyond mastery, as a relation of human re-
configuration and entanglement that does not necessitate mastery. Achebe 
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does not long for African writers to master the languages of his colonizers; 
he envisions instead an African literary landscape that implicitly engages 
newfangled forms of the colonial language that redraft rather than master 
the colonial linguistic tradition. Even while he wants English to “submit” 
itself to various uses, this submission does not for him entail wholesale 
domination. In turn, Ngũgı̃ articulates a desire for writing in African lan-
guages that reflects specific historical, cultural, and spiritual realities, even 
while he looks back to European literary masters as inspiration for African 
language revival and literary production. Postcolonial literary debates are, 
like the discourses of decolonization, fundamentally concerned with lan-
guage politics. Yet quite unlike the colonial- era debates that continuously 
returned in more and less explicit ways to the need for language mastery, 
these writers take up a relation to language that is ambivalently situated 
between masterful and unmasterful forms. While there is much disagree-
ment in these debates, the will toward language mastery begins to dissi-
pate and is replaced by the possibilities that languages embody—or can be 
crafted to embody—through the pens of colonized writers. Anticolonial 
thinkers tended to insist (even sometimes despite themselves) on language 
mastery as a crucial practice aimed at undoing the force of colonial rule 
in the colonies without theorizing the inextricable relations among forms 
of mastery. Postcolonial writers like Achebe and Ngũgı̃, while positioning 
themselves in opposition to each other, share a desire for unmasterful ways 
of formulating the relation between language and the postcolonial imagi-
nation.
World (Literature) Mastery
In Thou Shalt Not Speak My Language (2008), the Moroccan writer Abdel-
fattah Kilito asks: “Can one possess two languages? Can one master them 
equally?” Although Kilito’s central concerns are with translation and with 
the problems that mastering multiple languages poses for translation, he 
steps back to ask:
Can one possess any language? I remember hearing something, the 
source of which I have not yet been able to find, about one of the an-
cients who described his relationship to language in this way: “I de-
feated her then she defeated me, then I defeated her and she defeated 
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me again.” His relationship with language is tense, and the war between 
them has its ups and downs, but language, this ferocious creature that 
refuses to be tamed, always has the last word. The battle always ends 
with her victory, leaving one no choice but to make truce and to surren-
der, however reluctantly. (21)
If today the discourses of world literature remain preoccupied with the 
problems and politics of translation—as Emily Apter (2005) signals by be-
ginning her “manifesto” with the declaration that “everything is translat-
able” and ending with the assertion that “nothing is translatable”—Kilito 
reminds us that an engagement with translation must first and foremost 
attend to the power relations between the speaker and language itself. Here 
the unidentified “ancient” characterizes his relation to a notably feminine 
language as an unending battle with a “ferocious creature” who continues 
to win. Although Kilito does not answer his own query, he foregrounds 
that language has a long history of being framed as the enemy. Indeed, the 
problem of translation often misses a step that inhibits the inquiry. The 
ancient’s formulation of language rhymes with Heidegger’s assertion that 
“man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in 
fact language remains the master of man” (1975, 146). Despite this, con-
temporary language discourses continue to think language as that which 
must be mastered or subjugated, as something that we chase after in order 
to conquer, to own, to use at our own wills.
To be in a position to study language, as Edward Said (1994) insisted, 
means to be in a position in which one must contend with the power of the 
act and its relations to the nonlinguistic power relations that the pursuit en-
tails. To vie for mastery is to ignore these relations and to isolate oneself in 
the “ivory tower” without recourse to the real world effects that intellectual 
engagement produces. To believe that mastery (of texts or of languages) is 
possible, and to desire such mastery, solidifies our complicity with the very 
sources of imperialism that so many intellectuals and activists are wont to 
resist. For serious students of language, for those who continue to struggle 
toward a nuanced understanding of multiple languages, or even one’s own 
native tongue, and who believe that language learning is always inevitably 
a lifelong pursuit, the concept of linguistic mastery should seem perverse. 
When you study language, any language, you learn quickly that you do not 
possess it. To the contrary, the study of language and literature is precisely 
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the study of how language escapes, evades, and crystallizes differently at 
different times and through different speakers.
In the history of my own language learning, Hindi is one at which I 
have remained woefully (even shamefully) novice. After years of graduate 
school struggle to possess it, like Kilito, I found myself defeated. Almost 
as if in reverse of Gandhi—who as we have seen claimed to have failed to 
master his colonial tongue—I was a child of the Indian diaspora raised and 
educated as a speaker of colonial languages (English and French). As an 
emergent postcolonialist—and a comparative literature student no less—I 
found myself vying to become “fluent” in a language that symbolized (albeit 
perversely) my heritage. Hindi was so heavily loaded with historical signifi-
cance and a personal desire to become “properly” Indian (identity politics 
haunts even those of us who eschew it) that I could not in any sense relax 
in relation to its learning. It pained me deeply that the white peers with 
whom I studied soared so quickly and so far beyond me in their language 
skill, while I punished myself unrelentingly for not having already known 
what felt to be “rightfully” mine.
In Hindi, one commonly expresses one’s ability to speak the language 
as follows: Hindi mujhe aati hain, or “Hindi comes to me.” I do not possess 
the language. Rather, the language brings itself to me. Somewhere between 
my summoning, my calling it forth, and its own mobility and malleabil-
ity, it arrives—almost agentially—and I speak it. It is as though when we 
speak to another through language, we are always also in conversation with 
language itself. What I could not concede during those years of torturous 
language training was that language moves the speaking subject; it is not 
the speaker who controls it. I could not let language come to me precisely 
because I was too busy trying to claim Hindi as my own, which was also 
an act of covering up my historical losses and my inadequacies as a hybrid 
subject. Mastery here turns out to be a fantasy, and its rhetoric is used to 
justify ever more mastery—of language itself, but also of my own body 
(like Fanon’s tongue), of perceived enemies, of whole and diverse collec-
tives. What would it mean to refuse the rhetoric and pursuit of mastery? 
Could such a gesture dramatically alter the ways that we conceive of our-
selves as scholars? I am suggesting that it is false to imagine ourselves as 
masters of languages, authors, bodies of texts, areas. We must abandon 
mastery in order to give ourselves up to wider and less hostile horizons. It 
should be clear that I am not insisting that we all avoid a skilled relation-
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ship to our intellectual fields. Rather, I am advancing a practice of vulner-
able engagement, a practice of opening ourselves up to our dependence on 
other discourses, peoples, beings, languages (that we know and do not yet 
know), and things that give rise to the ways that we think and the claims 
that we make.
The current popularity of world literature sweeping literary studies has 
often abandoned the more vulnerable approaches to language and literature 
that began to emerge through the postcolonial language debates. Weltlit-
eratur, a resurrection of an old concept with newly defined aims, emerged 
initially in the early nineteenth century in the work of Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe (1973) to describe a universal conception of literatures around 
the world that together form a whole. Later, Marx and Engels (2002) re-
cycled the term to describe the global circulation of literatures as part of a 
capitalist network. These early evocations of world literature characterize 
the “universal” in a thoroughly Eurocentric sense, understanding Western 
Europe—with perhaps a smattering of Asian languages and literatures—
as the true heart and value of literary studies. After the decolonization 
struggles of the mid- twentieth century and the upsurge of multicultur-
alism in the later part of the century, world literature has resurfaced with 
an aim toward a self- consciously non- Eurocentric focus. Today, studying 
Kikuyu should be no less relevant than studying French, and rather than to 
approach literary studies through a politics of linguistic supremacy, many 
scholars aim to redress the damages done by linguistic dominion and to 
read the intricacies of all linguistic and literary traditions as uniquely valu-
able and contributing to a global literary landscape.
The central problem facing world literature is therefore how to conceive 
of world literature scholars, since they cannot possibly attain linguistic flu-
ency in every world language. David Damrosch correctly refuses a con-
struction of the world literary scholar as one who strives in vain to master 
the whole breadth of world literary traditions. In What Is World Literature?, 
Damrosch urges us away from “a possessive mastery of the world’s cultural 
productions” (2003, 303). Instead, he envisions “collaborative work” among 
“broad- minded specialists” that will lead us toward a more fully global 
practice of literary study (286). This vision of collectivity attempts to turn 
a prospective disciplinary crisis—the impossibility of truly being a scholar 
of all world literatures—into a communal intellectual enterprise. Across 
keynote addresses in the last decade, however, Damrosch has at times ar-
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ticulated this as a collectivity among specialized “language masters.” This 
irresistible return to mastery from one of its outspoken opponents signals 
the pervasive logic of mastery that underscores the fields of world and com-
parative literature.7
Of course, comparatists such as Damrosch employ the term “mastery” 
to signal not straightforward domination but rather great skill. Yet, as I 
argued in my introduction to this book, such skill can never be detached 
from the relations of power that make it possible. Skill and power are both 
rhetorically and economically linked to the mastery of other peoples and 
places, and to forget this fact is to abandon the foundations of the practice 
of world literature itself as a movement to bring all languages and liter-
ary traditions together in a dialogue that is not contingent on domination 
and subjugation. The demonstration of our skill and power, our “mastery” 
of texts and languages, should not be thought outside its referential con-
nection to the “dominion,” “superiority,” and “control” that both the term 
and the practice also entail. A renaming of our pursuits as literary scholars 
would miss the point altogether: This is not a problem of semantics, of sub-
stituting one noun for another. What we must critically consider is our own 
discourse as language scholars in order to examine the contradictions and 
slippages that define our work. (This would be true of all scholarship, which 
relies in every way on language.) The radical gesture of giving up mas-
tery is imperative because, whether implicitly or explicitly, our work bears 
on a world of power relations that exceeds our attention to language. The 
postcolonial language debates encapsulated by Achebe and Ngũgı̃ took the 
question of language in the postcolony seriously by attempting to engage 
language in unmasterful ways. This movement toward the unmasterful ap-
proach to literature is what is lost in the discourse of world literature today.
Damrosch’s notion of collective intellectual engagement is certainly 
compelling—even necessary—at a moment in which every aspect of inti-
mate and intellectual life is being increasingly privatized and corporatized. 
Yet his vision of a scholarly commune of masters forgets the complexity of 
language and literature as entities that, as poststructuralist and postcolonial 
discourses have encouraged us to recognize, themselves refuse mastery. The 
study of world literature in this sense signals the problem of mastery that 
is at stake in literary studies and, critically, for intellectual thought more 
broadly. As I will illustrate in chapter 4, literary studies is governed by its 
will toward mastery and despite itself continuously returns to this aim. 
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If what distinguishes world literature today from its early iterations is its 
particular drive to undo the ideological supremacy of a Western European 
literary tradition—what Dipesh Chakrabarty (2007) refers to as the gesture 
of “provincializing Europe”—the rhetoric of mastery that grounds the field 
reveals its own misleading aims. The notion of mastery therefore needs 
urgently to be reconsidered as the driving force and the aim of the field. At 
a moment in which the language of mastery sounds so harmoniously with 
the discourse of U.S. imperialism and the global reach of neocolonialism, 
it is essential that we redress the aim of literary and linguistic mastery even 
of the smallest bodies of authors or texts.
Edward Said echoes the necessity of this gesture by summoning Frie-
drich Nietzsche’s formulation of the truth of history as “a mobile army of 
metaphors and metonyms” whose meaning is to be ceaselessly interpreted 
without the drive to solve the riddles of the past (2004, 58). Indeed, Said 
gives rise to a postcolonial thinking that is driven by the intersections 
between language and colonization, and that is concerned with how the 
hybridization of languages speaks to or against neocolonial forms of domi-
nation. Aligned with the anticolonial thinkers who came before him, Said 
makes frequent claims about intellectual mastery without giving pause. He 
famously argued in Orientalism that the “unremitting ambition [of Ori-
entalism] was to master all of a world, not some easily delimited part of 
it such as an author or a collection of texts” (1979, 109). Here he points 
to the limitless scope of Orientalism, the absurdity of imagining that the 
Orient could be mastered as such. Yet to Said’s mind, the absurdity of this 
ambition was less in the drive toward mastery itself than in the notion 
that knowledge of some far- flung and nebulous place called “the Orient” 
could be mastered. The central problem of Orientalism as both intellectual 
practice and ideology is that in order to gain so-called mastery over the 
orient, it had to conflate and regurgitate common narratives about vastly 
different cultures and histories. If Said proved this body of knowledge to 
be both racist and absurd, we must in turn consider the role that mastery 
itself plays in this intellectual practice. As scholars, what we learn from Ori-
entalism (the text and the scholarly practice) should not be that we must 
limit our reach as masters over our fields. Selecting “easily delimited parts” 
for mastery, or knowing how to “limit or to enlarge realistically the scope 
of [our] discipline’s claims,” binds us to more limited, precise forms of mas-
tery. Rethinking what we do as something other than mastery—whether 
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over vast or miniscule, human or inhuman terrains—pushes us toward 
different forms of scholarship and different relations to our practices—in-
deed, toward different relations to the worlds we engage.
The writings of activists, political theorists, and literary scholars that I 
have engaged in the first half of this book form an archive of resistance to 
and engagements with mastery in anticolonial contexts. These thinkers pas-
sionately sought to resist colonial mastery while remaining entangled with 
other iterations of masterful practice and thought. While a majority of my 
attention has been centered on the ways in which “alternate” forms of mas-
tery are unthinkingly reproduced in efforts to disengage colonial mastery, 
I have also gleaned from their writings the crucial seeds of a dehumanist 
practice. For the remainder of this book, I am going to be illustrating how 
postcolonial literature opens us toward dehumanist subjectivities, prac-
tices, and politics. My aim will be to approach literature with an unmaster-
ful method of engagement, reading vulnerably the ensnarements of mas-
tery in figures who, like me, desire and fail to resist it. My abiding interest 
in the postcolonial literary archive rhymes with Wynter’s assertion that we, 
as humans, are products of narrative (1984, 50). For Wynter, literature pro-
duces the humans we understand and feel ourselves to be, and it may well 
be that through literature, through the narratives it casts and questions, we 
can begin to produce ourselves otherwise. What kinds of subjects—and 
what kinds of objects—can we be for ourselves and for others if we loosen 
the hold of mastery?
CHAPTER 3
Posthumanitarian Fictions
Despite the popular mantra of multiculturalism in the 1980s, I grew up 
in central Canada at a moment when interracial marriages were frowned 
upon, a moment when old women responded to the childish misbehaviors 
of our brood by whispering It’s the mixed blood!, a moment when the word 
“shit” circulated with schoolyard titillation to describe the color of my skin. 
My father was a child of Partition, born in India in a region of rural Punjab 
that would, in 1947 when he was six years old, become Pakistan. In the mass 
upheavals and extraordinary violence of that political moment, he migrated 
with his family to Amritsar, just on the edge of the Indian border hedging 
against a newly carved Pakistan. He would later immigrate to Canada to 
study at McGill University in Montreal, where he would meet my mother. 
She was herself a child of the diaspora, born in Ireland to a German Jewish 
mother who had been sent away from Berlin with the rise of Hitler, and 
to an Irish intellectual father who would accept a position at McGill and 
shift his family to Canada in the 1950s. My parents were drawn to each 
other’s differences and beauty, filled with the enchantments of the 1960s, 
the glamor and possibility of unions across divides. But theirs was an un-
easy marriage, fraught with cultural differences and the legacies of personal 
and political violence that persisted and proliferated through them. By the 
time I was born—the fourth and last of a motley hybrid crew—the utopian 
spirit of the ’60s had quite dispersed.
When I was young, my father completed medical school and we moved 
from a two- bedroom unit in a duplex to a huge, bedraggled blond- brick 
home in an area menacingly known as “the Gates.” Couched in a small bend 
of the Assiniboine River, it was an estuary of Winnipeg’s old money, the 
homes of the nation’s early bankers and their ilk. It was made clear to us that 
our kind was not uniformly welcome in this neighborhood. But my mother 
had a special fancy for historical homes, and for trees whose lives and leg-
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acies far exceeded our own. Despite my father’s protests, we moved into 
what would become my mother’s decades- long preoccupation: restoring, 
improving, and preserving a small space of the earth and its minor histories.
The lore of my family casts me as a difficult child, signaled unabashedly 
by the nickname “the little tornado”—a name bestowed on me during the 
one and only visit from my Babu Uncle, my father’s brother from whom 
he was mostly estranged. My mother sketches the scene of a preverbal me 
tearing out my hair in frustration (from where this frustration emerges is 
conspicuously absent from the narrative) and offering it to her in menacing 
handfuls. I was a no- less- difficult teen—suspended regularly from school, 
remiss in class participation and attendance, and impatient with the con-
fines of my world.
But there is a singular story couched within this family lore, and it is a 
story that I have always quietly cherished whenever my mother feels com-
pelled to share it. It is the story of my inaugural act as a “humanitarian”: 
I was perhaps five years old (in the narrative, I am always younger) when, 
wandering home alone after visiting a friend, I saw a white man in tattered 
clothing eating out of a neighbor’s garbage can. I was shocked at the sight 
and understood that I had a responsibility to act. I ran home in tears and 
pleaded with my mother to help, which she did readily. We brought him 
home and sat together in the backyard eating homemade pizza, learning 
the details of how he had come to be scavenging for discarded food in our 
affluent neighborhood. As it turned out, he was a ward of the province liv-
ing in a group home for people with “mental deficiencies” in a neighbor-
hood adjacent to ours. My mother would come to discover that his over-
seers had left their wards alone for a long holiday weekend without anyone 
present to distribute food and medications.
For all the ways in which I would or could not conform, for all of my bad 
behavior within the narrative remembering of our shared family history, 
this was my narrative of redemption. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that it 
became profoundly influential to my own self- formation, to how I learned 
to read myself in relation to the more negative (and indeed more frequent) 
narratives that circulated within the family. This redemptive narrative was 
one that propped me up against an errant past; humanitarianism became 
for me a kind of refuge from the tornado that had otherwise defined me.
Through my readings of the recurring humanitarian figures of post-
colonial literature, I began to return again and again to this redemptive 
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scene of my own self- formation. We do not always understand why we at-
tach ourselves to certain things and ideas in the world, yet as I reread these 
literary figures, I began to think critically about my own formative narra-
tives—narratives that, in ways both clear and less accessible, have shaped 
my self- understanding as a particular kind of subject. There was, indeed, a 
critical continuity between this scene of redemptive self- formation and the 
fact that I would pursue a doctoral degree in the critical humanities. One 
seemed to lead directly into the other, as though the work of the humani-
tarian and the work of the humanities were sutured. Yet through a vul-
nerable engagement with posthumanitarian fictions, I began to recognize 
mastery at play in what is commonly understood as a height of ethical 
action in the service of others. Becoming vulnerable to the self- narrations 
of other subjects, I also saw how the more and less overtly humanitarian 
aspects of my own self- constitution were in fact intimately interlaced with 
those less redemptive qualities that had also formed me. Rather than to rely 
on a dialectical ethics in which we are either “good” or “bad” subjects, an 
antimasterful approach to reading our own histories—and the histories of 
others—opens us to the messiness of our pasts, to the entanglements of our 
lives, and to the unsolvable riddles that shape us.
Moving in this chapter between readings of J. M. Coetzee’s novel Life & 
Times of Michael K (1983) and Mahasweta Devi’s Bengali short story “Little 
Ones” (1998), I engage postcolonial literary texts that pressure the ways 
humanitarian work has been imagined, represented, and enforced in the 
neocolonial present.1 These texts, which are exemplary illustrations of what 
I call posthumanitarian fictions, hinge on the narratives that humanitarian 
characters tell themselves to confirm their work, narratives that position 
them as inherently nonmasterful actors committed to the labor of advanc-
ing humanity. I am interested in the figure of the humanitarian precisely 
because of its attachment to narratives of humanitarian benevolence that 
are revealed to have concrete, material effects in the production of human 
inequalities. That these narratives are postcolonial is crucial to my read-
ing of posthumanitarian fictions, because I employ the term “postcolonial” 
not merely to signal particular geopolitical spaces but rather to name a 
constitutive modality of global political economy today. In this sense, my 
movement between the terms “postcolonial” and “neocolonial” insists on 
the ongoing entanglements and critical forms of mastery that carry over an 
imagined temporal divide between formal colonial rule and its afterlives.
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The figure of the humanitarian and its narrative attachments illustrate 
how our conceptions of the “best” human practices in the globalized world 
today remain committed to—indeed founded on—forms of violence and 
erasure that continue to be framed uncritically across popular and aca-
demic discourses. In these texts, humanitarians, who desire to work in the 
service of others less fortunate, finally cannot be extricated from the un-
equal power relations they seek to redress.2 They emerge as figures that 
stand in opposition to the colonial mastery of others but also unwittingly 
work alongside its modern- day iterations. In this way, they represent the 
complex entanglements of politics and ethics through forms of humani-
tarian aid, and they offer an urgently needed perspective on the neocolonial 
valences of humanitarianism as ideology and practice. Despite the fact that 
humanitarian characters desire deeply to act in ethical ways, these narra-
tives emphasize the complicity of humanitarian actors with the systems 
they oppose. I engage complicity through Mark Sanders, who argues that 
“when opposition takes the form of a demarcation from something . . . it 
cannot, it follows, be untouched by that to which it opposes itself. Opposi-
tion takes its first steps from a footing of complicity” (2002, 9).3 Etymolog-
ically signaling a “folded- together- ness,” complicity becomes for Sanders 
“the very basis for responsibly entering into, maintaining, or breaking off 
a given affiliation or attachment” (x). In this chapter, I turn to the humani-
tarian as a crucial figure through which to begin to reframe and renarrate 
the complicities of liberal subjectivity broadly, and to pressure us to loosen 
the attachments to which, as individual readers, we cling in order to frame 
ourselves as particular kinds of subjects.
Set amid an unnamed South African civil war during apartheid, Coet-
zee’s novel charts the path of the harelipped protagonist, Michael K. Hav-
ing spent his life outcast and institutionalized, K is driven by ecological 
attachments and by acts of cultivation. After the untimely death of his 
mother, he desires to extricate himself entirely from his war- torn environ-
ment, investing himself in the landscape as a refugee of war. Toward the 
novel’s end, K is captured by the state and, after his collapse, is sent to a 
camp hospital where the medical staff aims to restore his health in order 
to release him once again into a prisoner work camp. At this moment, the 
novel abandons the otherwise omniscient narrative voice, shifting instead 
to the first- person narration of an unnamed pharmacist hired as a wartime 
medical officer. Through the narration of the officer, a self- characterized 
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humanitarian actor, the reader is delivered into liberal desire squarely 
within and alongside the frustrations of the humanitarian worker. At this 
juncture, the novel recounts the medical officer’s bewildering encounter 
with K, whose emaciated body by all medical accounts should no longer be 
living. Against his patient’s own desires to be left alone, the officer is driven 
to restore his patient to proper health. Ultimately, this drive to heal his pa-
tient is revealed to be fundamentally entangled with the medical officer’s 
need to enforce his self- understanding as an agent of goodness.
In “Little Ones,” Devi emphasizes the longing of the humanitarian actor 
to extricate himself from a relation of mastery. Mr. Singh, the story’s pro-
tagonist, is a government employee hired for a short- term position to es-
tablish a relief camp in an impoverished region of Bengal. Singh’s mission 
is to oversee the rationing of annual supplies for the starving adivasi (trib-
als)—the indigenous peoples of India who are excluded from state- afforded 
rights. He finds himself thrust into his role as a relief officer, and while ini-
tially repelled by the human bodies of those in need, he quickly comes to 
embrace his exalted status as a humanitarian. But Singh’s humanitarianism 
reaches its limits when, at the end of the story, he is confronted by fugitives 
of the state who, having been deprived of basic nutrition, have become 
(in)human pygmies. Even more horrifying than the starved and emaciated 
bodies of those Singh has been serving, these unbelievable “inhuman” bod-
ies force him to concede to his own complicity within a postcolonial system 
that produces healthy human subjects at the expense of others. Assailed 
by these unbelievable bodies, Singh’s alibi as a good humanitarian subject 
collapses in on itself.
Posthumanitarian fictions such as these are a subgenre of postcolonial 
literature that create and then problematize alliances between the reader 
and humanitarian characters, functioning through the psychodynamics of 
identification at play in reading.4 Situated in relation to the humanitarian, 
the reader becomes aligned with humanitarian ideology. As humanitarian 
protagonists confront their complicities within systems that produce their 
objects of aid, the reader dwells intimately within the narrative frames and 
sutures of other “good” subjects. Posthumanitarian fictions represent char-
acters whose work is revealed to harmonize with the more overt force of 
colonial mastery, and readers are led through the structural form of the 
texts into a double identification with humanitarian figures and the aid 
recipients against whom they come to struggle. By doing so, these fictions 
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ultimately urge readers beyond a politics of compassion for the other, di-
recting the reader back to its own complicit relations.5
Posthumanitarian fictions urge us toward a radical revision of the dis-
courses of human rights and humanitarian action and of the notion of the 
properly “human” that gives rise to them. They summon the erasures and 
exclusions that make these efforts possible, implicating the reader through 
narrative devices that highlight, and in turn upset, our alliances. Novels, 
Lynn Hunt (2007) has argued, were instrumental forces in giving rise to 
human rights through their capacity to represent and create empathy from 
bourgeois readers toward “common” people. She illustrates how eighteenth- 
century upper- class readers (not unremarkably, mostly bourgeois women) 
began to imagine the interiority of lower- class people through narrative 
representation, creating a frame of empathy that made possible a thinking 
of (other white, Western) humans as beings with a critical likeness that 
were deserving of “universal” rights. For Hunt, whose work is invested in 
a politics of empathy, reading novels allowed privileged readers to imagine 
that all other humans (delineated via the shared whiteness of English and 
French peoples) had an interiority much like their own.
In his analysis of what he calls the “Third World Bildungsromane,” Jo-
seph Slaughter (2007) traces how empathetic reading takes on a much less 
idyllic political function. This increasingly popular genre represents despo-
tism abroad through characters that are able to escape or challenge the bar-
barity of their native lands. Through these texts, readers identify with char-
acters that have suffered and survived the atrocities of elsewhere. They are 
able to feel that they themselves have, through the act of reading and thus 
“knowing,” staged a “humanitarian intervention.” However much I may 
want to recuperate a sense of the reader as one engaged in the cultivation 
of critical capacities, Slaughter’s formulation warns how readily reading can 
reaffirm rather than challenge global politics. Indeed, as Freud argued in 
Civilization and Its Discontents, reading practices based on empathy have 
a disturbing habit of allowing the reader to insert themselves universally: 
“We shall always tend to consider people’s distress objectively—that is, to 
place ourselves, with our own wants and sensibilities, in their conditions, 
and then to examine what occasions we should find in them for experi-
encing happiness or unhappiness. This method of looking at things, which 
seems objective because it ignores the variations in subjective sensibility, 
is, of course, the most subjective possible, since it puts one’s own mental 
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states in the place of any others, unknown though they may be” (2010, 62). 
Because empathetic reading does not challenge the reader’s own subjectiv-
ity but instead allows them unthinkingly to impose their own “wants and 
sensibilities” on others, it becomes a masterful gesture in which the self is 
always authorized above and beyond its others. Empathetic reading might 
allow readers to extend their sense of who is human, but without calling 
into question the presupposed humanity of the reader and the politics that 
gave rise to it as such.
This is precisely why vulnerable reading is so crucial to the exchange 
between reader and text. In contrast to the work of the novel in the eigh-
teenth century and to empathetic readings of contemporary representa-
tions of Third World despotism, posthumanitarian fictions unsettle the 
narrative sutures of the empathetic reader—to open the fissures that join 
the reader to its textual allies, to pressure the racial politics of the humani-
tarian/recipient relation, and in so doing to query the reader’s particular 
claims to and performances of humanity. Posthumanitarian fictions antici-
pate—but crucially, do not announce—ways of being that exceed or depart 
from the hegemonic “human” of modernity: the bounded, Western, white, 
heteromasculine, able- bodied subject. This work of the text on the psychic 
and bodily life of the reader is crucial to the double- pronged project of de-
humanism: on the one hand, a critique of Western humanism through at-
tention to narrative and its fissures, to how exclusions are revealed through 
close attention to narratives that seem otherwise seamless; and on the other, 
an opening toward alternative, creative, and as yet unimagined forms of 
political action and relation. Critically, this opening toward the unknown 
is radically different from the psychic splitting of the subject. The latter de-
fensively closes down the possibilities by moving too quickly to cordon off 
the good from the bad, the pure from the persecutory. By bringing readers 
into this defensive disavowal of the split subject, posthumanitarian fictions 
invite us into the splits and crevices of our own subjectivities, inviting us to 
inhabit ourselves differently.
Humanitarian Fetishism
Posthumanitarian fictions enable us not only to see the interrelations 
among structural, material, and ideological forms of oppression but also to 
begin to envision alternate forms of alliance that exceed those that currently 
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define global relations. In posthumanitarian fictions, narrative form and 
fissure reveal humanitarianism to be part of an ideological imaginary—a 
way of relating to the structural and material facts of the neocolonial enter-
prise through what I call “humanitarian fetishism.” Coupling Marx’s (1992) 
formulation of the commodity with Freud’s ([1962] 2000) conception of the 
fetish, humanitarian fetishism is a process that negates one’s own complic-
ity in the mastery of the state over its disenfranchised subjects by obscur-
ing the material, social, and psychic aspects of humanitarian practice. In 
Marxist theory, “commodity fetishism” names the process of disavowing 
the “definite social relation between men” in the production of material 
objects (1992, 165). This disavowal leads to the fantasy that in capitalism one 
simply exchanges money for an object. Marx compels us to recognize that 
material objects do not magically appear but are produced by and through 
material labor, which is in fact the source of an object’s value. Fetishism in 
Freud takes a decidedly psychic turn, naming the overvaluation of an inap-
propriate sexual object. What is important here is that for Freud the choice 
of the fetish object has a very determinate psychological etiology. A fetish 
is a fantasmatic way of covering over a traumatic realization; in response 
to trauma, which must be disavowed, the subject immediately rescripts the 
original trauma with an object- ideal that governs the subject’s fantasy life.
Despite a long- standing difficulty in reconciling the Marxist and Freud-
ian accounts of fetishism within critical theory, Christopher Breu concat-
enates the two versions in his analysis of what he calls “avatar fetishism.” 
Drawing on Slavoj Žižek, Breu is interested in how materialities and bodies 
are disavowed by postmodern culture’s production of identities. For Breu, 
“avatar fetishism” names the disavowal of “the material processes, objects, 
and embodiments that structure and enable everyday life in our ostensibly 
post- industrial era” (2014, 22). In psychoanalytic terms, avatar fetishism is 
“akin to the construction of an ideal self or an ideal ego” (22). Breu’s merg-
ing of the valences of Marxist and psychoanalytic fetishisms helps us to see 
how the inability to register and attend to the materialities and material 
agencies that make particular kinds of life possible is intimately tied to pro-
cesses of subject formation and of psychosocial life.
While humanitarian action hinges on relations of power (since the hu-
manitarian is one who is in a position of relative power and thus able to 
offer aid to those in need), posthumanitarian fictions illustrate how this 
power becomes masterful through humanitarian fetishism. By obscuring 
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and enforcing one’s own power in the humanitarian effort, by upholding 
the narrative of humanitarian benevolence and disavowing material com-
plicities, humanitarian characters come to reproduce the very structures 
of power they desire to dismantle. The humanitarian ego becomes the be-
nevolent master of someone else’s house. Singh’s and the medical officer’s 
work turns out to humanize themselves but does little to uphold the hu-
manity of those they seek to uplift. Critically, this process of humanization 
that looks to the other but ultimately turns back toward oneself echoes the 
historical justification for the humanities, which has sought expressly to 
humanize its students. Humanitarian fetishism allows these characters, like 
those engaged in the humanities, to fantasize about becoming more fully 
human precisely by repressing their participation in the constitutive dehu-
manization of aid recipients. Put simply, humanitarians can only come to 
understand themselves as the kinds of subjects that do good in the world by 
ignoring the masterful material relations that enable their work. Humani-
tarian fetishism applies not strictly to those who work in explicit spaces of 
aid but is also a critical compulsion of liberal subjectivity itself. Focusing 
on the figure of the humanitarian throws humanitarian fetishism into re-
lief by turning readers toward our own relations to mastery, whether we 
pretend to be unmasterful in order to prop up the ideal of our benevolent 
subjectivities or we believe in “good” forms of mastery as necessary to the 
elevation of all humans.
In her work on the politics of humanitarian aid, Lisa Smirl argues that 
“the practices involved in post- crisis reconstruction by the international 
humanitarian aid community are inseparable from the production and re-
construction of global relations and identities” (2008, 237). Smirl illustrates 
how humanitarian aid practices, and in particular the spatio- material poli-
tics that enable such practices, ultimately confirm and “reconstruct” the 
disparities between aid workers and those they seek to assist. The aim of 
Smirl’s work is to intervene in what she calls the “humanitarian imaginary,” 
a mode of intervention that is based on “idealized assumptions regarding 
social organization and community” (2015, 2). The practices of humani-
tarianism reproduce, often devastatingly, the divides between the Global 
North and South. Indeed, as Costas Douzinas (2007) and Elizabeth Bern-
stein (2010) have argued from quite different vantage points, humanitar-
ianism can easily couple with the military objectives of imperial power.
Both Life & Times of Michael K and “Little Ones” pressure the “humani-
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tarian imaginary,” emphasizing how humanitarian subjectivities are foun-
dationally shaped by forms of mastery they persistently disavow. In these 
stories, the impulse toward mastery over other human bodily and psychic 
lives cannot be extricated from the aims of humanitarian characters, and 
the power to disavow one’s own complicity becomes folded into mastery’s 
particular function in the neocolonial crisis zone. As fictions, these texts 
reveal the always fantasmatic nature of mastery, positioning disavowal as 
that which paradoxically makes mastery flourish. The qualities of mastery 
that I elaborated in the introduction to this book emerge subtly but power-
fully across these stories: despite their own profound desires, humanitarian 
characters work to distinguish themselves from their objects of aid, to form 
hierarchical relations between themselves and their aid targets, and to ex-
tend this relation across time.
What we see through representations of humanitarian action in the 
postcolony is a humanitarian subject that is split. On the one hand, the 
humanitarian sustains a self- narration as a benevolent political subject 
working to amend the damages of oppressive regimes. On the other hand, 
this subject disavows its material and ideological entanglements with neo-
colonial power. Repeatedly, the humanitarian protagonists of these fictions 
cannot bear to confront their complicities and they cling to a need to neatly 
demarcate the good from the bad. By inviting readers to identify with hu-
manitarian protagonists, posthumanitarian fictions urge readers to attend 
to their own fictions, to the ways their conceptions of themselves as funda-
mentally benevolent often require a forgetting of the negative valences of 
their entanglements. Posthumanitarian fictions can in this sense be read as 
narratives about narratives and are fictions that beckon readers to engage 
literature as an ethical terrain from which intimate forms of self- reflection 
become critical potentialities.
The spatio- material politics of humanitarianism resounds with what 
Fanon in the colonial context called the ever- present “lines of force” that 
structured the colonies (1963, 38). For Fanon, the spatial politics of the 
colony revealed overtly the force of the colonial relation; the colonies were 
divided into “compartments”—different zones of restriction and access that 
reinforced the power of the master while ensuring the subjugation of the 
slave. Emphasizing the spatial politics of queer life, Sara Ahmed builds on 
Fanon to argue that “colonialism makes the world ‘white,’ which is of course 
a world ‘ready’ for certain kinds of bodies, as a world that puts certain ob-
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jects within their reach” (2006, 111). Ahmed’s argument builds on the ways 
the world becomes oriented toward certain bodies well beyond those colo-
nial contexts in which the “lines of force” are directly demarcated. Fanon 
and Ahmed resonate in posthumanitarian fictions as they represent the 
psychic and material lives of humanitarians whose presence in the crisis 
zone continuously confirms and situates their superiority over those they 
have come to serve. The critical continuities across colonial regimes and 
humanitarian practices are crystalized through postcolonial representa-
tions of the crisis zone as the ground on which the human is revealed to 
be not only a historically contingent subject but one that continues to be 
ideologically and structurally enforced. Through their representations of 
humanitarian actors, Coetzee and Devi emphasize those “best practices” of 
liberal action by attending to the narratives issued by these characters about 
their own benevolent functions. These texts insist that dehumanization is a 
structural problem that not only implicates but sustains the humanitarian 
as a figure of liberal excellence.
When Life & Times of Michael K turns abruptly two- thirds of the way 
through the novel to the narration of the medical officer, much attention 
is given over to K’s body as a site of bewildering emaciation. Although 
K refuses treatment, his body continues to be subjected by the state via 
its workers. The bodily enforcements and discomforts to which our pro-
tagonist is subjected are narrated and queried by the new narrative voice 
of the humanitarian. It is as though within the narrative only those who 
are deemed downcast are embodied, while those more normative and able 
bodies that give aid come under a privileged bodily erasure. It is not simply 
that K falls victim to this system and suffers as a result; it is that those 
well- fed bodies thrive within the systems they seek to amend. This thriving 
is perversely represented through a critical narrative absence, the novel’s 
casual erasure of the bodily conditions of the medical officer’s modes of 
sustenance in the hospital. Here we might recall the critical function of the 
mundane in Gandhi’s writings that I signaled in chapter 1. For Gandhi, the 
details of everyday bodily habits and processes were vital to the subject in 
search of truth. Scrupulous attention to the mundane for Gandhi was cru-
cial to the pursuit of an ethical life. Yet while so much narrative attention 
is given to K’s body—and to how this body is (mis)read in the hospital/
camp—the medical officer’s bodily habits, spatial relations, and alimentary 
practices are made powerfully invisible in the text.
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While the medical officer imagines himself to be a caregiver in pursuit 
of healing, he confronts the fact that his work within the militarized space 
of the hospital is absolutely complicit with the penal system that will in 
turn take his patient’s healthy body and put it to service in a war his patient 
wishes to avoid. This aligns with the novel’s provocative skirting of race 
and its particular force in the South African context; while race is virtually 
imperceptible across the novel, the style and form of the medical officer’s 
narration forcefully insinuates racial difference and its attending dehuman-
izations. What the novel “forgets” to include emerges poignantly, asking 
readers to re- member the material and psychic structures that prop up our 
own intimate and political lives.
“Little Ones” plays more directly with the contrast between the bodies 
of those in need of aid and the bodily comforts to which Singh as humani-
tarian is privy. As a political activist, Devi insists that the “sole purpose” 
of her fiction is to “expose the many faces of the exploiting agencies” and 
to write fiction that is a documentation of reality (1998, ix). Based on nu-
tritional and anthropological research, Devi depicts the “stunted” body of 
tribal peoples not as a metaphor for dehumanization but as a fact of depri-
vation. While Devi’s insistence on the factual does not account for the in-
strumental work of narrative itself in the making and shaping of particular 
bodies, her overtly political fiction does point us to the tangible failures 
of the postcolonial nation- state and to the liberal bourgeoisie’s complicity 
with the creation of abject postindependence tribal life.
At the start of the story, Singh is characterized as “extremely honest and 
sympathetic” and is set against the region’s impoverished inhabitants who 
have “no honest way of living” (Devi 1998, 1). Taking up a short- term posi-
tion away from his comfortable city office in the food department, Singh 
is shocked by the desolation of the geographic region and its people. The 
narrator reveals that Singh has been educated about tribal life exclusively 
through commercial Hindi films, in which the adivasi are represented in 
perpetual states of ecstatic song and dance. As such, Singh “had the im-
pression that adivasi men played the flute and adivasi women danced with 
flowers in their hair, singing, as they pranced from hillock to hillock” (2). 
His filmic illusion of tribal life is shattered by his contact with the “near- 
naked, shriveled, worm- ridden, swollen- bellied” bodies of the adivasi, and 
the encounter initially “repels” him (2).
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Set against this scene of absolute dehumanization are details of the 
comforts afforded to Singh as aid- giver: “A bath in cool well water. His 
aunt’s husband—a Minister. Hence, top quality rice served at table. Peas 
pulao. Meat, gulabjamun, pickle. At night, beds out in the open. The earth 
dampened with water, so slightly cool” (Devi 1998, 9). While Singh remains 
psychically unsettled by the sight of the adivasi people and by narratives 
that circulate among the government workers of terrifying ghost children 
that live in the forest and steal food rations, the story offsets Singh’s own 
bodily entitlements against those he serves. Unlike the conspicuously ab-
sent bodily comforts of the medical officer in Coetzee’s novel, Singh’s com-
forts are embedded in the narrative as spatial objects that physically and 
psychically orient Singh as distinct from those he serves and that waylay 
the haunting facts and fantasies of life in the region.
While Singh accepts these comforts, he continues to be haunted by 
stories—not only of inhuman thieving children but also of government 
officials who themselves steal food and other rations to sell on the black 
market. The logic of his informant suggests that since the “savage,” “irre-
sponsible,” and “animalistic” tribal populations cannot care for themselves 
despite government charity, there is little use in ensuring that the rations 
properly reach them. Ration theft turns out to be not only the work of little 
inhuman bodies that emerge from and disappear back into the forest but 
also the work of those who represent and serve the state. The story in this 
sense collapses the division between the state and its adversaries.
The acuity of the story is in how it characterizes Singh’s desire to break 
from the system he represents. Making a decision to set himself off from 
other corrupt government officials, Singh engages the humanitarian imagi-
nary by believing that his politics can be parsed from his privilege. He is by 
all accounts a successful humanitarian actor: he runs a “disciplined camp” 
that appears to be free of government corruption and supersedes protocol 
by insisting on an increase of medical and nutritional supplies (Devi 1998, 
14– 15). But humanitarian fetishism seeps into the narrative through Singh’s 
increasing comfort with his status as a successful humanitarian. Despite the 
fact that the narrative from its outset has emphasized that “the entire area 
is a burnt- out desert” on which nothing can grow (1), he fantasizes that he 
can persuade the tribals to engage in agricultural life: “He also wonders 
whether it will be possible to change their future. Honest and compassion-
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ate officers are needed. Such officers will be able to convert these people 
to agriculture. He decides to submit a note the moment he gets to Ran-
chi. It’s not possible for so many people to survive only on relief year after 
year” (15). The language of “conversion” in this passage emphasizes the split 
between Singh’s desire to help those in need and the simultaneous desire to 
bring them into the fold of his own ideology. This profound desire to help 
becomes folded into an ideology of conquest in which Singh—imbued with 
rights as a humanitarian citizen and with a degree of state authority—is 
the exceptional figure who can enact radical change simply by persuading 
the tribals to act differently and by submitting a simple note to the authori-
ties informing them of his solution. Singh cannot see that couched within 
his own purported claims to goodness is a desire for conquest. Precisely 
because he refuses to see his own complicity at work, he is able to set aside 
the haunting legacies of both state- employed and ghostly thieves and to 
fall calmly into “untroubled sleep” (15). What “Little Ones” illustrates is 
how Singh’s desire, through its fetishistic play, refuses the ecological and 
political realities that not only give rise to the abject lives of the tribals but 
also, perversely, enable his own humanitarian ego- ideal to flourish.
Sociogeny and Narrative Force
Literature, I am arguing, is a crucial site through which to explore how 
narratives instantiate subjectivities. For Fanon, as we saw in chapter 1, 
narrative has a sociogenetic function, producing and sustaining humans 
in ways both material and ideological. Although Fanon’s attention is toward 
black male embodiment in the colonies, his formulation of sociogenesis 
extends to all modern embodied subjectivities. Reading literature can be a 
crucial vantage point from which to rethink the human as a product shaped 
and enforced through narratives that are historically, socially, politically, 
and filially produced. Shaped through narrative, subjects are always also 
(and often unthinkingly) engaged in the ongoing narrative productions 
and enforcements of themselves—and of others. Posthumanitarian fictions 
emphasize how even those of us deeply invested in the labor and ethics of 
human care remain active in the creation of “human” subjectivity and in 
the enforcements of its abject alterities. Put concisely, these fictions show 
us how claims to goodness (signaled through humanitarian action) are en-
snared in the production and enforcement of dehumanization.
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Approaching these constitutive narratives with vulnerability—with a 
willingness to engage that which we have wished to avoid, and in so doing 
be crafted anew—can be a world- making practice through which we be-
come other to ourselves. Posthumanitarian fictions draw readers toward 
their own critical complicities with structures of dehumanization, em-
phasizing how complicity becomes obscured through narrative practices 
that continuously obfuscate responsibility toward others. In the effort to 
approach a dehumanist ethics—which is itself an enduring and irreduc-
ible commitment—we must read deconstructively and approach texts, 
as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak reminds us, not as anthropologists but as 
imaginative readers prepared for forms of self- othering as “an end in itself ” 
(2003, 13). Through vulnerable reading, and through an avowal of complic-
ity to which I turn in the next chapter, we might begin to revise, rewrite, 
and elaborate ourselves by untangling and demystifying the narratives that 
have crafted us to date.
Life & Times of Michael K underscores the medical officer’s failure to 
become vulnerable to the narrative force that has produced both himself 
and his patient as particular kinds of subjects. The novel maps an intricate 
connection between the medical officer’s claim to goodness and his un-
relenting need to hold control over his dehumanized patient. Through a 
psychodynamics of narrative identification, which sutures readers to the 
narrative voice(s) of the text, the reader becomes textually and ethically 
implicated in this paradigm. Structurally, the novel begins and ends with 
an omniscient narrative voice, but three- quarters of the way through it 
shifts to the first- person voice of the nameless humanitarian medical officer 
before returning to the omniscient narrator to conclude the novel. These 
two narrative voices, critically distinct in tone but linked through their 
repeated dehumanization of K, likewise reveal the sociogenetic force that 
unrelentingly bears down on the “disabled” protagonist.
In the first sentences of the novel, a sympathetic midwife obscures K’s 
newborn body from his mother before assuring her that a child with a hare-
lip is a sign of good luck. Despite this assurance, his mother “did not like 
the mouth that would not close and the living pink flesh it bared to her” 
(Coetzee 1983, 3). Relaying the mother’s dislike for the physical body of her 
child, the narrator takes on through free indirect discourse the mother’s 
alienation from her child, repeatedly describing the baby K as “it.” Un-
wanted and dehumanized from the outset of the novel, K’s body reveals an 
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openness (a mouth that would not close) and externalization (the baring of 
living pink flesh) that is unpalatable to the social world embodied through 
the mother. As the novel progresses, K is repeatedly evoked in animalistic 
terms, likened, for example, to “a dumb dog” (28). Unabatedly harsh in the 
portrayal of K, the narrator presents the reader with an unsettling and un-
restrained “factual” account of K’s bodily, psychic, and social life.
After following the exhaustive details of K’s journey through dispos-
session, the death of his mother, his search for her ancestral home, his re-
treat from a social world at war, and his increasingly conflicted relation to 
eating as a necessary act of violence against that which one consumes (a 
fascinatingly Gandhian crisis), he is misrecognized as an accomplice to 
war deserters and captured by the state. The novel then turns abruptly to 
the narrative voice of the nameless wartime medical officer, a voice that ap-
pears initially sympathetic toward K and comes as a form of readerly relief. 
Yet these two narrators are in crucial ways aligned, not only through their 
persistent dehumanization of K but through their roles as “social” voices: 
the first, omniscient, and the second, a poignantly nameless liberal subject.
The medical officer’s narration begins with a fundamental misrecogni-
tion of K and with a concern for his patient’s well- being: “There is a new 
patient in the ward, a little old man who collapsed during physical training 
and was brought in with very low respiration and heartbeat. . . . I asked 
the guards who brought him why they made someone is his condition 
do physical exercise” (Coetzee 1983, 129). The novel establishes an initial 
identification between the reader and the humanitarian narrative voice, 
on the one hand distinguishing them by virtue of the reader knowing the 
details of K’s backstory (which situates the reader, interestingly, in a posi-
tion of narrative authority over the medical officer), while on the other 
hand aligning them through a shared desire to preserve K’s body and to 
bestow him with full humanity. This alliance is distressed, however, as the 
narrator becomes increasingly ambivalent and forceful toward the object 
of its humanitarian desire. Initially characterizing himself as “soft” within 
a hard system and a healer amid systemic degradation, the medical officer 
is finally disabled through his relation to K from remaining within his own 
well- crafted narrative about his exceptional status as humanitarian. Under-
standing that his patient’s story has been radically misrepresented by the 
state, the medical officer struggles to recraft K’s history through his medical 
assessments and through the insufficient details of a patient who refuses to 
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abide by the strictures of self- accounting that the state demands of him. In 
the geopolitical space of the camp hospital where prisoners, inmates, and 
patients become interchangeable categories, K’s anomalous body comes to 
haunt the medical officer as he realizes that it signals not only its medical 
exception but the pervasive exclusions of the nation- state in and beyond 
times of war. While K’s shocking emaciation may at one level be read as 
self- induced, it also betrays for the medical officer the systemic injustices 
that produce it and that sustain his own fully imbued humanity (132).
Benita Parry argues that in Coetzee’s oeuvre, various “figures of silence” 
are “muted by those who have the power to name and depict them” (1998, 
151). Following this logic, K stands in contradistinction to the medical 
officer, who attempts through his own narrative projections to account for 
his patient’s silence. Parry’s concern that such figures of silence may well 
reinforce the supremacy of Europe—of Europe’s historical claim to the 
word and the world—is crucial to a consideration of the medical officer’s 
function in the novel. Although his encounter with his patient begins with 
compassion and with a desire to revise the state’s narrative about K to pro-
tect him from criminal punishment, his language and logic continuously 
reveal his masterful drives. His narration begins with repeated pronounce-
ments of uncertainty about his patient: “Though he looks like an old man, 
he claims to be only thirty- two. Perhaps it is the truth” (Coetzee 1983, 130). 
Signaled by the “perhaps” that throws the truth into question, the narrator 
shows a willingness to suspend his authority and to engage other narrative 
possibilities. Yet his claim to authority comes quickly into conflict with 
his commitment to being “soft.” Having successfully stalled the authorities 
from an undoubtedly torturous interrogation of his patient, the medical 
officer declares: “the long and the short of it is that by my eloquence I 
saved you. . . . I hope you will be grateful one day” (142). Insisting that his 
“eloquence” is K’s saving grace, the medical officer’s work as a medical prac-
titioner becomes bound to his desire to wield discursive power; he cannot 
help but to wish for the gratitude of his patient, and in so doing reveals the 
congruencies of discourse, enforcement, and aid in humanitarian action.
K’s unwillingness to comply with his enforced medical treatment be-
comes for the narrator a rejection of his own self- designated identity as 
a humanitarian amid the war. What the medical officer cannot see is how 
K’s refusal to comply with the treatment is part of a much larger resis-
tance to institutional force. Noting K’s lack of desire for “status, authority, 
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community, and property,” Anthony Vital suggests that while K fosters no 
resentment for his own lack and is “imposed upon utterly, yet without com-
plicity,” the medical officer by contrast “finds his own complicity simultane-
ously distasteful and inescapable” (2008, 91). K’s recalcitrance becomes for 
the narrator a paralyzing force: “You have never asked for anything, yet you 
have become an albatross around my neck. Your bony arms are knotted be-
hind my head, I walk bowed under the weight of you” (Coetzee 1983, 146). 
Crippled by the symbolic weight of K’s body, a body that is evoked now as a 
dehumanized albatross, the medical officer struggles to rationalize his posi-
tion in relation to his (inhuman) patient. He claims control by renarrating 
their relation and filtering it through the canon of Western Romanticism 
as he leans on Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “Rime of the Ancient Mariner” 
([1798] 1951), and he shores up his own human subjectivity by dehuman-
izing his patient. Through this double movement, Coetzee signals that the 
subject of Western Man cannot be separated from the literary production 
of its inhuman and dehumanized others. Establishing K as the albatross, 
the medical officer becomes the mariner who is stifled by a creaturely im-
position. The point is not that Coleridge’s poem necessarily restores the 
medical officer’s humanitarian power over K but that this renarration al-
lows him to continue to be the subject who narrates, who spins the narra-
tive structure within which the present takes on its meaning.
Not long after reconfiguring his narrative in relation to Coleridge’s 
“Rime,” the medical officer appears to undergo a radical transformation 
and wishes to “surrender” from his position of authority, a position that 
insists on the refusal of his complicity in the dehumanizing effects of war 
(Coetzee 1983, 149). Couched within the middle section of the novel is an 
epistolary plea from the medical officer to his patient. Therein the medical 
officer writes: “You are going to die, and your story is going to die too, for-
ever and ever, unless you come to your senses and listen to me. Listen to 
me, Michaels. I am the only one who can save you. I am the only one who 
sees you for the original soul you are. I am the only one who cares for you” 
(151). The use of “care” here works as a euphemism for the medical officer’s 
ability to preserve K’s story by making it legible to state bureaucracy. The 
persistently declarative stance of the letter reveals how the medical officer 
repeatedly fails to persuade K to behave according to his will, and in con-
sequence the language he employs to frame K becomes increasingly com-
manding. This is because K’s silence threatens the medical officer’s power 
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to make the patient speak, or what Michel Foucault calls “the incitement to 
discourse”: “an institutional incitement to speak . . . , and to do so more and 
more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to have it spo-
ken about” (1990, 18). While the medical officer’s repeated refrain that he 
is “the only one” who cares about or can save K registers his self- appointed 
exceptional status, Foucault reminds us that this does not in any way make 
him exceptional: the power to make speak is precisely what allows the op-
erations of bureaucratic power. All at once, his insistence that “Michaels” 
must listen to him and obey his commands stands in stark contrast to the 
more ambiguous and open “perhaps” that earlier characterized his rela-
tion to K. He ends his letter in command form: “I appeal to you, Michaels: 
yield!” (Coetzee 1983, 151). Preserving his anonymity to readers, this “ap-
peal” issued as a command to “yield” is signed by “A friend.” This marks 
the fantasy of the medical officer’s perspective and his willful blindness to 
his own coercive and corrective desires. Because friendship is characterized 
by reciprocity,6 the medical officer’s declaration of friendship is not only a 
delusion but another moment of asserting his coercive will.
The force of narrative comes into its sharpest focus when the medical 
officer pronounces K’s life not worth living: “In fact his life was a mistake 
from beginning to end. It’s a cruel thing to say, but I will say it: he is some-
one who should never have been born into a world like this. It would have 
been better if his mother had quietly suffocated him when she saw what he 
was, and put him in the trash can” (Coetzee 1983, 155). Here, the medical 
officer hits on one of the greatest obstacles of humanitarian ideology today: 
How does the humanitarian avoid enforcing judgments about a worthy or 
valuable life? What standards apart from one’s own can one seek to provide 
for those one wants profoundly to assist? Recalling Dipesh Chakrabarty’s 
(2007) emphasis on the coercive work of bringing all humans into the fold 
of modernity, here the medical officer’s discursive power is one that aligns 
entirely with modernity’s unrelenting quest for increasingly uniform and 
consumptive ways of living.
Finally, when K disappears from the camp hospital, the medical officer 
confronts the folly of his thinking and, with a “great force,” realizes that it 
is in fact his own life and not K’s that is wasting. Reversing his narrative 
logic to envision himself as the “prisoner to this war” (Coetzee 1983, 157), 
the medical officer desires suddenly and urgently to become K’s disciple. 
Yet he yearns to become his wayward patient’s disciple, to give up on a cer-
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tain form of forceful human being, only after his patient has vanished. The 
sudden wish to become K’s “foot follower” (which I will return to in more 
detail in the next section) turns out to be yet another narrative fantasy. 
While the medical officer can entirely change his narrative, what he cannot 
surrender is the compulsion to construct the narrative, to hold mastery over 
its production and his particular position within it.
Ultimately, the medical officer of Michael K butts up against the bor-
ders of his own narrative but cannot breach them. Although he fantasizes 
about becoming K’s disciple, his final words in the text betray the medical 
officer’s ongoing attachment to mastery. Conceding that K will not speak 
to him, the medical officer poses a question followed by an imperative: 
“ ‘Have I understood you? If I am right, hold up your right hand; if I am 
wrong, hold up your left!’ ” (Coetzee 1983, 167). Like the “yield!” that closes 
his letter to K, the medical officer finally cannot relinquish his imperative 
mode, still desiring to govern over the movement of K’s body. His inability 
to avoid command, to depart from the logic of the master that underscores 
his humanitarianism, exposes the contradiction at the heart of his desires. 
Coetzee’s novel brings humanitarian fetishism to crisis while he illustrates 
through the language of the humanitarian that this fetishism cannot simply 
be overturned by a desire for noncoercive human relations. The medical of-
ficer’s failure to move out of a paradigm of mastery reveals the unremitting 
force of humanitarian fetishism. His status as master appears constitutional 
at the end of his narrative: the desire to undo his own mastery, to relinquish 
his mastery and emerge as disciple, becomes perversely folded into the ac-
tivity of the master as such.
Singh’s Specters
“Little Ones” likewise plays on a tension between the well- intended liberal 
notions of the relief officer and the necessity of his coming to terms with 
his complicity in a system that creates the need for relief. Yet the narra-
tive closure suggested by “coming to terms” is precisely what does not and 
cannot happen: Singh reveals that complicity can be felt, can be registered, 
but it cannot be admitted within the masterful narrative of humanitarian-
ism. He is an intermediary figure explicitly situated between institutional 
initiatives that it is his job to carry out and the experience of poverty that 
proves his efforts ineffective. Across the story, the narrative grammar re-
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veals the acute ambivalence Singh feels toward both ends of this spectrum, 
and finally, toward himself.
The story dramatizes and exceeds Coetzee’s humanitarian actor by em-
phasizing and confronting the force of narrative through the psychic un-
doing of its protagonist. Parama Roy acutely locates “Little Ones” as “the 
bureaucratic gothic” (2010, 127), a haunted narrative that requires its ad-
ministrative protagonist to accept as fact that which is firmly held as fic-
tional in the rational mode. Devi exposes the vital link between fiction 
and fact by historically situating her story within scientific research that 
confirms that starvation can lead humans to become pygmies. She employs 
haunting throughout the story to reveal that Singh’s fear is generated not 
by otherworldly bodies but by subaltern human bodies that are deformed 
as byproducts of liberal democratic life.
Singh’s own narrative unfolds in relation to two other crucial narratives 
that circulate within the story. The first is that of the troubled political his-
tory of the region, a narrative about tribal protests and retaliation over a 
government resource excavation of sacred lands. Having killed the govern-
ment officials who desecrated their sacred space, these tribals disappeared 
into the forest and were never seen again. The other narrative alongside 
which Singh’s story develops is a ghost story that circulates within the camp 
about “inhuman,” animalistic, thieving children who come from the forest 
and steal food rations from the government base. These two narratives, the 
historical and the haunted, weave through the story and implicate Singh as 
a government employee. Singh’s own narrative of humanitarian benevo-
lence, and the adjacent narratives of historical violence and ghostly haunt-
ing, are revealed to be inextricable: the tribal enemies of the state turn out 
to be the terrifying “little ones” who steal the rations that Singh is paid to 
distribute. The story pressures us to consider how the separation of these 
narratives is necessary to preserving the functioning of the welfare state 
and to Singh’s subjectivity as a humanitarian therein. Humanitarian fetish-
ism, which structures Singh’s subjectivity and shields him from the material 
realities of his work, is sustained precisely through this narrative splitting.
This discourse of conquest heightens and becomes more overt when 
two bags of rations are stolen and Singh discovers that his child disciples 
are accomplices to the crime. As a result, his disciples emerge for Singh 
as false worshippers and are transformed into strangers: “Befuddled and 
wounded with the realization of trust betrayed, he looks at them. Unfamil-
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iar, unknown faces. Those same boys. But in their faces there is no echo 
of the despairing question that rends his heart. Smiling the cruel smiles of 
the victorious, they disappear into the darkness of the forest in the wink of 
an eye” (Devi 1998, 16). At this moment of betrayal, the roles are reversed 
and it is the child thieves who emerge victorious and not the humanitarian 
worker who “saves” them. Unlike Singh, whose victory confirms his status 
as the humanitarian imbued with full humanity, the boys are relegated to 
strangers and animals as a result of their small victory over him. Standing 
“befuddled and wounded,” Singh’s dedication to his “disciples” is contin-
gent on their reverence for him; without this devotion, Singh’s narrative 
quickly recasts them as enemies. This moment in which Singh envisions 
the boys as strange and animalistic marks a significant shift in the story 
from a view of the Other as that which is to be pitied (and therefore helped) 
to the Other as something precisely threatening and inhuman. These two 
formulations are closely bound, of course; in each case the other remains 
something to be overcome. As a result of their betrayal, the boys swiftly 
cease to be appropriate subjects of pity; they are no longer seen with com-
passion but rather are defined by an animal savagery that encroaches on 
Singh’s safety and sense of self.
Whereas Coetzee emphasizes the entrapments of narrative and its often 
subtle force through the humanitarian’s own narrative tropes, Devi pushes 
beyond the borders of self- narration to stall the proliferation of masterful 
subjectivity. When Singh follows the ration thieves into the forest, he en-
counters not the little ghosts of local lore but the tribal renegades whose 
bodies have over years of starvation radically mutated. Unlike those other 
thronging adivasi bodies Singh has been helping to feed, these bodies have 
survived off so little that their statures have mutated from the status of 
starved but recognizably human (like Michael K) to starved and unrecog-
nizably human. Singh becomes literally paralyzed by the incomprehensible 
sight of their bodies, and as he stands in disbelief, the adivasi renegades en-
circle and molest him with their shriveled, “grotesque” bodies (Devi 1998, 
18). For Singh, his implication in this system of oppression is absolutely un-
fathomable. He has, after all, worked diligently to feed the starving popula-
tions of India despite his own privilege. But their deformed and diminutive 
bodies in contact with his own lead him to a crisis of his own subjectivity.
In her reading of this scene, Roy argues that “this touch of the other . . . 
makes his own body monstrous to himself. More than the ghost’s body, 
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it is the body of the definitively living human that is rendered grotesque 
through this spectral logic” (2010, 138). Roy points us to a powerful depic-
tion of the postcolonial uncanny, in which the haunting spirits of the con-
science press on Singh in ways he cannot comprehend. The narrative con-
cedes that these unbelievable human bodies must finally be believed, that 
the lines between fact and fiction can no longer be upheld in his conscious-
ness: “Because if this is true, then all else is false. The universe according 
to Copernicus, science, this century, this freedom, plan after plan. So the 
relief officer reiterates—Na! Na! Na!” (Devi 1998, 19). Singh’s articulations 
of disbelief are quickly silenced by the terrifying spectacle and sexual con-
frontation of the renegade bodies. In the final moments of the story, he is 
rendered speechless as he struggles to locate himself within a scale of global 
oppression, wishing to extricate himself from the role of oppressor: “The 
logical arguments motor- race through the relief officer’s mind. He wants to 
say, why this revenge? I’m just an ordinary Indian. Not as well- developed 
or tall as the Russians- Canadians- Americans. I’ve never eaten the kind of 
calorie- rich food required for the development of a strong human body, 
the failure to consume which is construed as a crime by the World Health 
Organization” (20). Ultimately, Singh’s attempt to position himself as an 
“ordinary Indian”—and as therefore somehow innocent or exempt—can-
not be sustained. He can no longer deny that the crime of disallowing the 
human body the right to eat well is as much his own crime as it is the crime 
of public policies that ensure that he eats and that the adivasi cannot do 
so sufficiently.7 In this instant of recognizing his own complicity, Singh 
struggles to characterize himself as likewise underfed.
The story ends with a scene of fascinating performativity between Singh 
and the “little ones.” As Singh silently proclaims his own guilt, the tribals 
surround him with their abject bodies: “He can’t say a word. Standing under 
the moon, looking at them, hearing their laughter, feeling their penises on 
his skin, the undernourished body and laughable height of the ordinary 
Indian male appear a heinous crime of civilization. He feels like a criminal 
sentenced to death. Pronouncing his own death- sentence for their stunted 
forms, he lifts his face up to the moon, his mouth gaping wide” (Devi 1998, 
20). While the renegades force their abject bodies on his, Singh’s self- 
proclaimed condemnation registers as a profound and penetrating recog-
nition of his complicity—as a liberal democratic subject, as a humanitarian 
worker, and as a healthy human being—in the subjugation of other human 
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lives. His silence is finally a pronouncement of metaphysical guilt, of what 
Karl Jaspers (2001) defined as the guilt of staying alive despite the other’s 
suffering or death. By elaborating this form of guilt, Jaspers (notably a lib-
eral himself) specifically attempted to make sense of the German situation 
by charting the registers of German guilt and responsibility in the aftermath 
of the Holocaust. Metaphysical guilt is a universal guilt shared by those who 
chose to live rather than to sacrifice themselves in protest of Nazi atrocities. 
For Singh, his own guilt is born from the realization of his largely uncon-
scious decision to thrive despite the state sacrifice of the adivasi tribes. In 
this sense, the story represents the argument advanced by Hannah Arendt 
(1976) and Giorgio Agamben (1998) that we come to understand the human 
only when it is deprived of every other thing but bare life.8
Witnessing bare life, Singh registers the force and paradox of human-
ity only at the moment when the unthinkable body of the other reveals to 
him the forms of oppression that constitute his own suddenly estranging 
body. He relinquishes his claims to knowledge and truth, staging a radical 
act of antimastery by submitting himself both physically and psychically to 
the thoroughly dehumanized “objects” of his humanitarian aims. Singh’s 
desperate desire at the end of the story is to utter “the howl of a demented 
dog,” a howl that would signify his “liberation” by becoming animal and 
descending into madness. It is important here that this submission is also 
a desire for transspeciation; he does not submit himself to becoming other 
as a pygmy human but to becoming animal. His desire to howl is therefore 
a desire to escape altogether the psychic structures of dehumanization by 
leaving the human behind completely. But Singh’s muteness disables this 
descent; he is left in the final moments of the story with an inability to 
claim (through the howl) an “inhuman” psychic life and an inability to con-
tinue verbally to sustain his own alibi. Surrendering himself to the sound 
and touch of his ghosts, Singh brings us to the threshold of other psychic 
and narrative possibilities.
After the Humanitarian
Posthumanitarian fictions uncover humanitarian fetishism by refusing to 
separate the ideological fantasies of “doing good” from the material sup-
ports and consequences of those actions. They compel readers to linger 
with dehumanization, not to repudiate it uncritically but to abide by it, 
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activating the potentialities of dehumanism through which we might let 
ourselves be haunted by those we have (in more and less overt ways) ag-
gressed. These fictions ask us to become haunted, to listen to our hauntings 
even when we cannot translate their ghostly messages.
Across posthumanitarian fictions, the ability to be a “good” human is 
afforded to humanitarians precisely through their material participation 
in dehumanization; the humanization of the humanitarian and the work 
of dehumanization turn out to be inseparable practices. While posthu-
manitarian fictions do not proscribe radically new forms of political being, 
their representations of humanitarian actors ask us whether it is possible 
to imagine a humanism that would not structurally and materially (re)pro-
duce mastery and dehumanization. My desire is to engage dehumanism 
as a recuperative practice that casts ourselves as vulnerable to the ways 
that other beings—“human” and otherwise—have been subjected to de-
humanization. These ways of living in exile from the realm of “Man” can 
become, as Alexander Weheliye (2014) argues, critically instructive in the 
imagination of alternate forms of collective life and being. If we can learn 
how to recognize our own surprising complicities with dehumanization, 
we can also learn how to abide with others (human, inhuman, and dehu-
manized) that have enabled us to become particular kinds of masterful 
subjects. Precisely in this abiding, in consciously reading ourselves and at-
taching ourselves to that which we have subjected, we can begin to learn 
how to become differently relational with others. Perhaps more radically 
still, we might also learn how to become relational with ourselves as inti-
mate others.
What comes after Singh’s failure to howl? What forms of ethical action 
might circumvent the need to undo oneself completely in the face of one’s 
own complicity? If we can stall the disavowal of our masterful complicities 
and stay with dehumanization as it presents to us other forms of human 
being, we might offer ourselves new ways of becoming human. What is 
vital to this becoming is to revise our own narrative formations, making 
our narratives infinitely more dynamic than we have yet let them become. 
Embracing Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) summons to elaborate the infinity of 
traces that have been left on and through us as particular psychic and em-
bodied subjects, we can begin to discover the limits of our own narrative 
formations and to layer and unfold them as we shape ourselves into new 
kinds of subjective beings.
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Like the medical officer and like Singh, in my own inaugural moment as 
a humanitarian in a house of hybrid Singhs, I was caught up in a series of 
complex power relations that shaped my actions and reactions. Of course, 
as a child I could not have understood, as I would later begin to, the com-
plex power relations and forms of mastery that were mapping the scene of 
this inauguration: I was a child privileged enough to intervene on behalf of 
a grown man; I was comparatively wealthy and he was undoubtedly poor; 
I was able- bodied and psychically sound, while he—at least by my child-
hood memory—was both physically and mentally ill; I was a mixed- race 
child staging an intervention in a neighborhood in which neither of us 
were wholly welcome, or welcome at all.
The absolutely formative (and at times for me instrumental) narrative 
of my emergent humanitarianism did not include these complexities, and, 
like the protagonists of posthumanitarian fictions, I have hit up against 
the limits of my own narrative. In place of sheer frustration or the howl of 
madness, instead of throwing up our hands, tearing out our hair, or suc-
cumbing to a dialectic between humanitarian fetishism and madness, I am 
proposing a praxis of dynamic narration that not only avows the inescap-
able complicities of the “good” subject but also refuses the ability to neatly 
separate my humanitarian impulses from those less redemptive and mess-
ier qualities that have shaped me through the power of narrative structures. 
Recalling Sanders’s etymological formulation of complicity as “a foldedness 
in human being that stands as the condition of possibility for any opposi-
tion to a system that constantly denies it” (2002, x), complicity becomes 
not something negative to be resisted and disavowed but something to be 
affirmed in order to assume responsibility. By elaborating, upturning, and 
reshaping those narratives that have cast us as particular kinds of subjects, 
dynamic narration moves us beyond dialectical formulations toward a poli-
tics of entanglement from which other world relations can begin to flour-
ish. Dynamic narration is therefore a gesture toward dehumanism—an act 
of narratively inhabiting the gaps and fissures of our own subjective con-
structions in an effort to refuse the violence of splitting ourselves off from 
the less agreeable aspects of our being.
CHAPTER 4
Humanimal Dispossessions
In the opening sentences of Indra Sinha’s Animal’s People, the teenaged 
protagonist Animal declares: “I used to be human once. So I’m told. I 
don’t remember it myself, but people who knew me when I was small say I 
walked on two feet just like a human being” (2007, 1). The novel is a thinly 
veiled representation of the 1984 Bhopal disaster, broadly interpreted as 
the world’s worst industrial disaster, in which the American- owned Union 
Carbide corporation exposed over half a million people to methyl isocya-
nate, among other chemicals. It represents the disaster and its long after-
math, politicizing the power of transnational corporations and their dehu-
manizing effects. Animal, whose spine is twisted, has been formed into a 
quadruped as a result of toxic exposure. The movement of Animal’s inau-
gural sentences presents us with a fascinating formulation of the human, 
and of Animal’s particular relation to its figuration. He begins by signaling 
that the human is not something that simply “is” but rather is something 
contingent that can be moved toward and away from. In the second frag-
mentary sentence, Animal signals the human as a narrative creation: “So 
I’m told.” The human from the very outset of the story is thus positioned 
as provisional, as a product of narrative structure, and Animal distances 
himself from his humanity through his insistence on the past tense of it. 
More subtly, he complicates the narrative of his former humanity in his 
own telling, posing this “human” past as one in which he walked on two 
feet just like a human being. Even when he was a human, then, Animal’s sly 
rhetoric signals that he was always only ever proximate to it.
In the previous chapter, I explored posthumanitarian fictions, in which 
humanitarian actors face their complicity with the dehumanization of those 
they wish to humanize. Here, I turn to figurations of the human as animal 
in postcolonial literature. This is not as sharp a turn as might first appear. 
The question of the animal emerges in the final section of the preceding 
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chapter with Mr. Singh’s simultaneous recognition of his own complicity 
and his desire to utter the “howl of a demented dog” (Devi 1998, 20). At the 
end of Mahasweta Devi’s story, Singh straddles humanity and animality, 
unable to claim either as his proper topography. This is to my mind a most 
poignant promise at the end of a story that can so easily be read as hope-
less. Singh finally does not, and cannot, locate himself within a fraudulent 
typology that rends the human from the animal. As I argued in chapters 1 
and 2, anticolonial discourse has been caught up in a recuperation of the 
proper humanity of the colonized, one that remained in many respects 
bound to a masterful formulation of an emergent postcolonial subjectivity. 
In contrast to this tendency within anticolonial discourse, I am interested 
here in postcolonial writers who have affirmed the animality of humans as 
a hopeful politics of postcolonial becoming. To mobilize one’s animality is 
to dispossess oneself from the sovereignty of man, to refuse the anticolonial 
reach of becoming masterful human subjects. This literature pressures a 
sovereign imperial worldview that both refuses the human’s animality and 
insists on the mastery of “animal” others. Against the recurring tendencies 
that I emphasized in the first two chapters of this book to disavow animality 
in anticolonial movements that aimed to restore the colonized subject to 
full humanity, postcolonial literature offers us critical counternarratives of 
human becoming—ones that struggle with and in opposition to the sover-
eign subject’s disavowal of its own and other animalities.
I build in this chapter on Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou’s work 
on dispossession, a “troubling concept” that signals both a hopeful dis-
possession of the masterful sovereign subject and the systematic jettison-
ing of populations from “modes of collective belonging and justice” (2013, 
xi). Although the “double valence” of dispossession suggests distinct if not 
anti thetical modalities (3), Butler and Athanasiou engage the fundamental 
relation between, on the one hand, the “dispossessed subject” that avows 
the “differentiated social bonds by which it is constituted and to which it 
is obligated,” and, on the other hand, those communities that are and have 
been dispossessed by an external force (ix). We might say that in the first 
instance, the dispossession of the sovereign subject from its masterful reign 
is an act that aims toward unmasterful forms of being and relationality, 
while in the second instance, dispossession is made manifest through an 
external masterful force. Yet for Butler and Athanasiou, these disposses-
sions are crucially linked through an acute shared awareness of our funda-
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mental dependencies on “those powers that alternately sustain or deprive 
us, and that hold a certain power over our very survival” (4).
Animal’s Dehumanist Solidarities
Dehumanism—which articulates the brutalities of dehumanization at the 
same time as it names the open and antimasterful possibilities that can 
emerge from dehumanized forms of living in the world—shares with dis-
possession a “double valence.” Although they do not dwell extensively on 
the animal, Butler and Athanasiou argue that we must struggle against the 
“versions of the human that assume the animal as its opposite” and that the 
formation of an unmasterful political subject requires a mobilization of the 
human’s own animality (2013, 34). Through its dispossessed protagonist, 
Animal’s People persistently collapses a neat distinction between humans 
and animals and politicizes forms of humanimality that refuse their de-
marcation.
The novel shows us the unity between the two valences of disposses-
sion: Animal is, on the one hand, dispossessed through abject poverty and 
a dehumanizing physical disability produced by external forces; and, on 
the other hand, he refuses to be given back to the human by insisting on 
his own animality. Animal is thus doubly dispossessed through the force 
of neocolonial power that has disfigured him, and through self- cultivating 
practices that willfully reject “the world of humans” in an effort to cultivate 
other forms of solidarity (Sinha 2007, 2).
Animal engages in what I call dehumanist solidarities—social bonds that 
are mobilized and sustained through a refusal of the sovereign human sub-
ject and that enact agential forms of inhuman relationality. In this sense de-
humanist solidarities are inherently queer ones. They are, to recall Donna 
Haraway, practices of “becoming worldly” through transformative acts of 
“becoming with” our own and other creaturely selves (2008, 3).
I clearly do not wish to elide the crucial fact that Animal comes to em-
brace his animality because he has been critically dehumanized; I do think, 
however, that through this dehumanization Animal comes to tell his read-
ers—to whom he narrates and implicates directly as the “Eyes” interpret-
ing his story (Sinha 2007, 12)—something vital about their own disavowed 
animalities. The title of the novel itself politicizes the possessions and dis-
possessions of the human, complicating from the outset the prescriptive di-
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visions between humans and animals. On the one hand, “Animal’s people” 
indicates the people “of ” or “belonging to” Animal and thus appears as a 
simple possessive form. Within this apparently simple form, we are already 
asked to consider what form of possession the animal can have over people. 
This becomes more complex when we read “Animal’s people” as a contrac-
tion of “Animal is people.” In the most humanist formulation, we might 
read this as an insistence that Animal is “human” despite his abjection. But 
what if we read Animal as a “person” who is also animal in and through his 
belonging? The title wavers provocatively between the ontological mode 
(Animal is a person) and a relational one, in which Animal is caught up 
in an undecidable form of belonging with and to “people.” This wavering, 
from the title onward, loosens the borders of the human and opens toward 
more expansive dehumanist forms of relational collectivity.
I have written elsewhere (Singh 2015b) about Animal’s People as a post-
humanitarian fiction through which readers are brought critically into the 
fold of Animal’s dehumanization, but at this juncture I am interested in 
how Animal teaches us about the potentialities born from being dehuman-
ized, from claiming one’s own vital potentialities from outside the master-
ful reign of the human. Until the final page of the novel when he commits 
unwaveringly to his animality, Animal vacillates between an insistence on 
his inhuman status and an often “wild” desire to become human. But even 
before this final commitment to his animal subjectivity, he illustrates de-
humanist solidarities through his relations with other nonhuman and de-
humanized characters. Among the most poignant of these is his friendship 
with his canine companion, Jara. His narrative introduction of Jara refuses 
initially to name her species, and readers are confronted by their assump-
tions that she, like Animal, is “really” human: “Jara’s my friend. She wasn’t 
always. We used to be enemies. In the days of living on the street we were 
rivals for food” (Sinha 2007, 17). Jara’s emergence in the novel posits her 
as a former “rival” and as a current “friend” who shares with Animal a 
struggle for basic bodily sustenance. While some of Animal’s most overtly 
animal performances happen in relation to her—“I rushed at her snapping 
my jaws, growling louder than she, the warning of a desperate animal that 
will stick at nothing” (17)—Jara also becomes for Animal a reflection of 
himself: “She was as thin as me, her hide shrunken over her ribs. . . . A 
yellow dog, of no fixed abode and no traceable parents, just like me” (18). 
Here we witness a rhetorical repetition with a critical difference: The just 
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like of the novel’s inaugural sentences in which Animal becomes distanced 
from the properly human subject (“I walked on two feet just like a human 
being”) resounds in this passage but works instead to bring Animal into 
transspecies alliance with the canine Jara. Both her physical abjection and 
her “untraceable” genealogy enable for Animal a compassionate alliance 
with another creature fighting for her survival. Jara thus becomes folded 
into the novel initially as a “friend,” as one who has made the passage from 
“enemy” to ally, and as one whose species is registered as ancillary to a more 
expansive form of alliance.
Animal’s vacillation across the novel between wanting to claim his ani-
mality and wanting to become human is repeatedly articulated along sexed 
and gendered lines: part of his animality resides in a stature that exposes 
his genitalia to public view; he desires (at times desperately) to have sexual 
intercourse with a human female and understands this as a possibility only 
if he can become human; and he is offered by the novel’s white, Western, 
female humanitarian the opportunity to become “upright” (aka human) 
through the promises of Western medical intervention. The novel works 
through human/animal distinctions via sexuality, especially through its 
evocations of sexual violence and sexual liberation.1 Animal imagines that 
“the whole world fucks away day and night” and thus bemoans his exclu-
sion from this copulating human world (Sinha 2007, 231). His articulation 
of exclusion from the world of human heterosexuality produces both a 
compulsive desire to “master” his penis, to conquer it so as to make it cower 
“like a sulky dog” (245), and a deeply violent and disturbing fantasy of fe-
male penetration, in which Animal declares: “I’ll pierce her and open her 
up until my cock is stroking her heart and she’s crying my name, ‘Animal! 
Animal! Animal!’ and I will suck the sweetness of life from her lips” (231).
Teased for an inability to control his frequent erections, Animal be-
comes impotent at the moment he is given the opportunity to sexually 
penetrate the prostitute Anjali. Far from fulfilling his murderous sexual 
fantasy, Animal fails to enter into the economy of sexual intercourse and 
instead, in the aftermath of a drug- addled Holi celebration, finds himself 
curled up with Anjali, characterizing them as “two rainbow- coloured ani-
mals” (Sinha 2007, 242). From this position of shared “animality”—the 
prostitute who has been sold into prostitution and lives outside civil society 
and the once- human boy whose disfigurement marks his exclusion from 
the human world—Animal reconceives of sex and sexuality. Moving away 
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from the violent desire to “pierce” a woman’s body and to “suck the sweet-
ness of life from her lips,” Animal now desires not to penetrate but simply 
to witness sexual difference by looking at Anjali’s genitals. What he finds 
in his desire to see sexual difference, however, is a “nothing” that “is” and 
makes everything possible: “She shows me how the rose cave leads to a tun-
nel whose mouth at first was hidden, this is the way that leads to the womb, 
where life begins, where I began, where we all began. I try to imagine the 
womb and realise that it’s an empty space, which means there’s nothing-
ness at the very source of creation” (243– 44). With the discovery of this 
“empty space”—the “very source of creation”—Animal moves away from 
the rhetoric of sexual difference toward an intensified desire for liberation. 
Saving the funds he has earned over the course of the novel through his 
work for a justice group seeking recompense from the company that has 
devastated the community, Animal tells his readers on the last page of the 
novel that rather than spend his money toward “corrective” surgery, he will 
embrace his animality unwaveringly and will use his funds to “buy Anjali 
free” (366). While Anjali’s freedom will bring her to live with Animal, there 
is importantly no sexual contract between them (her freedom is crucially 
not premised on their marriage), and the novel ends with the promise of 
a dehumanist community—the newly freed prostitute, the newly avowed 
Animal, and the canine Jara—who will live in queer solidarity despite the 
systemic forces that have produced and will continue to produce and en-
force dehumanized lives.
Humanimal Bonds
I am taken by the dehumanist possibilities of transspecies identification 
and cross- species solidarities and the queer collectivities that can form 
through active, unmasterful forms of self- dispossession. As I think my way 
through such possibilities, I am keenly aware of my longtime companion 
Cassie, whom I can hear downstairs navigating blindly toward her food. I 
first encountered Cassie in 2000, when I was an early undergraduate and 
she a feral stray living on a Canadian riverbank behind my mother’s home. 
She was young and small in stature, though her age (as with all cats, espe-
cially strays) was difficult to pinpoint. She displayed bodily signs of having 
birthed offspring, though she had been spayed. I have no sense of how long 
she had been living as a stray, though her staunch refusal of human contact 
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suggested that it had been some time. My mother, afraid that Cassie would 
not survive the brutalities of an oncoming Canadian winter, persuaded me 
to house her in my miniscule undergraduate apartment. It took four adults 
(with a couple of pairs of oven mitts) to capture her, and when I released 
her into her new home, she mauled my hand so badly I was sent to the hos-
pital for shots and bandages. Because of my mother’s certainty that Cassie 
would be beheaded by the government and her head shipped to Ottawa 
for testing (this still sounds absurd to me, but she was unwaveringly insis-
tent), I pretended in the hospital that I had been randomly attacked by an 
unknown street cat.
Like Animal and Jara, then, we were initially adversaries: between the 
mauling and her repeated escapes from my apartment—after which, to rub 
salt in my psychic wounds, she would reappear at my mother’s house!— 
I did not have any special love for this creature. There was, however, a 
critical moment of transformation that fundamentally changed our rela-
tionship. One fall afternoon, as I watched Cassie (yet again) hightail it out 
my back door, down the fire exit, and toward the river (where she would 
no doubt begin her journey back to my mother), I decided not to chase 
but to follow her. Conceding to her preference for another home, and her 
insistence on remaining a creature of the outdoors, I trailed after her with 
a calmness I had not yet experienced with her. She knew I was behind her 
but she also knew I was not giving chase, and very quickly the lines be-
came blurred between which of us was following the other. Eventually, we 
wandered home together, back up the fire escape steps and into our apart-
ment. We began to wander together every day, without fixed destination, 
sometimes exploring the river bank and at other times just meandering 
along the sidewalks of our neighborhood. We became, and would remain 
across three cities and two countries, a somewhat notorious neighborhood 
phenomenon (she was often hailed by neighbors who did not know us 
well as “the cat- dog,” and I “the cat- girl”). I would frequently read novels 
as I walked, and Cassie would tear up and down trees, getting ahead and 
trailing behind as she so desired. For most of our lives together, I lived in 
places from which she could come and go at her leisure, and she made plain 
to me at every turn that she had chosen to stay with me but in no sense 
depended on me for her survival. Across seventeen years, ours has been a 
friendship founded on the refusal of mastery and on a vital resistance (de-
spite the well- worn insistence of veterinarians and many cat lovers on the 
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benefits of bounded feline domesticity) to the prescribed roles of animal 
“pet” and human “owner.”
Cassie dispossessed me of a masterful desire to domesticate her “prop-
erly”—one that was for me built into a socially instantiated idea of what an 
urban relation between humans and felines should look like. While I never 
shared with Jacques Derrida (2008) his famous discomfort with being nude 
under the inscrutable gaze of his feline companion, I did share with him 
a relation to another creature that insisted on the profound recognition 
that my initial desire for mastery over her was predicated on positing Cas-
sie as an “animal” against my own confirmed and practiced “humanity.” 
Against this enforced division, we cultivated a humanimal bond in which 
neither of us could simply stand as conceptual unities. We were specific 
beings and shared as such a relationality founded on our individual and 
collective needs, and on what we could and were willing to sacrifice. We 
came increasingly toward each other and discovered a frame of alliance 
that remained—for most of her life and much of mine—vital and sustain-
ing. While I would not say that we have ever been in any sense “equals” 
(I confess, against liberal discourse, that I have always been ill at ease with a 
politics of equality that seems relentlessly to produce its opposite), her style 
of being and her mode of becoming with me urged me toward an embrace 
of my own (often forgotten, elided, and disavowed) animality.
The endurance of our solidarity is marked by many things, including 
that our relation has spanned the entirety of my adult life. Some years ago 
when I was pregnant, Cassie began to climb insistently on my body and 
purr, as though conjuring the creature developing inside me. She seemed 
in communion with this forthcoming addition to our humanimal pack and 
lay committedly against the seam of my flesh, over the curious temporal 
mappings of zygote, embryo, and fetus (what strange ways to imagine be-
coming!). But she was also communing with me in a more intense, more 
persistent way throughout a period in which I simply could not ignore that 
I was an embodied and embodying creature. Pregnancy was an intensely 
pedagogical time, not because I was eager to take in the discourse of par-
enting that was suddenly inundating my daily life but because it was an 
unrelenting lesson in my own primate animality. Housing another creature 
within me, I could neither disavow the animality of my own being nor for-
get the daily bodily acts that we are otherwise trained to ignore (that is, to 
master) as we move through the world as humans. Insightful creature that 
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she is, Cassie responded to these dynamic forms of creaturely becoming 
with striking attentiveness. I had been warned through popular parenting 
discourse and pedagogy against the “dangers” of allowing animals to com-
mune with newborns, but Cassie drew me away from such enforced dis-
tinctions when, in the first days with this newborn child, she enacted such 
keen sensitivities toward our new creature. Anyone who had known Cassie 
across time, or who knew the legend of her becoming, was amazed by how 
this “wild” cat had become friend, ally, and in some critical ways parent to 
other (human) beings. She has played no small part over the last years in 
the pedagogy of our human child, in the teaching of relational boundaries 
and care, and in the formation and flourishing of a queer family unit.
As I type bleary- eyed through increasingly achy fingers, I hear Cassie’s 
howl and can so easily envision her own now blind and arthritic body navi-
gating the well- charted paths toward food, litter, and rest. She is undeni-
ably old and a very different creature from the ones she has been across the 
many stages of our lives. (We are aging together, but her body is stiffening 
much faster than mine and transforming in ways more readily apparent.) 
4.1 Cassie and infant child together, adjacent in repose. Photograph by Julietta 
Singh.
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I admit to being deeply pained by this stage, not only because it feels “final” 
but because I am haunted by a feeling that I am failing her in companion-
ship. She is dependent on me now in ways that she was not before. And in 
biopolitical fashion, I have claimed the right to treat her kidney disease and 
high blood pressure medically, just as I will likely claim one day the right to 
end her life. I feel tugged away from the humanimal bond we shared across 
a decade and a half, a tug that is produced in part through the dependen-
cies of creaturely disease and aging, and a preemptive mourning for what 
we once were.
This mourning for what feels like an increasingly distant humanimal-
ity is also located squarely within the specifically human productions and 
performances with which I am now more than ever acutely engaged in 
my roles as both mother and intellectual. As a mother, I find myself cease-
lessly crafting my child—at times quite discomfortingly—as a material, 
ideological, and narrative being. While I urge her toward unconventional 
ways of thinking (I am told that this is a “plight” of children raised by in-
tellectuals), which entail ways of conceiving our relations to others human 
and inhuman that are in excess of and sometimes in stark contradiction to 
empirical thinking, I also realize that I am raising her as a human subject. 
My responsibilities “as” a mother sometimes feel in tension both with my 
relation to Cassie and with my intellectual passions (which are more than 
“just” intellectual) for unthinking my own claims to humanity. I am in the 
odd position of having another human in my care who has from the outset 
depended on me for survival, and whose sense of the world is being shaped 
by particular performances of—and pedagogies in—family, community, 
and citizenship that are geared toward being and acting human.
As an intellectual situated within the humanities, and currently pro-
pelled by the encroaching temporality of the tenure- track, there is no doubt 
that I have become increasingly driven by certain modes of human mas-
tery—especially over myself—even while my intellectual thought is com-
pelling me to work against them. This became most palpable two years ago 
when, hard at work on a text about Gandhi’s complex ethics toward the 
animal, Cassie suffered the detachment of her retinas and became suddenly 
blind. She howled and wandered aimlessly through the house, summoning 
me with an urgency I could not interpret. I moved back and forth over the 
course of hours between attempts to comfort her and the drive to meet a 
writing deadline. I thought initially that she was suffering from the demen-
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tia of old age, and I was, admittedly, annoyed at her “neediness” during my 
few sacred child- free writing hours. As the pitch of her howl intensified and 
her confusion became impossible to dismiss, I wondered if she had gone 
deaf. Finally, in our first emergency visit to an animal hospital, we learned 
that she had been blinded as a result of other as yet undetected medical 
conditions.
There could have been for me no more palpable contradiction between 
my intellectual ethics and my performance as a subject than this moment 
in which—working through Gandhi’s own often confounding relation to 
animals he vied so earnestly to protect—I repeatedly turned my back on 
Cassie’s call in her moment of creaturely crisis. Working toward my instan-
tiation as a tenured professor of the humanities has necessitated certain 
forms and practices of mastery that starkly confront my own political hopes 
and aspirations. Recalling that painful moment in which I moved between 
Gandhi’s writings on animals and my beloved old friend, I am keenly aware 
of how disciplinary knowledge production obscures—at times violently—
other ways of reading, creating, and being. The discomfort of that moment 
and its recollection produces in me a wish to return myself to my own hu-
manimal bonds, not in the sense of moving back in time but in the queer 
sense of moving forward toward forgotten possibilities. This is a wish made 
manifest in my own animal body, a wish that remembers our changing hu-
manimal bodies and our still mutual and vital dependencies—even those 
we are not, through our blind and bleary eyes, yet able to see.
Feeling Undisciplined
At the 1997– 98 Tanner Lectures, sponsored by Princeton’s Center for Hu-
man Values, J. M. Coetzee stood before his academic audience and read 
stories, respectively titled “The Philosophers and the Animals” and “The 
Poets and the Animals.”2 These coextensive stories situated particular kinds 
of humans (philosophers and poets) in relation to animals (writ large). 
Coetzee has become renowned for reading stories in academic settings, 
which are notoriously better accustomed to academic prose. At his Prince-
ton reading, he emphasized the potential of creative work to disrupt con-
ventional disciplinary boundaries, delivering what Marjorie Garber calls 
a “lecture- narrative” (1999, 73). With the crucial exception of sexual dif-
ference, the protagonist Elizabeth Costello is, like the author himself, an 
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aging, white postcolonial novelist invited to deliver lectures at a prestigious 
U.S. academic institution. The genre trouble Coetzee engages in this text is 
thus entangled with gender trouble (Butler 1990), implicating his readers/
audience in the policing of specious boundaries that produce authoritative 
knowledge. They (Coetzee and Costello) are expected to speak within their 
realm of expertise as novelists: that is to say, they are expected to elaborate 
some aspect of the human condition. Instead, they discomfort (a term I 
will return to in detail in the next chapter) their academic audiences with 
anti- intellectual “lectures” driven by counterlogical claims about human/
animal relations and the urgent need to rethink our relations with and re-
sponsibilities toward animals.
Coetzee toys with the theme of the Tanner Lectures, “Disciplinarity and 
Its Discontents,” reading aloud a fictional tale that advances a politics of 
feeling in place of the violence and erasures produced through Western 
reason. In so doing, he formally compromises the validity and value of 
the lecture as authentic knowledge production by articulating it through 
the imaginary terrain of fiction. The content—the unethical human rela-
tion toward animals—is likewise disruptive, positing the animal as subject 
where listeners and readers expect to find the human. Thus, while his au-
dience may anticipate that the South African writer will tell them some-
thing illuminating about the function of racial violence, white supremacy, 
or postcolonial guilt—something that he “knows” by virtue of his race 
and nationality—Coetzee posits at the center of his text the “illogical,” un-
masterful claims of an aging female novelist. He tells us, in other words, 
about how an aging white woman feels about the human treatment of ani-
mals. What, we might well ask, could seem less important to postcolonial 
thought?
Although The Lives of Animals has been interpreted as one of Coet-
zee’s least “postcolonial” narratives, the central preoccupations of these 
narratives are critically aligned with those of postcolonial studies. From 
the very earliest formulations of postcolonial studies—whether through 
Edward Said’s (1979) attention to orientalist discourse and its own racist 
refrains about the non- West or through the Subaltern Studies Collective’s 
insistence on the need to redress the exclusions of official historical narra-
tives3—the postcolonial project has pressed on disciplinarity as a system 
of knowledge production that necessitates claims to authenticity as it sub-
jugates other perspectives and peoples. In The Lives of Animals, Coetzee 
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emphasizes this foundational postcolonial critique but extends its poten-
tial beyond the human. The boundaries that have historically differentiated 
properly human subjects from inhuman objects must today, his protago-
nist insists, be extended to a thinking of the limit that separates humans 
from animals. By proposing a critical turn toward the animal, the narrative 
unsettles what have now become conventions of postcolonial thought by 
insisting on a rethinking of the status of the animal therein. While there 
has been a recent scholarly turn in postcolonial studies toward the environ-
ment, most notably through the publication of Graham Huggan and Helen 
Tiffin’s Postcolonial Ecocriticism: Literature, Animals, Environment (2010) 
and Elizabeth DeLoughrey and George B. Handley’s Postcolonial Ecologies: 
Literatures of the Environment (2011), the question of the animal remains a 
vital hinge between the “postcolonial” and the “ecological” that still needs 
careful consideration and mobilization. In the language of anticolonial dis-
course and postcolonial studies, the animal continues to be put to work as 
a figure for injustices toward dehumanized human subjects—or as that 
which, because of its inhumanity, remains a largely unquestioned and thus 
“proper” sacrificial body. Among others, Fanon has insisted on the his-
torical and material forces that produce some humans as animals. Coetzee’s 
text does not displace that critique but pushes us to consider the animal 
not solely as a figure for racist logic. It folds Fanon’s processes of producing 
particular bodies as animal (such as Animal’s) into a wider thinking of the 
animal (like Cassie) as a being whose existence exceeds and is not predi-
cated on its relation to the human. This excessive singularity is the ground 
for humanimal relations.
In his antidisciplinary mobilization of queer failure, Jack Halberstam 
argues that “disciplines actually get in the way of answers and theorems 
precisely because they offer maps of thought where intuition and blind 
fumbling might yield better results” (2011, 6). If we are accustomed to 
believing that disciplinarity makes intellectual inquiry possible, Coetzee 
shows us that it also necessarily obscures aspects of its own task and ig-
nores what falls beyond its purview. The discipline follows in the footsteps 
of the masterful subject by being founded on the refusals of its own vul-
nerabilities. To make concrete its authority, a discipline must remain blind 
to what is beyond its limits, disavowing the ways that it remains affected 
and permeated by its outside. Coetzee breaks provocatively with disci-
pline, productively confusing the lines between fact and fiction, between 
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author and protagonist, and between human and animal. In a sense, Coe-
tzee’s lecture- narrative—perhaps especially through the genre and gender 
trouble it offers—is an act of dispossessing his own claim to authority by 
submitting himself (as woman, as animal, as fiction) to others trained to 
disavow vulnerability. Through his female double, he engages imaginative, 
even utopian performances of humanimality that radically extend the hori-
zons of our ethics. Although the protagonist of his narrative is bound to 
fail in her anti- intellectual emotional plea to her intellectual audience, her 
failure against the force of discipline ultimately brings us toward “more 
creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world” 
(Halberstam 2011, 2– 3). Through what Halberstam calls “counterintuitive 
modes of knowing,” Costello privileges feeling over the rational mode in 
order to dispossess us from the disciplined and disciplining subjectivities 
from which we have been crafted and to which we have remained bound.
Disciplining Anxieties
Underlying the academic response to The Lives of Animals has been an anx-
iety about how much of Coetzee’s political and ethical beliefs are registered 
through his fictional female protagonist. Initially delivered orally, then pub-
lished in 1999 as a Tanner Lecture, and finally included as two chapters 
in the novel Elizabeth Costello (2003), the text upsets the rigid boundary 
between truth and fiction, lecture and story, author and text, male and fe-
male, and human and animal. This interpretive anxiety tells us something 
vital about the relation between intellectual thought and fiction, about how 
ungrounded we become when “truth” is disrupted by less authorized ideas, 
genres, forms, and concepts. Perhaps just as importantly, it reveals how pro-
foundly we—and by “we” I mean to include those situated squarely within 
Western culture, those working in relation to Western academia, and, per-
haps most perversely, those of us who are literary scholars—distrust the 
word (and the world) of fiction. The novel Elizabeth Costello “helps” to ease 
both the genre and gender trouble caused by Coetzee’s addressing his au-
dience “as” an aging white woman writer.
Critics of Elizabeth Costello, Derek Attridge writes, ”complain that Coet-
zee uses his fictional characters to advance arguments . . . without assuming 
responsibility for them, and is thus ethically at fault” (2004, 197). According 
to the logic of this complaint, by couching his arguments in fictional form, 
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the genre becomes an alibi that absolves the author of responsibility. At-
tridge refuses this logic by returning to the relation between Coetzee and 
Costello through the event of the public readings of the lecture- narratives, 
proposing that “the arguments within [the lecture- narratives] should more 
strictly be called arguings, utterances made by individuals in concrete situa-
tions—wholly unlike the paradigmatic philosophical argument, which im-
plicitly lays claim to a timeless, spaceless, subjectless condition as it pursues 
its logic. They are, that is, events staged within the event of the work; and 
they invite the reader’s participation not just in the intellectual exercise 
of positions expounded and defended but in the human experience, and 
the human cost, of exposing convictions, beliefs, doubts, and fears in a 
public arena” (198). Fiction as a vehicle of knowing is not only critically 
different from philosophical modes of truth production; it also makes very 
different demands of its interlocutors. While philosophical arguments lend 
themselves to masterful reading practices, literary “arguings” must be en-
gaged vulnerably, which is to say with an openness toward forms of “ex-
posure” that may well upset the most rudimentary preconceptions of its 
 interlocutors.
The tension between “truth” and “fiction” emerges everywhere in Amy 
Gutmann’s introduction to The Lives of Animals, but also and more sub-
tly throughout the multiple disciplinary “reflections” by Marjorie Garber, 
Peter Singer, Wendy Doniger, and Barbara Smuts that follow Coetzee’s 
narrative. In her short response, Marjorie Garber—the literary critic in-
vited to reflect on the text—reads the text through multiple registers: form 
and content, psychoanalysis, and gender studies. Although she engages the 
problem of “partitioning” bodies of knowledge and insists on reading the 
text from various vantage points, her conclusion is quite striking: ”In those 
two elegant lectures we thought John Coetzee was talking about animals. 
Could it be, however, that all along he was really asking, ‘What is the value 
of literature?’ ” (Garber 1999, 84). This closing inquiry implies that Coetzee 
uses the animal as a literary trope to speak about something else—that is, 
the status of literature. Literature reigns supreme for Garber at the end of 
the text, but this is certainly not so for the philosopher, the historian, or 
the anthropologist whose individual responses to the text derive from their 
own firmly entrenched relations to their individual disciplines.
This is all to say something quite obvious: interpretation and analysis 
are not freely flowing acts but rather are governed by specific intellectual 
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currents. A disciplined scholar has authority by virtue of having “mastered” 
a body of knowledge and guards against the penetration of its mastered do-
main. In Garber’s case, her discovery of literature at the end of a text that 
is already very clearly concerned with literature and its voice, its power, 
and its authenticity in the world beyond itself offers us an interpretation 
of the text that avoids the question of the animal in the name of literature. 
If the text is about both—the ethical problem of human– animal relations 
and the plight of literature in the moment of advanced capitalism—and we 
feel compelled to choose one over the other, we might very well miss the 
absolutely essential relation between them. By reading the animal strictly 
as a trope, as a nonliteral means of speaking about literature, we fail to 
understand how the text formulates a complex relation of dependency and 
struggle between the animal and literary studies. Rather than to subju-
gate the ethical question of animal liberation to literary studies, we might 
instead consider how the text relationally frames and negotiates animals 
and/as texts. To do so necessitates a willingness toward vulnerable reading, 
toward a reading practice by which we do not foreclose dependency and 
struggle among “subjects” but rather concede to the porousness of our dis-
ciplined ways of knowing. Recalling Animal’s gesture of looking “into” An-
jali’s body and imagining therein a “nothingness” that creates “everything,” 
perhaps through Coetzee’s text we are offered a related invitation to risk 
seeing more than we are able to “know” concretely. Tailing Animal, what 
we risk is being dispossessed of our disciplinary mastery and the authority 
of our instantiated ways of knowing.
Costello’s Wounded Humanimality
In “Force of Law” (2001), Derrida argues: “In our culture, carnivorous 
sacrifice is fundamental, dominant, regulated by the highest industrial 
technology, as is biological experimentation on animals—so vital to our 
modernity. . . . Carnivorous sacrifice is essential to the structure of sub-
jectivity, which is to say to the founding of the intentional subject” (247). 
The unquestioned ability to inflict violence against animals is, for Derrida 
as for Costello, a structural aspect of Western subjectivity. There is no way 
then to challenge human mastery over animals without first calling this 
subjectivity into question. But how might we accomplish this from within 
it? The aging Costello relies on “seven decades of life experience” to argue 
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that reason looks to her “suspiciously . . . like the being of one tendency 
in human thought” (Coetzee 1999, 23). Like the acts of vulnerable reading 
and writing, Costello opens herself to an experimental mode of knowing 
across experience and through language. In a crucially postcolonial gesture, 
she insists that reason partitions thought by forcefully policing its specious 
(and species) borders.
Costello begins her first lecture by evoking Red Peter, Kafka’s fictional 
ape from “A Report to an Academy” (1971).4 In the story, the educated ape 
recounts to the academy his ascent from life as a beast in the jungle and 
his postcapture emergence as a thoughtful being whose ability to speak 
intelligently renders him almost human.5 In order to gain human status 
and rights, however, Red Peter must perform particular tasks in a disci-
plined manner to satisfy his audience. Like the scholar who works to mas-
ter her field and forget what lies beyond her intellectual terrain in order to 
be validated by disciplinary interlocutors, the captive animal must in turn 
captivate his intellectual audience by proving his human likeness. Collaps-
ing the distinction between herself and Red Peter as she stands before her 
audience, Costello declares: “Now that I am here . . . in my tuxedo and 
bow tie and my black pants with a hole cut in the seat for my tail to poke 
through (I keep it turned away from you, you do not see it), now that I 
am here, what is there for me to do? Do I in fact have a choice? If I do not 
subject my discourse to reason, whatever that is, what is left for me but to 
gibber and emote and knock over my water glass and generally make a 
monkey of myself?” (Coetzee 1999, 23). Costello posits herself here as an 
animal who, like Red Peter, stands before intellectuals and is expected to 
conceal her “tail” (her animality) by submitting her “tale” (her lecture) to 
the discourse of reason. Without a disciplined engagement with Western 
rational discourse, she will—like her animal double—remain unheard 
and dismissed (even dehumanized) by her audience. “Becoming” animal 
in this moment, Costello in one sense plays on the fact that as an aging 
woman she is already in some sense less than fully human. But there is 
also a fascinating and doubled gender switch at play here, since Coetzee 
“becomes” the female Costello, who herself “becomes” the male ape, Red 
Peter. There is something provocative about these ambiguous masquerades 
that persistently co-implicate sex with species. This returns us to Animal, 
whose overactive sexual impulses situate him paradoxically as “animal” (he 
cannot control himself) and as a “proper” heterosexual man who desires 
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intercourse with women. Undoubtedly, Costello’s willingness to “become” 
an animal is vitally different from Animal’s, not least because his radical 
humanimality is staged from within the Indian slum as a geopolitical 
space of dispossession, while Costello’s is literally performed on the stage 
of the Western academy. Despite their radically uneven material lives and 
the critical distinctions between them, these figures of difference share a 
mutual willingness to inhabit the break between the human and the animal.
Unlike Red Peter, who struggles as an ape to validate his entrance into 
the human world, Costello moves in reverse as a human toward an embrace 
of her animality. By drawing on forms of thinking- feeling that exceed rea-
son, she attempts to speak for the animal as an animal—one that identifies 
itself as wounded within and by its human capture: “I am not a philoso-
pher of mind but an animal exhibiting, yet not exhibiting, to a gathering of 
scholars, a wound, which I cover up under my clothes but touch on in every 
word I speak” (Coetzee 1999, 26). While her “tail” pokes through her cloth-
ing but is not seen by her audience, this ambiguous “wound”—a brand-
ing of sexual and species difference—is concealed beneath her clothing 
but “touched on” through speech. As if in sympathetic response to Costel-
lo’s “wound,” Butler mobilizes the concept of woundedness as an opening 
toward the Other. She writes: “I am wounded, and I find that the wound 
itself testifies to the fact that I am impressionable, given over to the Other 
in ways that I cannot fully predict or control. I cannot think the question 
of responsibility alone, in isolation from the Other; if I do, I have taken 
myself out of the relational bind that frames the problem of responsibility 
from the start” (Butler 2004, 46). While Butler’s is a wound that implicates 
the Other as human, Costello opens the borders of the wound, urging us 
toward animal others. If for Butler the wound enables us to see our other-
wise disavowed impressionability in relation to other humans, Costello af-
firms the wound as an opening toward animal others, including those that 
we already are. By affirmatively “touching on” her own humanimal wound, 
Costello calls for a radical expansion of our ethical horizons.
Vulnerable Listening
During the brief question and answer period following her public lecture, 
Costello is asked by a well- intentioned but perplexed audience member to 
clarify her thesis: Is she advocating for the mass closure of factory farms? 
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Does she want to convert her audience to vegetarianism? Does she want 
more humane treatment for animals, or to stop testing on them? To this 
request for clarification, Costello replies: “I was hoping not to have to enun-
ciate principles. . . . If principles are what you want to take away from this 
talk, I would have to respond, open your heart and listen to what your 
heart says” (Coetzee 1999, 37). Costello’s response is wholly inadequate to 
the context and no doubt strikes her audience as an evasion and a sign that 
she lacks a strong thesis. Indeed, it does both of these things, but it also 
does more. Implicit in her response is an assertion that the act of listening 
(to which I will return in the coda to this book) has greater ethical poten-
tial than speaking. Declarative speech is tied to the proscriptive, to the 
realm of law, which like reason is tautological and justifies its own ends. It 
is through a practice of vulnerable listening that Costello imagines we might 
hear something not merely spoken but felt. Recall here the discussion in the 
previous chapter of Singh’s howl, which he cannot finally utter. Or Cassie’s 
howl—one that I could hear but stubbornly could not read during the sud-
den onset of her blindness. What is at stake for Costello is not a reasonable 
claim about animals but a practice of learning to encounter animals vulner-
ably, including the wounded animal that she is. That we all are.
In her response to Coetzee’s text, religious historian Wendy Doniger 
(1999) challenges Costello’s position on animal silence by suggesting that 
far from confronting us with silence, the animal repeatedly speaks a lan-
guage we simply refuse to hear. It is through this language—through the 
voice that is not heard precisely because another voice disables or refuses 
its recognition—that we can critically consider the productive potential 
of silent engagement. In Jean- Luc Nancy’s formulation of the philosopher, 
he tells us that the philosopher is one who “cannot listen,” who “neutral-
izes listening within himself, so he can philosophize” (2007, 1). To exceed 
philosophy, then, we must press on listening to those voices that appear 
voiceless in order to produce new forms of engaged entanglement with 
and beyond ourselves. The potential of vulnerable listening resides in an 
exchange between (animal) “silence” and (human) listening, an exchange 
that exceeds the didactic clamor of disciplinarity by crossing the borders 
of reason. To Doniger’s mind, the question is not whether the animal has 
language but about the human refusal to hear its “silences.”
Doniger extends Costello’s formulation of animal language to include 
not only voice but also gesture, gaze, and so on. Like Costello, she posits the 
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act of listening as absolutely central to understanding. Recall that Costello 
urges her audience members to “listen to their hearts” rather than to be 
governed by the didactic structure of the lecture form. Listening—even 
when we struggle profoundly to hear—is therefore absolutely fundamental 
to a becoming with the Other. As Doniger suggests, these other languages 
are forms of communication that must be not only heard but also inter-
preted. “This is the language we must learn to read,” she insists. Like the 
human languages I discussed in chapter 2, animal languages will likewise 
continue to defy our will toward mastery over them. Yet since the act of 
reading (most broadly defined) is in all cases an imaginative and interpre-
tive one, it is also therefore an act through which we might radically recon-
ceive our responsibilities toward and as others. The voices of “barbarians,” 
natives, and slaves were, after all, once similarly voices not worthy of being 
heard by the colonial ear. Both Costello and Doniger imply that by listening 
to those voices that have been forced to submit, voices that are so “foreign” 
that they have remained unheard, a radical reconceptualization of subjec-
tivity itself can emerge. While this reconceptualization of vulnerable listen-
ing informs relations among humans, both Costello and Doniger insist that 
it necessitates a wholly new sense of being with/as animals.
Future Humanimalities
Rather than to articulate the animal as a figure for the oppression of more 
worthy human subjects, as anticolonial discourse has been wont to do,6 
Costello’s commitment to sympathetic imaginings and practices of cul-
tivated listening enables her to posit the animal as subject and her own 
subject- position as animal. In doing so, she urges us toward what I call the 
future humanimalities. Once we begin to take seriously the animality of 
the human, we must rethink the reach and methods—as well as the sub-
jects and objects—of the humanities. Traditional humanities have taken 
for granted the human as an empirical object of study (as I discussed in 
different contexts in chapters 2 and 3) and have understood their impor-
tance as a pedagogical act of humanizing certain (human) subjects. Once 
we deconstruct the presupposed differences between humans and animals, 
the disciplinary division erected on that distinction will begin to crumble. 
To cultivate the future humanimalities, we might first ask how our already 
existing skills as scholars can move us beyond the masterful human en-
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closures of disciplinarity. Through her attention to metaphorical language, 
Costello enables us to begin to imagine how a future engagement with 
humanimal literary studies could dispossess us from our entrenched sub-
jectivities and cultivate us otherwise. This future humanimalities will be, 
remembering José Esteban Muñoz (2009), a utopic one in the sense that it 
will be a practice that is forever dawning, never quite here.
Costello appeals to her academic audience to engage what she calls the 
“sympathetic imagination,” a term that has gained attention in Coetzee 
scholarship (Durrant 2006). It is her own imagination of human charac-
ters, she reminds us, that has earned her an invitation to speak at a pres-
tigious American university. Costello’s magnum opus is a 1960s feminist 
rewriting of James Joyce’s Ulysses from the perspective of Leopold Bloom’s 
wife, Molly. Therein, Costello has created a world and a subject position 
for the fictional Molly Bloom, a character for whom Costello’s readership 
reveres her. By imagining and articulating the world of Molly Bloom—lit-
erally a figment of Joyce’s imagination made accessible to the world through 
Costello (who is herself literally a figment of Coeztee’s imagination)—she 
has given rise to a character that her readers sympathize with and indeed 
love. She uses this example to illustrate the unlimited human potential for 
imaginative sympathy: “there is no limit to the extent to which we can think 
ourselves into the being of another. There are no bounds to the sympathetic 
imagination” (Coetzee 1999, 35). Costello submits to a romanticized sense 
of literary potential, and in so doing, denies the notion of ideology. She 
suggests that writers (and by extension readers) have the capacity to think 
beyond the discourses in which they operate. If we can imaginatively sym-
pathize with a fictional character like Molly Bloom, she contends, we must 
certainly be capable of thinking our way into the real lives of animals. She 
dares us, in other words, to blur our engagements with the real and the fic-
tional. Unlike Molly Bloom, after all, animals are living beings whose lives 
are not bound to the page but are physically among us: “If I can think my 
way into the existence of a being who has never existed,” Costello declares, 
“then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an 
oyster, a being with whom I share the substrate of life” (35).
Her academic audience is unsurprisingly puzzled by the romanticism 
of this appeal. The term “sympathetic imagination” is from the start under 
suspicion within an institution founded on objective inquiry and ratio-
nal thought. If knowledge is something pursued in order to be mastered, 
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the sympathetic imagination defies this mastery by extending itself to that 
which thought cannot foreclose. (Think again of Animal’s wonder at the 
“empty space” that was nothing and everything all at once.) Despite the 
inevitable failure of her appeal, Costello insists that everyone—most ur-
gently perhaps academics by virtue of being custodians of knowledge—
must move beyond empirical knowledge into a form of thinking that im-
plicates feeling. Picking up on this failure of imagination (of feeling and 
sympathy) within the academy and far beyond, Sam Durrant (2006) argues 
that The Lives of Animals is a text that continuously rehearses the failure 
of the sympathetic imagination in order to make way for a more effective 
relation toward the Other. For Durrant, this failure is “a precondition for 
a new kind of ethical and literary relation, a relation grounded in the ac-
knowledgment of one’s ignorance of the other, on the recognition of the 
other’s fundamental alterity” (120).
Humanimal Metaphorics
There is arguably no more contentious moment in The Lives of Animals 
than Coetzee’s turn toward the Holocaust, where the future humanimalities 
as a politics of dispossession comes into view. If ignorance of the Other is 
indeed always necessary, and as Durrant argues perhaps even productively 
so, Costello attempts to move her interlocutors toward a practice of respon-
sible ignorance. Such a practice stands in contrast to the ignorance enacted 
during the Holocaust, during which people living near the camps ignored 
the practices of extermination that were so clearly signaled around them. 
This ignorance, Costello declares, situates those citizens imbued with full 
humanity as complicit with Holocaust executioners. Like the executioners, 
she provocatively claims, they refused to imagine themselves in the place 
of those being tortured and killed. In this way, the Holocaust represents a 
collective failure of the sympathetic imagination (Coetzee 1999, 34). This is 
the juncture at which Costello links the politics of Holocaust complicity to 
Western culture at large, which overwhelmingly ignores the mass torture 
and slaughter of factory- farmed animals. In each case, the failure to imag-
ine oneself in the (horrific) position of the Other is a collective failure. She 
reminds her audience that “sympathy has everything to do with the subject 
and little to do with the object” (34– 35). This call to imagine oneself in the 
place of the Other might seem to risk the same collapse of difference in the 
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name of empathy that I criticized in the preceding chapter. But I want to 
suggest that Costello is in fact recommending something different. This is 
because she insists that the sympathetic subject is in no sense bounded—or 
limited—by the object toward which it reaches. Imagining oneself in the 
place of the Other does not require that we imagine ourselves to be the same 
as the Other. It is not, in other words, a lack within the Other that produces 
the Holocaust victim or the factory- farmed animal. In Levinasian terms, 
it is not the Other’s lack of a face that signals its alterity but, as Matthew 
Calarco (2008) has argued, it is the turning away of our own faces that 
constitutes the Other’s alterity for us. This marks the paradox of Hegel’s 
master/slave dialectic; it is, after all, the master who is lacking, and not the 
subjugated slave. Costello points us toward the delicate maneuver between 
reckoning with our ignorance of the Other (there is a space between us and 
the Other that we cannot close) and the fact that we still bear responsibility 
for the Other. Our ignorance cannot justify ignoring their plight.
Costello insists on language as a locus for social change (and in this 
sense, she preaches to a literary choir). Her arguments press on language 
as that which reveals the unconscious and often conflicted tendencies in 
human thought. The rhetoric of the Holocaust is a prime example of this, 
illuminating the animal’s function as the most crucial figure through which 
to evoke the atrocities of the Holocaust: “ ‘They went like sheep to the 
slaughter.’ ‘They died like animals.’ ‘The Nazi butchers killed them.’ Denun-
ciation of the camps reverberates so fully with the language of the stockyard 
and slaughterhouse that it is barely necessary for me to prepare the ground 
for the comparison I am about to make. The crime of the Third Reich, says 
the voice of accusation, was to treat people like animals” (Coetzee 1999, 
20). The animal as simile for the murdered human works to convey the 
sheer barbarity of the Holocaust. The Nazis were “butchers,” and the vic-
tims suffered and died as though they were nothing more than “animals.” 
In this metaphorical configuration, the Jew as animal deserves our deepest 
sympathy. Yet perversely, while the animal has become the most poignant 
simile for the Holocaust victim, it simultaneously also best describes the 
brutality of the executioners: “In our chosen metaphorics, it was they and 
not their victims who were the beasts. By treating fellow human beings, be-
ings created in the image of God, like beasts, they had themselves become 
beasts. The human victims of the holocaust were treated like animals, but 
those who did the killing are animals” (21). As simile, the animal is a dis-
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posable object that is likened to the Holocaust victim as tortured subject. 
As metaphor, however, the animal is loathed by virtue of its violent nature. 
Our language reveals an ambivalent need to claim and decry the animal, to 
make it evoke both innocence and evil.
If for Costello poetic language offers us a crucial “feel” for the animal’s 
experience of the world (Coetzee 1999, 30), it is also the figure of the poet 
in The Lives of Animals that refuses outright her attempts from within lan-
guage to move us toward a humanimal politics. The respected (fictional) 
poet Abraham Stern is, like Costello, invested in language, form, and func-
tion. But he categorically refuses her use of rhetoric to develop her case 
for an animal ethics. Responding in written form to her analogy between 
concentration camps and slaughterhouses, between the slaughtered Jews 
and factory- farmed animals, Stern writes to Costello:
You took over for your own purposes the familiar comparison between 
the murdered Jews of Europe and the slaughtered cattle. The Jews died 
like cattle, therefore cattle die like Jews, you say. That is a trick with 
words which I will not accept. You misunderstand the nature of likeness; 
I would even say you misunderstand willfully, to the point of blasphemy. 
Man is made in the likeness of God but God does not have the likeness 
of man. If Jews were treated like cattle, it does not follow that cattle are 
treated like Jews. The inversion insults the memory of the dead. It also 
trades on the horrors of the camps in a cheap way. (49– 50)
It is not Costello’s desire to rethink the animal that affronts Stern but rather 
that she relegates Holocaust victims to animal status in the service of her 
argument. He is not so much “against animals” as he is invested in the pres-
ervation of the exalted humanity of Holocaust victims. Here God guaran-
tees the unidirectional movement of the simile; Stern must leave behind the 
language of poetry for the preservation of religious and cultural identity. 
Yet his refusal of rhetorical language to invert the “familiar” simile between 
Jews and slaughtered cattle reveals more than his position as an affronted 
Jew. As with the enormous chasm between animal similes and metaphors 
in Holocaust rhetoric, language poses a vital interpretive problem. For 
Stern, the reversal of the simile—from Jew treated as animal to animal 
treated as Jew—bears down on memory, history, and the murdered Jew. 
Describing the Holocaust victim as one sacrificed like an animal therefore 
signals the force and horror of the act. To reverse the simile threatens rea-
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son by issuing a comparison that renders the Jew as disposable as livestock. 
Stern’s subject position—imbued with a profoundly traumatic history and 
invested with a desire to cling to the Jew’s exceptional character—makes 
Costello’s “trick with words” not merely difficult to digest but absolutely 
unpalatable. Paradoxically, while language provides for Costello the means 
to engage the sympathetic imagination, it is also her drive to toy with it that 
prevents Stern from sympathizing with animals.
This ideo- linguistic tension elicits Michael Rothberg’s critique of “com-
petitive memory”—the process by which two or more histories collide in 
a competition for historical supremacy and thus contemporary resources. 
Rothberg calls instead for a thinking of “multidirectional memory,” wherein 
historical events as distinct as the Holocaust and decolonization struggles 
“coexist with complex acts of solidarity in which historical memory serves 
as a medium for the creation of new communal and political identities” 
(2009, 11). Multidirectional memory thus enables a noncompetitive coex-
istence between different traumatic pasts, enabling distinct histories such 
as the slave trade, the extermination of Jews and indigenous populations, 
and decolonization struggles to sound with each other rather than to com-
pete in an economy of suffering. I want to suggest here that extending the 
concept of multidirectional memory to include the mass torture of animals 
can enable new conversations between Holocaust, postcolonial, literary, 
and animal studies rather than confirming a competitive hierarchy among 
them. It also allows us to reach toward a multidirectional sense of hum-
animal being and to work through structures, histories, and languages of 
dehumanization toward a dehumanist politics.
While the animal may not remember its traumatic past in a conscious 
way (or does it?), it certainly continues to experience and be molded by its 
trauma. The absence of evidential animal memory in no way exonerates 
human populations from linking the modern violence done to the animal 
with other acts of violence enacted by and on humans (some remarkably 
similar in nature when we consider the striking resemblance between the 
extermination camp and the slaughterhouse). Rothberg argues that “a 
certain bracketing of empirical history and an openness to the possibility 
of strange political bedfellows are necessary in order for the imaginative 
links between different historical groups to come into view; these imag-
inative links are the substance of multidirectional memory. Comparison, 
like memory, should be thought as productive—as producing new objects 
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and new lines of sight—and not simply as reproducing already given en-
tities that either are or are not ‘like’ other already given entities” (2009, 
18– 19). Stern makes clear the problem of thinking the Holocaust victim 
and the factory- farmed animal as “bedfellows,” since to his mind the link 
cannot help but to confirm the Nazi discourse that Jews were subhuman 
beings deserving of extermination. His resistance also signals the limits of 
decolonial thinking, which has, as I argued in the first half of this book, 
sought to redress the relegation of the colonized to animal status without 
accounting for the ways in which the human/animal distinction itself is 
deeply problematic within and beyond the human. Redressing the ways 
that humans have been rendered “animal” across time and space marks 
the limits of postcolonial thinking as much as it signals the limits of Stern’s 
thought as affronted Jew. Both discourses remain limited by their political 
parameters and mired by unimaginative modes of comparison. In forget-
ting the productive potential of acknowledging the animality of all humans, 
we abandon the urgent need to redress the human/animal distinction that 
makes possible the subjugation of all beings. Dehumanist readings of fic-
tion can be a venue for Rothberg’s necessary “bracketing of empirical his-
tory,” a venue through which we can begin to repoliticize animal metaphor-
ics toward the liberation not only of particularly dispossessed humans but 
also of the animal as a sacrificial object. Recalling Animal’s disarmingly 
productive insistence at the start of this chapter that he is both “just like” a 
human and ”just like” his canine friend Jara, we might begin to assemble a 
politics that enables us—from within and beyond language—to be always 
both different from and proximate to those others to whom we are bound.
Toward a Dispossessed Humanimality
If humanist discourse has become instrumental to seeking rights and 
equality for those dehumanized by colonial force and its reverberations, it 
will seem to many counterintuitive, laughable, even an act of betrayal, that 
I engage postcolonial texts with an openness toward what I am calling a 
humanimal ethics. Yet by claiming the human—over and over again, across 
discrete historical moments and within particular political contexts—we 
have in this act of bringing some into the fold of humanity continued to 
produce others as abjectly outside. Anticolonial discourse has produced 
a series of human, dehumanized, and inhuman “remainders” through its 
humAnImAl dIspossessIons 147
claims to a universal human subject, a point I have laid stress on in chap-
ter 1. Subsequently, I have explored how human rights discourse and hu-
manitarian intervention have been represented in postcolonial literature as 
sites of violent erasure. Such critique—though vital—does not feel to me 
enough. I also feel compelled to experiment—in the Gandhian sense of 
experimentation, which entails a willingness to falter and an understand-
ing that violence is inescapable—with other forms of discourse, intellec-
tual practice, and embodied ethics that might become less harmful and 
exclusive than those we have to date been redeploying even in the name 
of “liberation.” It may well be that literary and philosophical thinkers such 
as Matthew Calarco (2008), Mel Y. Chen (2012), Vanessa Lemm (2009), 
Susan McHugh (2011), and Cary Wolfe (2010) are already leading us toward 
a dispossessing of humanimalities to come. We do not have to be Animal, 
crippled by toxic exposure in the so-called Global South, nor do we have 
to be the white, aging female fiction writer of Coetzee’s narrative in order 
to feel that there is something menacing about how the human has been 
claimed, performed, and enacted, or to desire more entangled forms of 
ethical becoming.
If a future humanimalities will enable—even require—a break from 
our disciplined trainings, it will also urge us toward more careful prac-
tices of dispossession, both in the sense of dispossessing ourselves from the 
humanist subjects that we have become and in the sense of producing more 
intimate ways of engaging those who have been forcefully dispossessed. 
From such grounds of dispossession, we might begin the work of sculpting 
ourselves as different kinds of beings. The future humanimalities offer us 
an impossible temporality in which we are learning from a future we have 
not yet reached; this is a utopian practice of learning how to break (in the 
now) from structures that have enabled us to turn away from the alterity of 
ourselves and others. If we have come to learn that our disciplines, like our 
subjectivities, are structured by violence—even (and perhaps especially?) 
those that have sought to humanize us—we can in response embrace the 
styles of thinking- being- performing together (with our disavowed “ani-
malities” and with each other) that exist and are in the making, and that can 
revise the structures of subjectivity that have mapped us to date.
This is a scholarship that cannot be parsed from our mundane lives, 
a practice in which our “animal” aspects cannot be refused by the fully 
“human” work of intellectual inquiry. The dispossessions of this future hu-
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manimalities thus entail intimate acts of embracing and enfolding through 
which we call up the animals we have always been, and practice, along 
with Donna Haraway, new ways of becoming with the creatures we are, 
and the creatures that we live among. It is both a promise and a paradox of 
the future humanimalities that literature—a distinctively human form of 
communication/expression—may be one of the vital places where we can 
unteach and unlearn practices of the human.
CHAPTER 5
Cultivating Discomfort
I open this final chapter, about cultivation, discomfort, and the cultivation 
of discomfort, with an end that ushers us back toward a beginning. In the 
final sentence of Jamaica Kincaid’s My Garden (Book) (1999), the Antiguan 
writer provocatively concludes her garden reveries by asserting, “I am in 
a state of constant discomfort and I like this state so much I would like to 
share it” (1999, 229). What is it about Kincaid’s relation to her garden that 
produces this unabashed discomfort? Indeed, what is so enjoyable for her 
about discomfort, and how might we read and learn from her desire to 
“share” it? Kincaid’s garden book—which explores her “attachment in adult 
life to the garden” (3) through colonial histories, botany, consumerism, 
mundane garden life, and exotic garden travels—is replete with sketches 
of bodily and psychic discomfort. Unlike the more romantic genre of gar-
dening prose, Kincaid unearths her Vermont garden by contextualizing it 
within histories of colonization and their attendant human and botanical 
transplantations. In a similarly unromantic gesture, she also shares her own 
masterful fantasies through her garden meditations. Her fantasies of vio-
lence thus comingle across the text with the histories of colonialism from 
which she emerged as a subject.
In the earliest pages of My Garden (Book), Kincaid narrates a scene in 
which she finds herself inexplicably digging up parts of her lawn into “the 
most peculiar ungardenlike shapes,” until one day she realizes “that the 
garden I was making (and am still making and will always be making) re-
sembled a map of the Caribbean and the sea that surrounds it” (1999, 7– 8). 
For Kincaid, the garden is a repository of history, “an exercise in memory” 
that draws her back to uncontainable pasts both personal and political (8). 
Like those histories it elicits, the garden escapes and refuses the will of 
the gardener who desires mastery over it. Through Kincaid’s discomfort, 
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we begin to learn the ecological stakes of human mastery and the critical 
potentialities of feeling, recognizing, and inhabiting our own discomforts.
Throughout the text, she evokes the garden as a place rooted in mem-
ory and history and underscores the personal and political pasts—and the 
forms of violence that constitute them—that grow into and through the 
garden. It is a space in which the seeds of mastery continue, in more and 
less subtle ways, to germinate through the gardener and her particular at-
tachments. The discomforting turn of Kincaid’s text also circles us back 
to the very beginning of Unthinking Mastery, to the grounding claim that 
while the rhetoric and activism of decolonialism have decried mastery in 
its expressly colonial form, they have failed to account for the ways that 
mastery has continued to propagate in other, but critically related, forms 
5.1 Jamaica Kincaid watering her Vermont garden. Jamaica Kincaid by Annie 
Leibovitz (1999).
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and practices of both political and mundane life. The scale of dehumanist 
potentialities in the previous two chapters have moved us from intrahuman 
violence to the violence of humans over animals. In chapter 3, I considered 
through the figure of the humanitarian the complicity of liberal subjectiv-
ity with the systemic dehumanizing violence it wishes to amend, while in 
chapter 4 I broadened the horizon of this violence through a discomforting 
embrace of the human’s animality and a critique of the human’s masterful 
violence against animals. In this final chapter, we are turned ever more 
expansively toward dehumanist ecologies—and toward a practice of being 
uncomfortable in the world. A crucial part of this discomfort will come 
from having to reckon with the agency of nonhumans (the plants and ani-
mals who inhabit Kincaid’s garden), since these other lives and agencies are 
caught up in a becoming with human agencies. When it comes to comfort, 
it is not only the human’s that is at stake.
If comfort is, as Sara Ahmed reminds us, about “the fit between body 
and object” (2013, 425), discomfort allows us to pose the question of why 
some bodies can and cannot fit comfortably within particular spaces. I have 
discussed Ahmed already in chapter 2 in terms of her phenomenological 
reading of Fanon’s embodiment of racial difference, but here I am interested 
in Ahmed’s “Queer Feelings,” in which she theorizes discomfort’s genera-
tive potential. Ahmed argues that discomfort need not be read as strictly 
“constraining or negative” but rather can be transformative for normative 
social life: “To feel uncomfortable is precisely to be affected by that which 
persists in the shaping of bodies and lives. Discomfort is hence not about 
assimilation or resistance, but about inhabiting norms differently. The in-
habitance is generative or productive insofar as it does not end with the 
failure of norms to be secured, but with possibilities of living that do not 
‘follow’ these norms through” (2013, 430). It is not so much that discomfort 
becomes “radically” transformative by breaking away from norms com-
pletely but rather that discomfort shows us how to abide differently within 
those norms. But discomfort is also a passage through which we are moved 
by “a lack of ease with the available scripts for living and loving” toward 
other (perhaps no less discomforting) possibilities for collective life (425). 
Kincaid’s garden prose cultivates discomfort, in part by showing us how 
within bourgeois life, according to Ahmed, one “can be made uncomfort-
able by one’s own comforts” (425)—how even within the ease of relative 
affluence, discomfort can persist and proliferate. But Kincaid also shows 
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us how this bourgeois discomfort leads back to other discomforting histo-
ries, such as those of colonial dispossession and theft, and the discomforts 
produced through the recognition of one’s always failed mastery over the 
object in relation to which one seeks comfortable refuge. Crucially, Kincaid 
also makes her readers uncomfortable, by confronting us with her own vio-
lent fantasies and with her own perversely Orientalist representations of 
other dispossessed peoples (a topic to which I return in detail below). She 
thus writes her garden through relays of unease, offering discomfort as a 
politically fertile affect.
Transplanting Discomfort
For all the ways that discomfort can suddenly befall us, it is also an inheri-
tance. In Derridian terms, we can call discomfort a hauntological affect that 
marks the present with a past, one that is in no sense easy to trace (Derrida 
1994). Because so much of our discomfort—political, intergenerational, 
cultural, sexual—is inherited, and thus often unconscious, its potential to 
become an affective site of political resistance and reinvention requires a 
degree of psychic tilling. In her work on emotion and education, Megan 
Boler argues that a “pedagogy of discomfort” (1999, 196) may in fact be not 
only desirable but ethically imperative. For Boler, pedagogies of discomfort 
emphasize the bodies and materialities that both make life possible and dif-
ferentiate (often radically) some lives from others. Practicing and teaching 
our discomforts can become acts of learning to live with the ambiguities 
and uncertainties of our complex ethical entanglements. Teaching discom-
fort, then, is an act of uprooting our deeply felt—but often deeply buried—
discomforts. It is a way, in other words, of making discomfort conscious 
to those who embody it, as well as to those entangled with it in more and 
less complex ways. Yet when we learn discomfort unconsciously, we do so 
in ways that are complex and often difficult to articulate. This is at least in 
part because discomfort is often transmitted through composite networks 
of time and transplanted across generations and geographies. The site of 
the garden is a particularly fecund site through which to think discomfort 
precisely because it is a threshold space—often situated between the home 
and the world, between culture and nature.
The garden for me has always been a vexed space and the act of culti-
vation has been woven through with wonderment, confusion, and intense 
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unease. Some of my earliest memories are of my mother at work in her gar-
den, a space that seemed to flourish magically at her touch. In her famous 
essay “In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens” (1983), Alice Walker reminded 
feminist thinkers to look “low” rather than “high” to find the artful legacies 
embedded in women’s work. Like Walker’s, my mother’s garden has always 
been a space of extraordinary beauty and bounty. It has been an open sanc-
tuary for her across the stages of her adult life, one situated beyond (but im-
portantly, adjacent to) a home marked by palpable forms of cross- cultural, 
gendered, and intergenerational discomforts over time. Similar to Kincaid’s 
own emergence as a gardener, my mother’s attachment to the garden began 
in the early stages of motherhood. The act of cultivating food seemed hand 
in hand with the act of raising humans (a deep immersion into growing 
wild things). My mother’s gardening life began in a plot of a small commu-
nity garden in central Canada, at the intersection of mourning and moth-
erhood. Having moved from her beloved Montreal (a city to which she had 
once migrated by way of Belfast) to what then seemed to her a stark and 
hopeless prairie land, she found the city of Winnipeg had little to offer her 
beyond the conventions of married life for which she had moved.
My memories of my mother’s garden do not stem from that community 
plot but rather are rooted two plots later in her magnificent garden behind 
134 Westgate, where we were raised beneath a canopy of giant elm trees in 
a beige brick home that was, for most of my life, in a state of unrelenting 
restoration. Like the house itself, the garden was my mother’s passion. But 
unlike the home, the garden was a sanctuary outside—in “nature”—that 
allowed her to separate herself off from the uneasy life that was unfurling 
within the home. If our home was tumultuously cleaved by cultural differ-
ences (my mother was a proudly disobedient feminist from Ireland who 
was a product of the Jewish diaspora, and my father—who hailed from 
India—was keen to have a “proper” family in an era when interracial fami-
lies simply were not so), the garden for my mother was a refuge from the 
forms of physical and psychic discomfort proliferating within the home. 
But if her garden—in all its glory—was a space of refuge for my mother, 
it was also one into which the discomforts of the home spilled out into 
the earth. My mother used the garden as a repository of the political and 
personal forms of violence that had shaped and governed her life. The gar-
den was also—and crucially—a space in which she did violence to herself, 
pushing her body beyond its limits and “beating the shit out of herself ” (to 
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quote a recurring yet unusually crass utterance of hers) in order to work 
out the impossible social dynamics that had made life inside intolerable. 
As a repository for violence and its fertile ground, my mother’s garden was 
always a magnificent site of her discomfort—and a space within which I 
could not help but to share in it.
My mother’s passion for the urban wild occupied an overwhelming de-
gree of psychic space in my childhood. She was the founder of the Coalition 
to Save the Elms, a grassroots movement that proactively prevented the 
devastating effects of Dutch Elm Disease in Winnipeg. She battled against 
the Manitoba hog industry for its toxic environmental and social effects, 
prevented the demolition of countless historical buildings, and fought to 
save natural urban spaces from becoming sites of urban development. As 
a well- known environmental activist in our city, my mother held a certain 
acclaim as an ecofeminist renegade, so much so that a therapist of my youth 
once asked me in her presence whether I rather wished I was a tree, so that 
I could be assured of her absolute attention and unabated care.
It makes perfect psychoanalytic sense, then, that I would later come 
to work during my undergraduate summers as a tree planter in North-
ern Canada. For Canadians, tree planting is a fairly well- known subcul-
ture, comprised of mostly young, mostly white urbanites—often university 
students—who travel out to “the bush” to plant seedlings across clear- cut 
forests. By law, the logging industry of Canada is required to replant a per-
centage of the trees they cut, and planting companies bid for contracts to 
replant demolished forests. This results in a somewhat questionable net 
gain for the environment, since it promotes the regrowth of forests after 
they have been heavily logged. The culture of tree planting is one marked 
by brutal labor practices in which planters—with hundreds of saplings 
strapped to their bodies, sporting hard hats, steel- toed boots, and heavily 
duct- taped fingers—maneuver their way through logging debris in condi-
tions ranging from snow to blistering sun. Planters are often swarmed by 
insects (black flies, deer flies, horse flies, etc.) as they pick their way across 
devastated geographies. The days are long, the repetitive motion of the 
work tolls on bodies, and there are days when the only sustenance a planter 
has for the workday is devoured by bears while planters look on helplessly 
at a distance. Planting is typically piecework, and most relatively skilled 
planters—conditions depending—plant thousands of saplings per day.
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For all its brutalities, tree- planting is also a coming- of-age experience 
for many young Canadians and a first attempt for most at communal living. 
This seamless relation between the intense rigors of planting life and the 
social bonds shaped through it are stunningly captured through Canadian 
artist Sarah Anne Johnson’s exhibit Tree Planting (2005) (fig. 5.2). Moving 
between photography and still vignettes crafted through small clay figures 
and fabricated landscapes, Johnson’s work charts the intensities, rigors, and 
passions of life in the bush. She captures the wildness of humans and the 
magic of flora and fauna that persist in and around intentional ecological 
catastrophe. In her piece The Buffer Zone (fig. 5.3), she represents from an 
aerial view a picturesque Canadian highway cutting through forest. Yet she 
reveals this forest to be an illusion crafted for highway passengers who can-
not see that just beyond the tree line lies ecological devastation. Through 
an expanse of felled timber that extends beyond the borders of the image, 
Johnson exposes the hidden life of the clear- cut. Across her work, humans 
are represented both as extensions of the natural world and in stark contrast 
5.2 Collective labor: replanting saplings in the wreckage of clear- cut forests. 
Sarah Anne Johnson, Planting Trees, 2004. Chromogenic print, 11 × 14 in. Printed 
with permission of the artist.
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to it. If the clear- cut is itself devastation, so too are human bodies devastated 
within it. And if the clear- cut—despite its ruin—insists on life and beauty 
after its willed destruction, the damaged bodies of human planters and their 
solidarities likewise continue to vibrate and echo with utopian promise.
Tree- planting was my first experience of communal life, my first time 
being in an environment in which nudity was mundane, in which the taboo 
practices of urination and defecation became—often out of necessity—a 
public affair, and in which filth, wounds, and the body’s return to uncul-
tivated states were badges of extraordinary honor. The hardest work, the 
wildest parties, the closest to nature, the most intimate moments of collec-
tive life unfurled alongside—and because of—environmental devastation. 
If planting culture holds a radical social promise in its act of collective envi-
ronmental repair, it is also haunted by those other socialities at the expense 
of which planting culture emerges. Clear- cut logging is very often—and 
often unbeknownst to planters—undertaken on unceded indigenous terri-
tory, with indigenous communities having scarce (if any) input about or 
5.3 The illusion of bountiful Canadian forests demystified through an aerial 
representation of the clear- cut. Sarah Anne Johnson, The Buffer Zone, 2003. 
Chromogenic print, 20 × 24 in. Printed with permission of the artist.
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benefit from the destruction of their lands. The commitment to practicing 
communal living and feeling (often brutally) utopic, in other words, comes 
at the cost of violent eradications both environmental and social. How can 
we think about such profound bonds formed through more and less con-
scious engagements with radical violence? Jodi Byrd’s The Transit of Empire: 
Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism (2011) is a vital touchstone here, as she 
points to how settler colonialisms are “predicated on the very systems that 
propagate and maintain the dispossession of indigenous peoples for the 
common good of the world” (xix).1 Here the questions of complicity and 
dispossession that framed the preceding two chapters surface again, sum-
moning us to consider ways of inhabiting our own discomforting politics 
differently—of living alternatively within our contradictions rather than 
seeking to escape them.
It so happens that I was at my most poetically prolific in the clear- cut. 
Often miserably uncomfortable, driven to madness by swarms of bugs and 
the inescapability of penetrating sun or driving rain, I composed poems 
aloud in the trenches. This was art as salvation: poems became my way 
of working through the intolerable conditions of the labor. Without paper, 
ink, or free hands to capture them, these poems lived in the clear- cut as 
I worked—as though everyday language itself was being embedded in the 
earth along with thousands of saplings. Every once in a while a line will 
return to me, but most of them live in the clear- cuts that by now have be-
come young forests again. If the language of those poems remains largely 
imprecise to me, what I remember of them is their tenor and tone, the ways 
they were always putting into language the urgent feelings of discomfort 
that came through me but also seemed to emerge from the clear- cut quiet 
of forests that once were. Without the precision of language, they sound 
to me now—from the distances of time and geography—like melancholic 
howls of hope. They took up the real and imagined histories of broadly 
conceived indigenous lives that had inhabited those desecrated forests and 
wrestled with the labor of piecework that I desired so much also to be peace 
work. They were poems that sought out complicity, that struggled not to 
extricate my labor from the forms of violence that enabled it but aimed in-
stead at putting the present into conscious contact with histories—human 
and ecological—that had made possible my discomforting labor and com-
munal bonds. Replete with failure and an uneasy awareness of complicity, 
these clear- cut poems took root in my own vital ambivalence, grasping at 
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the queer promise of being exactly where I was and trying to inhabit the 
world otherwise there and then. Here and now.2
Vital Ambivalence
Kincaid’s desire to “share” her discomfort and her often discomforting 
ecological prose become a way of locating her own violent entanglements 
and inescapable contradictions while bringing her readers into the folds of 
their own. She enacts vital ambivalence—a practice of representation that 
emphasizes, politicizes, and embraces the subject’s contradictions and slip-
pages. Kincaid stages her ambivalence through her attention to the living, 
agential space of the garden. Her vital ambivalence upturns the unthink-
ing proliferation of masterful subjectivity by emphasizing the split subject 
that is at once masterful and oriented toward decolonization. Following 
R. Radha krishnan’s insistence that it is necessary for postcolonial studies 
not to read ambivalence as a sign of the postcolonial project’s weakness 
but rather to “politicize this given ambivalence and produce it agentially” 
(2000, 37),3 I read Kincaid’s ambivalent gardening prose as an urgent and 
provocative call to return to the “seeds” of our cultivated subjectivities and 
to follow Kincaid’s recognition within her garden of the “series of doubts 
upon series of doubts” (1999, 15) at root in our own subjectivities.
My contention here is that through the practices—linguistic and mate-
rial—that shape her garden, Kincaid tends a decolonial ethics through split 
forms of self- representations that refuse modernity’s insistence on a uni-
fied self.4 Indeed, Kincaid herself engages a form of vulnerable writing in 
which she takes up the ecological by perverting genres and insisting on a 
form of self- narration that is not reducible to Enlightenment subjectivity. 
Her contradictions signal not a gap between conscious and unconscious 
drives or a Freudian version of contradiction and complexity but two kinds 
of consciousness at play in the subject. She is both a fierce and antagonistic 
critic of colonial domination and, as a bourgeois gardener, a willful par-
ticipant in forms of dispossession that she ties back to histories of coloni-
zation. What her garden reveries make clear is that in order to mobilize 
feminist, ecocritical, and decolonial discourses, the foundational problem 
of mastery that underscores and binds them must be queried through the 
self- representation of the subject who is situated ambivalently in relation 
to Enlightenment thinking and its worldly manifestations.
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While Kincaid queries “the relationship between gardening and con-
quest” (1999, 116), this relation remains expressly equivocal across her gar-
den writing. She continuously sketches scenes, memories, and relations of 
violence that link the garden to more explicitly “political” forms of domi-
nation, coming to the realization that the garden is “a way of accommo-
dating and making acceptable, comfortable, familiar, the wild, the strange” 
(44). And she shows us that part of this “strange” and “wild” nature springs 
precisely from within a version of the human itself, from the uncanny land-
scapes outside and inside the human. A case in point is the brilliant move-
ment of discomfort across the concluding paragraph of My Garden (Book). 
She begins with a return to an Edenic English garden after having traveled 
through Chinese landscapes in her ecotourist search for seeds to plant in 
her Vermont garden. Sitting at a dining table at Gravetye Manor in Sussex, 
once home of the famous English botanist and “inventor” of the English 
garden, William Robinson, Kincaid is struck with a violent fantasy. Amid 
the stunning beauty and reverence of Gravetye’s famous gardens, Kincaid 
writes: “I had a delicious lunch in the dining room, and while eating I 
was struck with the desire to behead all of my fellow diners who were not 
traveling with me . . . because . . . because . . . because. Eden is like that, so 
rich in comfort, it tempts me to cause discomfort” (229). At Gravetye, with 
its soils rich in colonial histories of dispossession, Kincaid indulges both 
in the beauty of the place and in historically based fantasies of beheadings. 
Beauty, space, proximity, and temporality are entangled in this fantasy of 
execution, where (presumably white) strangers with whom she shares in 
Gravetye’s indulgence become headless sacrificial bodies. In this fantasy, 
Kincaid as colonial subject holds sovereign power—but a power over un-
differentiated subjects who are also critically like her by virtue of a shared 
passion for colonial English gardens.
Kincaid’s ecological writings have been taken up to some extent by the 
recent surge of postcolonial ecocriticism, which seeks to map the vital con-
nections between environmental and postcolonial studies.5 This scholar-
ship is founded on a core agreement that “what the postcolonial/ecocritical 
alliance brings out, above all, is the need for a broadly materialist under-
standing of the changing relationship between people, animals and en-
vironment—one that requires attention, in turn, to the cultural politics 
of representation” (Huggan and Tiffin 2010, 12). While highlighting the 
relations between economic power and environmental sustainability, post-
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colonial ecocriticism as a discursive field is also invested in how global 
narratives intervene in dominant formulations of the environment as an 
exploitable resource for certain human populations and how nondomi-
nant environmentalisms emerge through such narratives. Because in this 
discourse globalization is understood as a “latter- day colonialism based 
upon economic and cultural imperialism,” postcolonial studies has become 
a critical way through which to read environmental crises and the narra-
tives that represent them (Roos and Hunt 2010, 3).
Although Kincaid’s ecological writings are familiar within this inter-
disciplinary turn, the emphasis has been on her explicit critiques of colo-
nialism. In the introduction to their coedited volume, for instance, Eliza-
beth DeLoughrey and George B. Handley employ Kincaid’s gardening 
prose to bolster an ecocritical critique of the “eighteenth- century homoge-
nization of the natural world” (2011, 10). They argue that Kincaid becomes 
a crucial supplement to Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things (1994), in 
which he dwells on the theory of natural history and the power of language 
to shape dominant ideologies. Unlike Foucault, who was not explicitly con-
cerned with the colonial politics of “ordering,”6 Kincaid emphasizes such 
politics through her critique of the (re)naming and classification of plant 
species during the colonial period. For her, “this naming of things is so 
crucial to possession—a spiritual padlock with the key thrown irretriev-
ably away—that it is a murder, an erasing” (1999, 122). While ecocritical 
scholars have been quite right to see Kincaid as a crucial voice in environ-
mental critiques of imperialism, the tendency in this scholarship is to cite 
her most direct critiques of the colonial enterprise without dwelling on the 
discomforting ambivalence of her prose—an ambivalence that I contend 
is absolutely crucial to politicizing her work beyond a straight critique of 
imperialism.
I use the term “straight” here to signal how queer theoretical trajectories 
can help to reorient Kincaid’s work for and within postcolonial ecocritical 
scholarship. Jill Casid (2005) has pointed to the practice of relandscaping 
in colonial territories that was so vital to the imperial project. For Casid, 
looking back on the landscape of the West Indies as a colonial archive al-
lows us to see the queer seeds of resistance that were always and from the 
outset germinating. Kincaid brings this history into the present, represent-
ing the postcolonial subject as one vitally and ambivalently tied to colonial 
force and the garden as a site of enduring colonial mastery. When Kincaid 
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posits a relation between gardening and conquest, for instance, she queries 
whether we might cast the conqueror as a gardener and the one who works 
the fields as the conquered (1999, 116). Doing so, she recalls the slave plan-
tation, putting it into discomforting relation with her own Vermont garden. 
Embedded in Kincaid’s critique of colonial practices of mastery are the dis-
continuities and ambivalences of the postcolonial subject whose practices 
in relation to her garden often rehearse and subvert colonial modes and 
fantasies of mastery.
Recalling Halberstam’s (2011) utopic summons to inhabit and embrace 
our failures, we can read Kincaid’s always failed attempts at mastering her 
garden as a promise of stalling mastery. The vital ambivalence that she 
stages across her garden prose—always shifting between being the con-
queror within her garden and being conquered (by colonists and by her 
garden), by casting herself as both Subject and Object—gestures toward 
Monique Allewaert’s argument about personhood and colonialism in the 
American tropics. Allewaert contends that when we read across “artifacts” 
of the American tropics, we witness the emergence of human subjectivities 
that do not conform to the models of subjectivity made dominant through 
Enlightenment thought. Reading artifacts from the American tropics, Alle-
waert illustrates “the emergence of a disaggregated conception of the body 
that enables an understanding of the person that cannot be reduced to 
either of these periodizations’ understandings of the human, nature, or 
politics” (2013, 9). Kincaid’s vital ambivalence is attached but not reducible 
to the Enlightenment conception of the human, and her garden writing 
emphasizes a subject whose position in relation to the “natural” world re-
mains haunted by both the force of Enlightenment thought and those other 
“conceptions” of subjectivity that it has repressed.
Wild Disruptions
In a fascinating discussion, Caribbean- born Vermont gardeners Kincaid 
and Kathleen M. Balutansky express their apprehensions about “coloniz-
ing” their gardens as territories already inhabited by other species. Balu-
tansky explicitly links her gardening practice to the violent erasures and 
dispossessions of colonization. To this concern, Kincaid replies that “people 
with our history, when we give it some thought, we are very careful about 
the issue of displacing others” (Balutansky and Kincaid 2002, 795). She pos-
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its people of the tropics, in contrast to Europeans, as those who “live along 
with things” (795). Kincaid represents this tension in her garden prose, such 
as when an American botanist visits her garden and suggests the removal 
of certain trees from her property (1999, 34). Casting the trees as agents de-
serving apology, Kincaid is affronted by the audacity of the American who 
would not hesitate to destroy them. This commitment to living along with 
things, tied to colonial histories and the lessons wrought from them, posits 
Kincaid as a subject ethically formed by a violent past. This is an ethics that 
learns from colonization and reaches beyond the human consequences of 
colonial force by including “things” in her ethical frame.
All at once, and in a perfect play of her vital ambivalence, Kincaid tells 
Balutansky that in her garden she struggles endlessly to defend against wild 
invaders and to “keep things under control” (2002, 797). Kincaid acts repeat-
edly as a master of her garden. She enacts what Mick Smith calls “ecological 
sovereignty” (2011), which names the modern sovereign control over par-
ticular bounded spaces.7 Straddling between self- representations that on the 
one hand pitch her as an ethical subject formed through colonization and on 
the other hand as yet another master emerging from the colonial encoun-
ter, Kincaid appears absolutely incongruous. Yet her narrative brilliance is 
rooted in this incongruity, through which she stages a critical disruption of 
the ways we imagine and sustain ourselves as bounded, coherent subjects.
If wild animals are under human threat in Kincaid’s garden, they are also 
absolutely crucial to her garden reveries. At several moments in My Gar-
den (Book), she is disrupted by unexpected creatures that throw her off her 
narrative course. Wild animals tend to appear at moments in which Kin-
caid is dwelling on existential problems (how to live with the uncertainties 
of life, for example) or over a particular botanical species in her garden that 
will not conform to her desires. While Kincaid is grappling with her “fears” 
and her “responsibility toward others,” for instance, a woodpecker begins 
suddenly to hammer at her house (1999, 25). This maddening interruption 
of her thought decenters the human focus of the text. Through its disrup-
tion (which is to say, its act of living), the woodpecker becomes entangled 
with Kincaid’s fears and ethical queries. The wild becomes, in other words, 
folded into the narrative subject who wishes to deny it.
There are a series of similar vignettes in Kincaid’s garden prose in which 
she violently fantasizes about killing animals. Of rabbits and woodchucks, 
she “plot(s) ways to kill them but can never bring myself to do it” (1999, 71), 
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and when she captures a raccoon that she imagines to be “full of malice,” 
she plans to drown it in a barrel of water before being halted by “the three 
whining pacifists I have somehow managed to find myself living with (my 
husband and our two children)” (50). Her explicit drive toward violence il-
lustrates a radical break from the picture she paints of the Global South and 
practices of living along with other species. Her prose performs the excep-
tional status of the human while disrupting it, calling into crisis the prod-
uct of European modernity by propping up and disabling its own fictions.
If for Kincaid the garden is “a way of accommodating and making ac-
ceptable, comfortable, familiar, the wild, the strange” (1999, 44), it is also a 
place in which that human comfort is always wildly disrupted. In her nar-
ration of a scene in which “one proper afternoon,” as she is busy pondering 
the wisteria in her garden that will not conform to her desire, a fox appears 
and disorients her narrative trajectory (16). For Kincaid, the fox threatens 
the sovereign sanctity of her garden. (But this, we know already, is fan-
tasmatic, since the misbehaving wisteria was already working to threaten 
her mastery.) If the fox breaks her from her mediation on the wisteria, it 
also gives rise to a fascinating psychological movement in which Kincaid 
first envisions the fox’s coat as an ornamental object but turns abruptly to 
a radical inquiry into her own human subjectivity: “I believe I am in the 
human species, I am mostly ambivalent about this, but when I saw the fox 
I hoped my shriek sounded like something familiar to the fox, something 
human” (18). Kincaid’s “hope” that the fox will recognize her shriek as is-
suing from a human is a hope that the fox will be scared away from her 
garden. Yet on another and crucial level, the fox is positioned to recognize 
(even confirm) for Kincaid a humanity about which she is both uncer-
tain and “mostly ambivalent.” The fox is thus both an unwelcomed animal 
intruder and, through the hope that it will recognize her voice, one that 
might call her into human being. Her response to the fox trails between fear 
and jealousy: “The way he would run away from me with his head turned 
toward me, watching me behind him as he propelled himself forward, was 
frightening. I could not do that. And then he disappeared into another part 
of the wild and I could not follow” (19). Kincaid’s psychic play in the fox 
scene moves ambivalently from the complete objectification of the fox as 
“ornament,” to a fear of its capacities, to a suspension of her own species 
being (“I believe I am in the human species”). Like Animal, who as we saw 
in the previous chapter emphasizes his own contingent humanity, here Kin-
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caid likewise throws her relation to the human species into question. This 
sweepingly dehumanist movement takes us from the exterminating force of 
the modern subject, to the colonial question of who counts as human, and 
finally to the more primordial question of what the human is as a life form. 
Kincaid’s dehumanism traffics between a human both familiar and strange, 
representing the human’s complex adjacency to colonial history and to the 
animal in ways upsetting, unpredictable, and abidingly disruptive.
Garden-Variety Orientalism
What part of “the wild” does Kincaid inhabit? In her caustic travelogue A 
Small Place (1988), she writes to the white tourist (identified poignantly as 
“you”) about the geographic, historical, architectural, and social lives of her 
Antiguan homeland. Positing the tourist as “an ugly human being” whose 
presence in Antigua echoes and extends colonialism, the book functions 
in part as a disinvitation to vacation on the island. The tourist industry, 
she explains, has supplanted colonialism, keeping Antiguans subservient to 
Western powers and desires. The tourist industry in Antigua, then, is a neo-
colonialist enterprise with which those on vacation are critically entangled. 
Given her staunch critique of the tourist industry as an extension of colo-
nialism, it comes as a surprise that in Kincaid’s later garden writings she 
participates eagerly in “seed hunting” expeditions across China and Nepal. 
These ecotourist expeditions, aimed at collecting “exotic” seeds to cultivate 
in her Vermont garden, edge uncomfortably close to her fierce critiques of 
Western tourism in Antigua.
Kincaid’s narrative self- location is expressly complex, straddling between 
an alliance with others “like me” who are subjects of colonial and neoco-
lonial power and situating herself as part of the neocolonial “conquering 
class.” In her garden travel prose, she slides between these conflicted modes 
of self- representation, rehearsing in often vexing ways the Orientalist travel 
practices and fantasies that cast her in the role of the “ugly” Western trav-
eler. Her plant- hunting pursuits are first detailed toward the end of My 
Garden (Book), when she travels to the Yunnan province in China, and later 
to Nepal in Among Flowers. It is in the latter text that she confesses, “I had 
no idea that places in the world could provide for me this particular kind 
of pleasure” (2005, 3– 4). Unlike the ugly Western traveler of A Small Place 
(1988), who remains oblivious to the social conditions of Antigua and uses 
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the place as a relaxing “escape” from real life, Kincaid’s pleasures abroad are 
ones derived through repeated discomfort and unease produced through 
her foreign travel. But like the travels of other tourists, her journeys often 
neglect the lives of those who serve her. How should we think about this 
frustrating movement between Kincaid’s staunch critique of tourism and 
the ways that she narratively celebrates her own complicities with it? I 
want to suggest that Kincaid’s contradictions—far from being mere signs 
of her hypocrisy—reveal a postcolonial subject (in her case, a formerly 
dehumanized subject now imbued with Western bourgeois subjectivity) as 
one whose paradoxes upend the very foundations of Man. Kincaid in this 
sense harmonizes with Sylvia Wynter by emphasizing through her garden 
prose how the construction of particular narratives and the performance of 
particular versions of being human are intimately and inextricably linked. 
By exploiting the contradictions of the subject through narrative, Kincaid 
demonstrates an awareness of how the human is sociogenically produced. 
As though answering Wynter’s call to produce new modes of being human, 
Kincaid’s narrative plays with ambivalence and contradiction, emphasizing 
the cracks in postcolonial subjectivity and opening up the possibilities that 
may flourish from its fissures.
Kincaid’s Rousseauean “walk” in Nepal is replete with reverie and reflec-
tion and situated precariously between a longing for full possession of the 
“rare” and “indigenous” that can be transplanted and cultivated “at home” 
and a discursive disavowal of this desire. Mimicking the language of colo-
nial botanists, Kincaid states in no uncertain terms that “claiming . . . was 
the overriding aim of my journey” (2005, 71). She is often discomforted—
if not disgusted—by the seemingly strange practices of the Chinese and 
Nepalese people whom she encounters during her seed hunts. Yet she tells 
her readers that her hunt in Nepal would “haunt many things in my life 
for a long while afterward, if not forever” (8). Kincaid moves—sometimes 
bewilderingly—between alliance with the Nepalese and radical difference 
from them. She grounds her alliance historically: “Because of my own per-
sonal history, every person I saw in this situation seemed familiar to me” 
(18). This “familiarity” (with those whose cultures are very different from 
her own) emerges again when she declares, “I only viewed everything I 
came upon with complete acceptance, as if I expected there to be no border 
between myself and what I was seeing before me, no border between myself 
and my day- to-day existence” (20).
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Nevertheless, her difference from the Nepalese in Among Flowers is 
most forcefully articulated through the politics of naming, a politics she 
describes in the colonial context as a violent erasure in My Garden (Book). 
In the latter text, through her reflections on the Swedish botanist Carl Lin-
neaus, she ties European botanical practices to colonization through their 
mutual practice of renaming in the production of European knowledge. 
Like the colonial explorers who “emptied worlds of their names” (1999, 
160), so too did the early botanists proclaim the names of species “not to 
fulfill curiosity but to possess” (156). Possession here is not merely claiming 
ownership over something but “a murder, an erasing” of the thing being (re)
named. As in Genesis, where God gives humans dominion only after they 
have named the animals, the power to name precedes and extends itself 
toward mastery. The Canadian environmentalist David Suzuki emphasizes 
this power when he illustrates how naming shapes our orientations toward 
other things: “Calling a forest ‘timber,’ fish ‘resources,’ the wilderness ‘raw 
material’ licenses the treatment of them accordingly” (2007, 289). Suzuki 
emphasizes how destructive social practices become authorized through 
uses of language and the particular practice of renaming things in ways that 
legitimize their material exploitation.
The power to (re)name, then, comes to signal a mode of masterful re-
lation in which the one who names is also the one who can bestow, clas-
sify, and possess. Kincaid’s own acts of renaming signal particularly poi-
gnant forms of dehumanization that are overtly linked to colonial practice.8 
When Kincaid refuses to recognize the names of the Sherpas whose labor-
ing bodies make possible her journey, she renames them through char-
acteristics identifiable to her: the Sherpa who cooks her meals becomes 
“Cook”; the one who carries their dining table on his back is known to her 
and her fellow seed hunters as “Table”; and the Sherpa who speaks little 
English is named after the one phrase he knows—“I Love You” (2005, 26). 
Of the Sherpa she names Table, she declares, “I was appalled that someone 
had to carry this whole set of civility” (30). The point here is not simply 
that Kincaid—like Linnaeus and the colonists she critiques—engages the 
violence of renaming. There is a crucial continuity among the colonial, the 
botanical, and the ecotouristic in that they perform the possessive erasures 
of others, enforcing masterful world relations by naming others as if they 
exist for oneself. The Sherpa becomes Table not merely because the name 
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describes the particularities of his work but because his work as a table car-
rier is oriented toward Kincaid’s own comfort. The Himalayan seed hunt 
is a perversely neo- Orientalist undertaking—narrated through Kincaid’s 
postcolonial and Western perspectives—that represents the Sherpa’s labor 
as the only consequential aspect of his existence.
Of her nearly indiscriminate forgetting of the names of the Nepalese 
people who made possible her journey, Kincaid declares: “This is not at 
all a reflection of the relationship between power and powerlessness, the 
waiter and the diner, or anything that would resemble it. This was only a 
reflection of my own anxiety, my own unease, my own sense of ennui, my 
own personal fragility. I have never been so uncomfortable, so out of my 
own skin in my entire life, and yet not once did I wish to leave, not once 
did I regret being there” (2005, 27). The erasure of the Other thus becomes 
not about sheer power and the ability of the master to strip the slave of a 
world. Instead, Kincaid turns the erasure inward, signaling how her own 
“anxiety,” “unease,” “ennui,” and “personal fragility” paves the way for the 
erasure of others. What Kincaid advances here is a list of feelings that align 
with Judith Butler’s (2004) concept of “vulnerability,” a state of reckoning 
with one’s own unease and reliance while accepting without “regret” or de-
fensiveness the fact of being in this position. In this instant, fragility is not 
something to be disavowed but something to embrace. At the same time, 
Kincaid’s language also echoes the master/slave dialectic in fascinating 
ways. Writing from the narrative position of a postcolonial bourgeois sub-
ject, Kincaid reveals the uncanny continuity between the psychodynamics 
of the colonial master and the postcolonial subject that I have traced across 
this book. Indeed, she appears here to fulfill Fanon’s theory that the post-
colonial bourgeoisie would in turn come to reproduce the material dis-
parities of the colonial moment if during decolonization a full proletariat 
revolution did not occur. And she knows this: Kincaid’s explicit desire to 
eliminate others (like the fox) is turned inward to reveal her own profound 
discomforts; she effaces the Other because she is discomforted by alterity 
and because she herself fears effacement. What would it mean to stay with 
this vulnerability, to bear the familiarity of the Other, whose simultaneous 
likeness and difference are so profoundly distressing?
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Wonderment and Time
There is a fascinating moment toward the end of Among Flowers in which 
Kincaid is inspired by the beauty of the Sacred Lake in Topke Gola. Gaz-
ing at this natural wonder, Kincaid is filled with “the joy of spectacle, the 
happiness that comes from the privilege of looking at something solely rare 
and solely uncomplicated. But the Sacred Lake plunged me into thinking of 
the unknowableness of other people” (2005, 151). From the privileged gaze 
rehearsed in the first sentence, Kincaid articulates a thoroughly anthro-
pocentric view of the landscape as “solely uncomplicated.” Yet she is then 
“plunged” by the lake, which surfaces as an agent that acts on her, imme-
diately after which she declares “the unknowableness of other people.” She 
moves from enjoying the extraordinariness of the foreign landscape to an 
assertion about how other people (like her garden) cannot be truly known, 
and this movement is prompted by a barely perceptible recognition of an 
agency that is radically Other. By reading Kincaid’s contradictions vulner-
ably, her slippages between performing as a critic of neocolonialism and as 
a bourgeois postcolonial Orientalist, we witness the shadow of a nonmas-
terful subject, one that while still tied to structural modes of violence also 
allows itself to be “plunged” by others (both human and nonhuman) into 
other orientations. While it is abroad that her seed hunting narratives most 
glaringly expose the contradictions of the bourgeois subject, it is back “at 
home” in her American garden where this nonmasterful subject begins to 
take root and grow.
Ultimately, Kincaid’s garden is one that nurtures unanswerable ques-
tions, emphasizes antagonisms, and germinates the masterful gardener’s 
future disappearance. An integral part of the gardener’s personality, Kin-
caid declares, is made up of that which is “to come” (1999, 85). As such, the 
gardener is one whose present activity is driven toward a futurity. But the 
garden is always also historical, haunted by gardeners past and by the pos-
sibilities of flourishing that have been historically stamped out: “Memory 
is a gardener’s real palette; memory as it summons up the past, memory as 
it shapes the present, memory as it dictates the future” (218– 19). As an inti-
mate political space, the garden exists in a queer temporality. For Elizabeth 
Freeman, queer temporalities are “points of resistance” to normative tem-
poral ordering, ones that “propose other possibilities for living in relation 
to indeterminately past, present, and future others: that is, of living histor-
cultIvAtIng dIscomfort 169
ically” (2010, xxii). Against what Freeman calls “chrononomativity,” which 
functions by organizing bodies to capitalize productive use, the queer time 
of the garden is one in which we can begin to “trail behind actually exist-
ing social possibilities: to be interested in the tail end of things, willing to 
be bathed in the fading light of whatever has been deemed useless” (xiii). 
Lingering in the queer temporalities of the garden—as a disruptive space 
that is always both historically haunted and future- oriented—we might 
ourselves become cultivated differently.
Seeking to define the complexity of the gardening subject and to de-
scribe its desires, Kincaid continuously shifts between her constitutive 
wonderment and fundamental hostility toward the garden. In My Garden 
(Book), she writes: “Even after many years of gardening, I never believe a 
live plant will emerge from the seed I have put in the ground; I am always 
surprised, as if it had never happened to me before, as if every time were 
the first time” (1999, 49). Here, the garden produces something unbeliev-
able for Kincaid, something bestowed with wonder precisely because the 
garden—the plants, the seeds, the soil, the perceptible and imperceptible 
beings that dwell therein—has an agency that is never reducible to the 
gardener’s will. This experience of watching nature act always as though 
for the “first time,” an experience that signals an engaged awareness of 
nature without intervening in its unfolding, is for Kincaid an essential part 
of the wonder of her garden. Yet in defining the desires of the gardener 
in the closing paragraph of the book, she explicitly casts the garden as a 
subjected adversary: “What does a gardener want? A gardener wants the 
garden to behave in the way she says, and when it does not, she will turn 
it out, abandon it, she will denounce the garden, not in general, only as it 
is particular to her, and we who come after will have to take some of what 
she loved and some of what she didn’t love, and accept that there are some 
things we cannot take because we just don’t understand them” (229). The 
gardener of the past relates to her garden as a possession, as that which 
can be abandoned and denounced when it does not “behave in the way she 
says.” While the gardener remains a subject passionate about the garden 
as a concept, she deplores her “particular” garden for not reflecting and 
confirming her mastery. Yet Kincaid is also the gardener of the future—
the “we who come after”—and in this spirit is willing to give up on the 
fantasy of mastery enacted by the earlier gardener, who may well be her 
own earlier self.
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While Kincaid registers the continuities between her wonderment toward 
and desire to hold mastery over the garden, her prose also persistently at-
tunes to the garden as an agential space. It is a space rife with uncontrollable 
and at times unwelcome life, and the recognition of this life—even when she 
explicitly disavows it—begins to upend the stability of the gardener as sov-
ereign subject. It is the garden, and its unwelcome inhabitants, that reveal 
to the gardener the fantasmatic nature of the sovereign subject. It compels 
those engaged with the garden to consider their own psychic and bodily 
materialities. Melissa Orlie argues that “each of us is not only matter but 
impersonal matter; made of stuff over which nothing is master and whose 
entirety no one is in a position to know. It is precisely when this unpalatable 
fact is glimpsed that the ego is most likely to submit to delusions of sov-
ereignty” (2010, 122). Orlie frames mastery as a delusion, an unrealizable 
fantasy most likely to appear at precisely the moment that the subject has to 
confront its vulnerability, its disavowed openness to the nonhuman and in-
human actors that materially and biologically give rise to and sustain human 
life, and to the lives and histories of other humans. Kincaid’s garden—rife 
with unexpected visitors and “willful” species—reveals the entanglements 
of the past, present, and future as it uncovers not only the gardener’s vul-
nerability but her fraught constitution as a porously bounded subject.
Always filled with thoughts of “doom” in her garden, of “thoughts of 
life beyond her own imagining” (1999, 61) that produce her discomfort, 
Kincaid returns the reader consistently to the unanswered refrain, “What 
to do?” (26). She sketches the agencies and historical trajectories of both 
garden and gardener, of colonization and its resulting transplantations, and 
in so doing asks us to weed through the tangled subjectivities of this post-
colonial moment—a moment in which mastery is both the driving force 
of the modern subject and its anticipated ruin. Here, in the work of vital 
ambivalence and the vulnerable engagements it elicits, repressed concep-
tions of personhood linger and subjectivities straddle mastery and wonder. 
Through the radical unpredictability of inheritance and of precisely not 
knowing “what to do,” Kincaid sustains a representation of the subject’s in-
congruity and vital ambivalence. This ambivalence is the vital inheritance 
that leads us toward emergent conceptions of being. The queer hope of 
dehumanism is that we might uproot our masterful subjectivities, dwelling 
within our devastated landscapes alongside other dynamic agencies that are 
making up the future with us.
Coda
Surviving Mastery
Toward the end of Aimé Césaire’s A Tempest (Une Tempête, 1969), an anti-
colonial play that rewrites and restages Shakespeare’s The Tempest, the 
slave- master Prospero articulates himself as a “prophetic scientist”: “I am 
not in any ordinary sense a master, as this savage thinks, but rather the 
conductor of a boundless score: this isle, summoning voices, I alone, and 
mingling them at my pleasure, arranging out of confusion, one intelligible 
line. Without me, who would be able to draw music from all that? This isle 
is mute without me. My duty, thus, is here, and here I shall stay” (2002, 46). 
Against the experience of his “savage” slave Caliban, who characterizes him 
as a despotic colonial ruler, Prospero envisions himself to be engaged in 
extraordinary acts of magical mastery. He distinguishes his own practices 
from other “ordinary” forms of colonial mastery, casting his unusual mas-
terful practices as works of art crafted from silence and chaos. Yet this ex-
ceptional mastery resounds with the more mainstream discourses of colo-
nialism that likewise seek to replace “chaos” with something approaching 
(but always falling short of) civility. The violent occupation of the island 
and the enforcement of slavery become not merely the white man’s burden 
but also an artistic act—a production of “one intelligible line” of music 
from voices that to him are otherwise “mute.” To colonize for Prospero is 
to “mingle” for his own pleasure the forms of life that inhabit the island. 
His creative, magical mastery is for him not merely an act of domination 
but an act of making sound in ways that are pleasurable to and for him. 
Prospero is a self- designated artist whose artistic mode is enslavement, 
and what he needs is for his slave to understand—and to appreciate—his 
exceptional force.
In the final scene of A Tempest, after the other actors have departed, 
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Caliban and Prospero remain together on the now ostensibly “postcolo-
nial” island. While no longer structurally master and slave, they remain 
firmly locked in the dynamics of mastery. Unrelentingly at odds and inca-
pable of being together without coercion, their actions and sounds become 
mixed with the rest of the “natural” world that fully inhabits—physically 
and sonically—the island. If nature has always been living and sounding 
on the island, it is only now that we come to hear it as its own character, 
its own unfolding drama. A decaying Prospero, left only with the “magic” 
of his firearms, shoots arbitrarily into space as he impotently fights against 
the “unclean nature” that surrounds him, calling for Caliban to assist him 
(Césaire 2002, 65). Off set, the audience hears “snatches” of Caliban’s on-
going freedom song, gleaned only “in the distance, above the sound of 
the surf and the chirping of birds” (66). Will the need for this song never 
cease? In this anticolonial restaging, Prospero has failed both to be master 
across the play and to relinquish his mastery at its end. So too has Cali-
ban failed, having fought for a freedom that he still cannot feel or make 
Prospero recognize. Somewhere amid this decolonizing spectrum in which 
former masters and slaves remain locked in a struggle for recognition and 
power, we can envision the desiring liberal subjects of Mahasweta Devi and 
J. M. Coetzee, or the ambivalent autobiographical Jamaica Kincaid slipping 
between botanical awe and possessive desire. Somewhere therein we might 
also become able to position our own desires and pursuits, which often and 
despite ourselves remain deeply entrenched in a logic of domination we 
have yet to understand how to relinquish.
I am not uncritical of my recurring use of the term “we” across these 
pages, but it is one I cannot do without. At the start of Unthinking Mastery, 
Hélène Cixous’s desire for unmasterful forms of being became entangled 
with my own, and these allied desires shaped a “we” that hoped toward anti-
masterful collectives. But “we” is not in any sense a given, nor is it exempt 
from its own masterful snares. Sara Ahmed, for example, sounds a caution-
ary note about the pronoun “we,” which she persuasively argues remains 
bound to a Eurocentric collective construct that includes only via a pro-
cess of violent exclusion (2006, 17). The Bush administration’s rhetoric of 
“us” versus “them” in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, for 
instance, illustrates how dangerous such conceptualizations become when 
they materialize against thousands of civilians whose maiming and deaths 
are the necessary by-products of this form of political inclusion. This “we” 
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guards itself through particular dialectical political practices, ones that rely 
increasingly on mythical constructions of those- who- are- not- us, shaping 
whole worlds beyond us as dangerous and in need of submission.
But “we” is also necessary to collectivity, to imaginary and imagined 
futures in which “we” comes to include forms of being we have not yet 
learned to recognize, to hear, or to feel. Jeanne Vaccaro writes, “ ‘We’ is an 
idea and a problem, a shape to ask after” (2015, 273). “We” is indeed a prob-
lem, one often marked by specific forms of human being and human in-
clusion. But it is, Vaccaro suggests, also a “shape” that we continue to ques-
tion, to envision, to amend. In his framing of utopia, José Esteban Muñoz 
argues that “concrete utopias are relational to historically situated struggles, 
a collectivity that is actualized or potential” (2009, 3). While these utopias 
can be “daydream- like” and exist in the “realm of educated hope,” they are 
guided by “the hopes of a collective, an emergent group, or even the soli-
tary oddball who is the one who dreams for many” (3). Here we can see 
in Muñoz’s formulation so many ways in which “we” moves between col-
lectives and singularities, in which “we” is emerging and contingent rather 
than concrete and impenetrable. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak reminds us in 
fact that the question “who are we” is part of the pedagogical exercise, one 
that cannot be answered in advance of its asking (2003, 25). My own “we” 
across Unthinking Mastery is a question as much as it is a hopeful summons 
to the (always imagined) future readers of this text who might be or might 
become invested in collective reorientations in the world. It is also funda-
mentally a dehumanist “we,” one that arises not on the grounds of Western 
scientific discourse and humanist politics but from the promises of those 
subjugated and emergent worldviews that recognize life, feel energy, and 
hear rhythms where now there appear to be none.
This always inquisitive, always revising, always expansive “we” is as 
hopeful as it is necessary for survival. In the midst of global climate change, 
of vanishing rain forests and melting polar ice caps, of “natural” disasters 
across the globe, our masterful practices are perversely plowing the soils 
of our extinction. Mastery in this sense is a diagnosis of a certain form 
of human living that is—as Unthinking Mastery has sought to pressure—
woven tightly into the fabric of our worldviews. Rather than to live by seek-
ing out forms of mastery to correct damages done, or as though we have 
reached a palliative stage as a species, I am driven by a utopian hopefulness 
in the activities of unfolding mastery in all its aspects. To survive mastery, 
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we must begin to deconstruct our own movements (intellectual, activist, 
corporeal) that remain entangled with the violent erasures of other lives, 
and of things we declare insensate. Survival depends on new forms of living 
together, gathered in collectives that promise to astonish us.
Unthinking Mastery has pointed toward twentieth- and twenty- first- 
century discourses that have aimed explicitly to disavow mastery and has 
illustrated how these discourses have often failed to theorize the absolutely 
vital links among these “historical” forms of mastery and those that con-
tinue to shape human subjectivities today. My aim has been to provoke a 
more detailed and sustained examination of mastery precisely in order to 
begin to understand the ways that, like Prospero, we engage unthinkingly 
in masterful acts that we firmly believe to be harmless, benevolent, or even 
works of art. Nonetheless, art can also open us toward forms of cohabita-
tion and being with others that have been lost, suppressed, or have yet to 
be performed. The readings of postcolonial literary texts that I have of-
fered across the book focus on a host of seemingly benevolent figures: the 
fictional writer’s more- than- human ethics, the humanitarian aid worker, 
and the impassioned gardener and ecotourist. These are subjects that are 
invested in a politics of “the good” but have remained locked within their 
own impulses toward and pursuits of mastery.
Like those anticolonial thinkers in the first half of this book who took 
seriously mastery but continued to issue its force, and like the various fic-
tional (and semifictional) characters that surfaced across the second half 
of this book, we are failures. We are failures both in our masterful pursuits 
(“nature” keeps having the last word) and, perhaps most urgently, in our 
current capacities to recognize our abiding desires for mastery even as we 
might renounce mastery politically. Kincaid’s refrain from the previous 
chapter—“what to do?”—reminds us that we cannot rely on masterful pro-
scriptions about ethics and politics, nor can we abdicate our responsibility 
to act even when we fear complicity and risk failure. In making the claim 
that we are failing in our “alternative” movements toward increasingly 
utopian worlds, I by no means wish to extinguish hope. On the contrary, 
I remain profoundly invested in envisioning and enacting utopias, through 
intimate and active imaginaries, in the work and wonder of even the most 
mundane and seemingly apolitical activities. I mean to suggest that in fail-
ure—and critically, in recognizing, reading, and becoming vulnerable to 
failure—we participate in new emergences, new possibilities for nonmas-
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terful relations. Alongside Jack Halberstam, we might say that the undo-
ing of masterful subjectivities can be located precisely in mastery’s disap-
pointments, in understanding failure as “a refusal of mastery” (2011, 11). 
The decolonial texts analyzed across Unthinking Mastery teach us that our 
“ways of inhabiting structures of knowing” are ways that obscure and legiti-
mate the masterful fracturing of particular bodies, spaces, and things (12).
When we open ourselves to the ways that texts can teach us, what we 
begin to learn is our own undoing. If it is no longer au courant to claim as 
intellectuals our “mastery” over our disciplines (and I’m not sure that it is 
not), this change of language does not undo the drive to think of ourselves 
as the active subjects of reading and the texts we read as the inanimate ob-
jects that confirm our declarative knowledge. To distance ourselves from 
mastery is, first, an act of reframing our relations to all things, regardless of 
whether in the moment we bestow them with something currently called 
“life.” From this point of departure, directionality becomes infinite and fail-
ure a process we might begin to meet with pedagogical delight.
Because our tendency has been to map history and time as and for the 
human (the histories of certain lives, certain collectivities, a certain “spe-
cies”), we register only a shallow sense of embodiment and time. Edward 
Said (1979) and Antonio Gramsci (1971) mutually insist that we compile 
inventories of the infinite traces that history has left in us as subjects. Ex-
panding Gramsci and Said, we must begin to understand that such “traces” 
far exceed human histories and the human subjectivities that history pro-
duces. While Fredric Jameson has famously urged us to “always historicize” 
(1981, 9), Christopher Breu compels us to look to histories far longer and 
more inclusively than we have done to date (2014, 28). The surface and 
deep traces that comprise us as beings are traces that entail not only other 
human lives that have touched ours but also and vitally the infinite forms of 
being that far predate and give rise to us as particularly formed subjects. At 
different moments across Unthinking Mastery, I have turned back to myself, 
sifting through some of those traces that comprise me. Those trees I have 
planted in clear- cut forests are still growing, amid words, affects, and foot-
prints also left behind. I have also deposited traces in places I have never 
been, such as in the Arctic where polar ice caps are receding and through 
absence leaving behind their own devastated traces. Those traces left in me 
and those I leave behind constitute me as a subject. We live because we have 
deposited energy and matter into the world and because forces well beyond 
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what we can see or hear or touch have embedded themselves in us and have 
enabled and sustained our existences. The impossible historical inventory 
to which we might aspire includes those ecological and material entities 
that underlie our individual and collective forms of being.
If the failures at the end of Césaire’s play resound in Prospero’s collaps-
ing but relentless worldview, and in Caliban’s as yet unachieved freedom, 
there is also extraordinary promise in engaging with and beyond this 
human deadlock. To be sure, the play’s end signals the ongoing fight for 
decolonization, a battle that has become increasingly muted by the more 
insidious processes of globalization. If colonization is masterfully coex-
tensive with liberal globalized life today, our task is to take stock of their 
abiding connections and to begin to untether them. The end of Césaire’s 
play draws us through sound explicitly toward other voices—voices that 
have always been there but that (as readers, audiences, modern subjects) 
we have been untrained to hear. The background noise of the “natural” 
world becomes foreground, and the sounds of humans become sounds that 
comingle with other increasingly more dominant sounds. The sounds of 
nature at the play’s end are always already with and among us. Listening to 
these voices, we might begin to hear other songs of survival, and to sound 
differently among them.
Introduction
 1 I capitalize “Man” in keeping with Sylvia Wynter’s differentiation between Man 
and the human. For Wynter, Man designates the particularly Western, secular, 
imperial version of the human.
 2 Some of the major thinkers within this stream of posthumanism insist that tak-
ing the human’s animality seriously not only calls into question humanist tradi-
tions but also allows us to imagine alternative forms of political being. Jacques 
Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008), for instance, which was origi-
nally a series of lectures in 1997, traces how a wide variety of philosophers, in-
cluding Aristotle, René Descartes, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Lacan, and Em-
manuel Levinas, all insist on the human difference from other animals (Derrida 
calls them animots, partly to call attention to the absurd flattening of difference 
enacted by the word “animals”) by rehearsing some version of a distinction 
between reaction (which all animals can do) and response (which is supposedly 
reserved for humans). Although Derrida does pressure how humans, based on 
this dogmatic division, conceptualize animals, he is also interested in how this 
division has caused the human to misunderstand itself (downplaying, for ex-
ample, how it also reacts more often than not). Donna Haraway’s When Species 
Meet (2008) picks up on Mary Louise Pratt’s (1992) concept of the “contact 
zone” to think about spaces (the scientific laboratory, the home where multiple 
species make mess mates, the dog show) where different species of animals 
come into contact, and about the politics and ethics that inhere in those con-
tacts. Haraway insists that “people can stop looking for some single defining 
difference between them and everybody else and understand that they are in 
rich and largely uncharted, material- semiotic, flesh- to-flesh, and face- to-face 
connection with a host of significant others” (2008, 235). Brian Massumi’s What 
Animals Teach Us about Politics (2014) turns to the animality of the human that 
is operative in play, drawing on the philosophies of Henri Bergson and Gilles 
Deleuze to see play—which is found among many animals—as the condition 
of possibility for language, art, and creative forms of political relation.
 3 New materialisms tend to assert that matter is neither inert nor passive but 
rather active, agential, and, to use Jane Bennett’s (2010) term, “vibrant.” Mel Y. 
Chen builds on Bennett’s general conception of vibrant matter in Animacies: 
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Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (2012), exploring how nonhuman 
agencies (of animals, rocks, and words) are deeply implicated in the human 
politics of race, gender, ability, and sexuality. William Connolly (2013) puts new 
materialist ontology to work in thinking about ecological politics within neo-
liberal capitalism.
 4 The term “queer inhumanisms” is the title of a 2015 special issue of glq edited 
by Dana Luciano and Mel Y. Chen in which Nyong’o’s article appears.
 5 See, for example, Timothy Brennan’s Wars of Position: The Cultural Politics of 
Left and Right (2007), Neil Lazarus’s The Postcolonial Unconscious (2011), and, 
most recently, Vivek Chibber’s Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital 
(2013).
 6 In his review of Gayatri Spivak’s A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (1999), Terry 
Eagleton suggests that “post- colonial theorists are often to be found agonising 
about the gap between their own intellectual discourse and the natives of whom 
they speak; but the gap might look rather less awesome if they did not speak a 
discourse which most intellectuals, too, find unintelligible” (1999, 3).
 7 Giorgio Agamben’s political philosophy is articulated around the concept of the 
“state of exception,” which he elaborates from Schmitt’s theories. For a sense of 
how far- reaching and influential Agamben’s reworking of Schmitt has been, 
see Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s “Homo Sacer” 
(2005), edited by Andrew Norris.
 8 For a more detailed account of the temporality of the master/slave dialectic, see 
Derrida’s Writing and Difference (1978).
 9 The asymmetry in recognition is the starting point for Glen Sean Coulthard’s 
Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (2014). 
There, Coulthard refuses recognition’s snare, arguing that “instead of usher-
ing in an era of peaceful coexistence grounded on the ideal of reciprocity or 
mutual recognition, the politics of recognition in its contemporary liberal form 
promises to reproduce the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal 
state power that Indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition have historically 
sought to transcend” (3).
 10 A postcolonial reading of Hegel will insist on a tension within this dialectical 
play, wherein the slave has always already been imagining a future in which he 
will become free.
 11 Bernasconi writes: “Hegel was certainly justified in criticizing the travel liter-
ature of his day for tantalizing readers by appearing ‘incredible’ and lacking ‘a 
determinate image or principle’ . . . but the manner in which he himself used 
that literature opens him to the charge of sensationalism as well. The accusation 
is sustained by the evidence of major and widespread distortion in his use of his 
sources” (1998, 45).
 12 According to Hegel, Africans had a “sensuousness” developed through their 
geographic location that disabled them from a “fully developed mastery of 
reality,” and they were thus excluded from the drama of world history (Berna-
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sconi 1998, 52). It was Hegel’s attempt, in fact, to prove that Africans had not yet 
reached a capacity for fixed objectivity.
Bernasconi explains, “Hegel’s claim was not just that Africans lacked what 
‘we’ call religion and the state, but also that one could not find among them a 
conception of God, the eternal, right, nature, or even of natural things. In con-
sequence, Africans could be said to be in the condition of immediacy or uncon-
sciousness. This is the basis on which Hegel characterized them as dominated 
by passion, savage, barbaric, and hence, most importantly for his discussion of 
history, at the first level” (52– 53).
Such radically slanted declarations about “Africa,” employed by Hegel in his 
choices to dramatize, selectively cite, and elide the cultural practices of Afri-
cans themselves, are what enable Bernasconi to declare that while Hegel may 
not have directly developed colonial practices, “he certainly contributed to the 
climate in which there was relatively little scrutiny of the conduct of Europeans 
in Africa” (62). Indeed, Bernasconi argues, Hegel’s endorsement of African slav-
ery did not hinge on an argument of their natural inferiority but rather on the 
fact that being subjected to slavery by European colonial powers would benefit 
Africans by bringing them into the fold of world history.
 13 Between the fall of 1804 and the end of 1805, the journal Minerva, founded by 
the German publicist Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz, published a continuing 
series about the Haitian revolution “totaling more than a hundred pages, in-
cluding source documents, news summaries, and eyewitness accounts, that in-
formed its readers not only of the final struggle for independence of this French 
colony—under the banner Liberty or Death!—but of events over the past ten 
years as well” (Buck- Morss 2000, 838). While Archenholz was critical of the 
violence of the revolution, Buck- Morss argues that he came to appreciate the 
leadership and vision of Toussaint Louverture, and that there is evidence that 
Hegel was following this series. It is odd then that in Hegel scholarship “no one 
has dared to suggest that the idea for the dialectic of lordship and bondage came 
to Hegel in Jena in the years 1803– 5 from reading the press—journals and news-
papers” (Buck- Morss 2000, 843– 44).
 14 See Chen’s Animacies (2012), which offers a new materialist account of the poli-
tics of objectification, dehumanization, and thingification through disability 
studies and queer of color critique. The glq special issue “Queer Inhumanisms” 
also makes this critical link between race and materiality through a series of 
persuasive articles.
 15 The modern human understands itself by way of its mastery. Even Heidegger 
(1982) (via Friedrich Nietzsche) anticipated the moment in which the human 
as master of the world would come to crisis when our innovative technologies 
had advanced in ways we were not yet prepared to manage.
 16 Radhakrishnan situates himself in opposition to scholars like Aijaz Ahmad, 
who argues, for instance, in his critique of Edward Said that Said’s work is “self- 
divided . . . between a host of irreconcilable positions in cultural theory” (1992, 
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168– 69). If we follow Ahmad’s critique of Said as a selective thinker whose 
highly influential thought is founded on “irreconcilable positions,” it is precisely 
here in these irreconcilabilities that we can begin to read rather than repudiate 
the subject and its ways of producing knowledge (to read Said himself, and to 
read the canon of Western literary history that Said reads with us).
1. Decolonizing Mastery
 1 See especially Ann Pellegrini’s chapter “Through the Looking Glass: Fanon’s 
Double Vision” in Performance Anxieties (1997).
 2 I discuss Robert Bernasconi’s, Susan Buck- Morss’s, and Caroline Rooney’s work 
on Hegel’s “reading” of Africa in detail in the introduction of this book.
 3 Fanon offers definitive readings of white women’s desire for black men in “The 
Man of Color and the White Woman” (1967e).
 4 T. Denean Sharpley- Whiting’s Frantz Fanon: Conflicts and Feminisms (1998) 
seeks to bridge Fanon and feminism by illustrating how to her mind the male 
revolutionary fight against racism and imperialism does not necessarily entail 
an antifeminist politics.
 5 In his examination of the concept of the “proper” in Gandhian thought, Ajay 
Skaria argues that the Gujarati word veshya (prostitute) “marks the moment 
when a certain tension within Hind Swaraj over the question of the proper be-
comes especially fraught” (2007, 219).
 6 For a more thorough gloss of the wider scope of Roy’s book, see my review of 
Alimentary Tracts (Singh 2011). For a reading of Gandhi’s vegetarianism as a 
student in England and his alliance with radical anti- Imperial groups in late 
nineteenth- century Europe, see Leela Gandhi’s “Meat: A Short Cultural History 
of Animal Welfare at the Fin- de- Siècle” (2006).
 7 Roy points to Swami Vivekananda’s “prescription of ‘beef, biceps, and Baha-
vadgita’ ” as the best known of India’s curatives to the colonial characterizations 
of Indians as “feeble” and “effeminate” (2010, 79). Contexualizing his early draw 
toward carnivory, Gandhi tells his readers in the autobiography that “a doggerel 
of the Gujarati poet Narmad was in vogue amongst us schoolboys, as follows: 
‘Behold the mighty Englishman / He rules the Indian small, / Because being a 
meat- eater / He is five cubits tall’ ” (1993, 21).
 8 Gandhi states that the force of satyagraha could be best translated as “love- 
force, soul- force, or more popularly but less accurately, passive resistance” 
(1997, 85).
 9 Derrida builds from Søren Kierkegaard’s reading of the story in Fear and Trem-
bling (1983).
 10 I have discussed Gandhi’s “animal experiments” elsewhere (Singh 2015a), but for 
readers less familiar with Gandhi it may be useful to note here that his exper-
imental practices were at the heart of this political action and included exper-
iments with sexual abstinence and diet. Often, his experiments necessitated a 
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break with or modification of his commitments to ahimsa and to brahmacharya 
in order to sustain life or to create the least possible harm in a given situation. 
These experiments and modifications, Gandhi concedes, were not always suc-
cessful in their aims, and he often invoked his failures and revised his actions 
according to them.
 11 Desai and Vahed point to South African political figures like Nelson Mandela 
who have made a point of propping up the image of a South African Gandhi 
that ignore some of the more troubling historical facts about his time there 
(2016, 23– 24).
 12 Desai and Vahed’s figures are from Jeff Guy’s Remembering the Rebellion: The 
Zulu Uprising of 1906 (2006, 170).
 13 For a detailed history of this text, see the Cambridge edition of Hind Swaraj 
(1997, lxiii– lxiv).
 14 Desai and Vahed (2016, 20) remind us that in the aftermath of his South African 
life, Gandhi would serve twice more as a stretcher- bearer for empire in 1914 at 
the start of World War I and again in 1918, revealing that Gandhi’s commitment 
to empire could not be simply relegated to the South African part of his political 
career.
 15 For a more detailed account of Gandhi’s thinking of the animal in relation to 
abstinence, the formulation of hospitality in relation to animal consumption, 
and animal friendship, see “Gandhi’s Animal Experiments” (Singh 2015a).
 16 I dwell on the question of serving meat to carnivorous humans in more detail 
in “Gandhi’s Animal Experiments” (Singh 2015a).
 17 See Anurudha Ramanujan’s “Violent Encounters: ‘Stray’ Dogs in Indian Cities” 
in Cosmopolitan Animals (2015).
 18 Other men too—even Algerian men—are excluded from Fanon’s bod(il)y 
politic of anticolonial liberation. Drawing on the biographical work of Irene 
Gendzier (1985), Fuss (1995, 161) considers how in 1953, when Fanon was ap-
pointed director of the hospital at Blida- Joinville (the largest psychiatric hos-
pital in Algeria), his psychoanalytic practice required the use of Arabic and 
Kabyle translators to treat Algerian patients. I will return to this scene in the 
next chapter, where I attend specifically to language mastery in anticolonial 
politics, but here I want to note that these translators—educated Algerian men 
employed as nurses—are disabled from pursuing advanced medical degrees 
under colonial rule. They are instrumental to Fanon’s practice (because he can-
not understand his patients without them), and they are virtually erased from 
Fanon’s own psychoanalytic accounts.
2. The Language of Mastery
 1 See Jenny Sharpe’s Allegories of Empire: The Figure of Woman in the Colonial 
Text (1993) for more on the discursive emphasis on colonized masculinities as 
perceived threats to white British women. Although Sharpe’s study focuses on 
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the Indian context, she illustrates how the fantasy of dark- skinned male bodies 
as “dangers” to white women was a critical mechanism of colonial control in the 
colonies.
 2 For an important Derridean account of Hindustani that takes up Gandhi’s lan-
guage politics, see Pritipuspa Mishra’s “The Mortality of Hindustani” (2012).
 3 As David Lelyveld illustrates, for Gandhi the name for this rashtrabhasha 
shifted across his writings, beginning with a declaration that the national lan-
guage should be Hindi, which to Gandhi’s early mind subsumed Urdu and thus 
included both Hindus and Muslims in its scope. Later, Gandhi would modify 
this to calling the rashtrabhasha “Hindi- Hindustani” to signal the inclusion of 
Persian or Arabic words, and finally he shifted the name to “Hindustani,” mov-
ing away from Hindi altogether because the term “had become irretrievably 
bound up with hostility to Urdu” (Lelyveld 2001, 73).
 4 This simplified account of the purity of the mother will come to be complicated 
through Melanie Klein’s feminist psychoanalytic readings of the maternal rela-
tion, in which for her there is no “pure” relation between mother and child that 
is not always already caught up in destruction (1964). The aim for Klein, unlike 
Gandhi, is not to find a way out of this destruction but rather to understand that 
affection and aggression are not separable affects.
 5 I return to this idea of the “aping” and being “like” the human in chapter 4 in my 
discussion of Animal’s People (Sinha 2007) and The Lives of Animals (Coetzee 
1999). There, we will see how being “like” becomes in Animal’s People a critical 
and political generative difference, and how this “aping” gesture in The Lives of 
Animals becomes for the protagonist Costello an act of self- dispossession and 
a hopeful movement toward her animality.
 6 Macaulay’s famous “Minute on Indian Education,” delivered to the British par-
liament in 1835, formulated language as a central problem in the goal of produc-
ing semicivilized colonial subjects. Macaulay argued that the dialects of India 
“contain neither literary nor scientific information, and are, moreover, so poor 
and rude that, until they are enriched from some other quarter, it will not be 
easy to translate any valuable work into them” (1835, 2). Here the ineptitude of 
the native language inhibits the transformation of the colonial subject into fru-
ition as “a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in 
opinions, in morals, and in intellect” (8).
 7 The mastery of languages is an explicitly stated goal in the 1965 Levin Report on 
the state of the field of comparative literature. While this language disappears 
in the 1993 Bernheimer Report, at least two of the respondents to this report—
Michael Riffaterre and Elizabeth Fox- Genovese—take issue with the shift away 
from language mastery toward what they see as the encroachment of cultural 
studies. All these texts can be found in Comparative Literature in the Age of 
Multiculturalism (1995), edited by Charles Bernheimer.
notes to chApter three 183
3. Posthumanitarian Fictions
 1 Indra Sinha’s novel Animal’s People (2007), to which I turn in the next chapter, 
can be read as posthumanitarian fiction. For my discussion of the novel in this 
frame, see Singh 2015b.
 2 See Lisa Smirl’s Spaces of Aid: How Cars, Compounds and Hotels Shape Human-
itarianism (2015) for a nuanced account of the forces “in the field” that impede 
humanitarian aid practices. Smirl argues that “almost every aid worker comes 
to ‘the field’ with the intention to improve other people’s lives. But as aid dollars 
become ever more scarce and aid workers are increasingly the target of violent 
attacks, a careful examination of why it seems so difficult to merely ‘do good’ is 
drastically needed” (xv). In the documentary Assistance mortelle (2013), the Hai-
tian filmmaker Raoul Peck wades into the complexities of humanitarian efforts 
in the aftermath of the earthquake that devastated Haiti in 2010. Peck’s film 
illustrates how workers, despite their best intentions and despite the record- 
breaking international aid funds sent to repair damages, quickly become en-
snared in bureaucracies that render their work ineffective.
 3 In Complicities: The Intellectual and Apartheid (2002), Sanders addresses the 
role of the intellectual in apartheid by theorizing complicity as that which is en-
folded in every act and articulation of opposition. He therefore casts opposition 
as nondialectical.
 4 In Identification Papers (1995), Diana Fuss charts the function of identification 
as a concept within psychoanalysis and identity politics, detailing how identi-
fication is simultaneously part of how a subject is formed and a crucial force 
that “calls . . . identity into question” (2). Lynn Hunt’s (2007) account of the 
invention of human rights deploys a much less nuanced version of identifica-
tion, attending only to the identity- building function of identification to think 
about what happens between readers and texts that generate the emotion she 
calls “empathy” (see especially chapter 1, “Torrents of Emotion”).
 5 Over and above this double identification produced by the form of these texts, 
in my own reading of “Little Ones” it becomes virtually impossible to ignore 
the uncanny repetition of Singh’s name, which calls me into an uncomfortable 
proximity to the story’s protagonist. His descent into madness at the end of the 
narrative thus compels me toward a radical revision of the narratives that have 
shaped me.
 6 For an extended discussion of friendship and its relations to politics within 
Western philosophy (from Aristotle through Nietzsche via Michel de Mon-
taigne), see Jacques Derrida’s Politics of Friendship (1997). Derrida explores the 
tension between an “equality” among friends posited in what Aristotle calls 
“primary friendship” (23) and friendships, such as Nietzsche’s “philosophers of 
the future,” structured by certain kinds of dissymmetry (36) that are, neverthe-
less, characterized by forms of reciprocity or responsibility that are in no sense 
at play between the medical officer and his patient.
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 7 While the emphasis here is on how government programs and the actions of 
Singh and other bureaucrats are implicated in the distribution of resources that 
produces the differentiated bodies of Singh and the adivasi, Jane Bennett’s Vi-
brant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2010) allows us to begin to consider 
the food itself as agential here: “Food, as a self- altering, dissipative materiality, 
is also a player. It enters into what we become. It is one of the many agencies 
operative in the moods, cognitive dissipations, and moral sensitivities that we 
bring to bear as we engage the questions of what to eat, how to eat, and when to 
stop” (51).
 8 Agamben (1998) develops the concept of “bare life” (a phrase he borrows from 
Walter Benjamin) in order to account for what he calls, after Foucault, biopoli-
tics. His theory depends on thresholds or “zones of indistinction” that separate 
the properly political from its outside. This zone of indistinction passes through 
the human itself: “There is politics because man is the living being who, in 
language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same 
time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion” 
(8). Agamben, following Arendt, principally builds his account of this “bare 
life” through analysis of concentration and refugee camps, where humans are 
reduced to being “bare life.”
4. Humanimal Dispossessions
 1 I am inspired by and indebted to the work of my extraordinary former student 
Kerry Boland, who in her evocative undergraduate senior thesis teased out the 
vital links between the novel’s treatment of the human/animal and its queer 
sexual politics (Boland 2014).
 2 The reading I offer of Coetzee’s text here was originally published as “The Tail 
End of Disciplinarity” (Singh 2013).
 3 In the preface to the first volume of Subaltern Studies, which would become a 
highly influential series across the social sciences and humanities, the South 
Asian historian Ranajit Guha begins with a declaration that the aim of the sub-
altern studies project is “to promote a systematic and informed discussion of 
subaltern themes in the field of South Asian studies, and thus help to rectify the 
elitist bias characteristic of much research and academic work in this particular 
area” (1982, vii).
 4 It is important to note here that the dominant interpretation of the story has 
been one that reads the ape as a figure for the Jew. In this sense, Red Peter be-
comes a symbol of Kafka himself, as an intellectual whose Jewishness marginal-
izes him within the academy. This is precisely the kind of reading that obscures 
the other particularities of Red Peter, his animality, and our abilities as inter-
locutors to think/feel our way toward him as (another) animal.
 5 Homi Bhabha’s (1994) formulation of (post)colonial mimicry comes to bear ex-
plicitly here on animal studies. It is not simply that Red Peter “apes” his human 
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masters but that in the act of this aping he performs humanity in a style that 
begins to unfold the always performative aspects of humanity itself. We come 
to see the performativity of the human through the performance of the ape- as-
human. In this sense, we become mimics of our own species.
 6 See chapter 1, in which I illustrate through analyses of the language of Gandhi 
and Fanon how the animal emerges as a split, contestatory site in the framing 
of properly human subjectivities.
5. Cultivating Discomfort
 1 I came to Jodi Byrd’s The Transit of Empire (2011) in the late production stages of 
Unthinking Mastery. Her work is informed by indigenous perspectives as they 
challenge and redress settler colonial logics and postcolonial studies. Byrd em-
phasizes the concept of transit as it functions as a foundational settler erasure of 
indigenous peoples. I see her work as a vital site for unmasterful intellectual and 
political engagements, and as a sister text in the desire to redress and mobilize 
postcolonial discourse.
 2 I am thinking here with the beautiful work of José Esteban Muñoz in Cruising 
Utopia (2009).
 3 Radhakrishnan’s work departs from a refutation of Aijaz Ahmad’s (1992) cri-
tique of postcolonial studies, in which he reads ambivalence as a problem for 
the postcolonial project that registers its ineffectuality.
 4 J. M. Coetzee’s Life & Times of Michael K (1983) becomes an interesting novel to 
pair with Kincaid’s garden prose. While at its surface Kincaid’s bourgeois garden 
appears opposite to Coetzee’s depiction of the abjection of the gardening subject 
under the force of apartheid, both offer “alternative” readings of the subject in 
relation to gardening practice that complicate the Eurocentric legacies of this 
subject. For a reading of Coetzee’s novel in relation to ecocritical discourse, see 
Anthony Vital’s “Toward an African Ecocriticism: Postcolonialism, Ecology and 
Life & Times of Michael K” (2008).
 5 Recent critical works on the intersections between postcolonial studies and en-
vironmental politics include Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin’s Postcolonial 
Ecocriticism: Literature, Animals, Environment (2010); Bonnie Roos and Alex 
Hunt’s Postcolonial Green: Environmental Politics and World Narratives (2010); 
Elizabeth DeLoughrey and George B. Handley’s Postcolonial Ecologies: Litera-
tures of the Environment (2011); and Rob Nixon’s Slow Violence and the Environ-
mentalism of the Poor (2011).
 6 DeLoughrey and Handley’s argument resonates with a body of literature look-
ing to expand Foucault’s project by pressuring his avoidance of the colonial 
project. See Ann Laura Stoler’s Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s “His-
tory of Sexuality” and the Colonial Order of Things (1995) and Carnal Knowledge 
and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (2002); Alexander G. 
Weheliye’s Habeus Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Femi-
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nist Theories of the Human (2014); and Sylvia Wynter’s “Unsettling the Colonial-
ity of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, after Man, Its Over-
representation—An Argument” (2003).
 7 Thus “sovereignty is antiecological” (Smith 2011, xiii). Rejecting the common 
thought that “without sovereignty . . . nature cannot be preserved from being 
treated as a resource” (xiii), Smith turns to anarchist politics to think about an 
ecology that rejects territorial sovereignty.
 8 Kincaid’s critique of the imperial politics of naming rhymes with Jacques Derri-
da’s (2008) critique of the French word “animaux,” which forcibly erases differ-
ences between myriad animals into a single concept. Derrida’s critique and his 
proposal of “animot” as a way to signal the violence of naming are discussed in 
chapter 4.
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